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Abstract
What are moral values and where do they come from? David Hume
argued that moral values were the product of a range of passions,
inherent to human nature, that aim at the common good of society.
Recent developments in game theory, evolutionary biology, animal
behaviour, psychology and neuroscience suggest that Hume was right to
suppose that humans have such passions. This dissertation reviews these
developments, and considers their implications for moral philosophy. I
first explain what Darwinian adaptations are, and how they generate
behaviour. I then explain that, contrary to the Hobbesian caricature of life
in the state of nature, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that
organisms will be social, cooperative and even altruistic under certain
circumstances. I introduce four main types of cooperation – kin altruism,
coordination to mutual advantage, reciprocity and conflict resolution –
and provide examples of ‘adaptations for cooperation’ from nonhuman
species. I then review the evidence for equivalent adaptations for
cooperation in humans. Next, I show how this Humean-Darwinian
account of the moral sentiments can be used to make sense of traditional
positions in meta-ethics; how it provides a rich deductive framework in
which to locate and make sense of a wide variety of apparently
contradictory positions in traditional normative ethics; and how it clearly
demarcates the problems of applied ethics. I defend this version of ethical
naturalism against the charge that it commits ‘the naturalistic fallacy’. I
conclude that evolutionary theory provides the best account yet of the
origins and status of moral values, and that moral philosophy should be
thought of as a branch of natural history.
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Chapter 1 – Updating Hume
[M]orals and politics would be very interesting if discussed like
any branch of natural history.
– Charles Darwin1
Introduction
What is morality and where does it come from? In the history of moral
philosophy, there have been theological, cosmological, biological and
sociological answers to this question. Some have argued that moral
values are "thoughts in the mind of God". Some have argued that moral
values are the products of rational reflection on objective truths about the
universe, similar to mathematical truths. Some have argued that moral
values are a product of human nature. And some have argued that moral
values are merely social conventions or local cultural norms.
In his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume set out to give an
explanation of morality that was consistent with the rest of the natural
sciences. As John Mackie observes, Hume saw the problem as follows:
Here is this curious phenomenon, human morality, a cluster
of attitudes, dispositions, practices, behavioural tendencies,
and so on that we find almost universally among men, even
in different societies and at different times; why is it there,
and how did it develop? . . . [This question] may be
answered in sociological and psychological terms, by
constructing and defending a casual hypothesis; this is what
Hume has done. . . . [The Treatise] is an attempt to study and
explain moral phenomena (as well as human knowledge
and emotions) in the same sort of way in which Newton and
his followers studied and explained the physical world.2
                                                 
1 Quoted in: Cronin, 1992, p99.
2 Mackie, 1980, p6.
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Hume argued that morality is a product of human nature. According to
Hume, the behaviour of humans (and other animals) is a product of
passion and reason. Passion sets the goals of action, and reason works out
how to achieve them. Some of these passions – for example, sympathy –
are designed to promote ‘the common good’ of society. Hume called
these ‘moral passions’. The moral passions provide the springs of moral
action and the criteria by which to judge the actions of others. The goals
of these moral passions constitute the ‘natural virtues’; and the ingenious
ways that people found to extend the reach of the natural virtues –
through invention and convention – constitute the ‘artificial virtues’.3
By introducing ‘the experimental method of reasoning into moral
subjects’ and placing the study of morality on a naturalistic and empirical
footing, Hume left open the possibility that his account of morality could
be updated in line with advances in science. The purpose of this thesis is
to provide just such an update. I argue that Hume was basically correct
about the origin and status of morality, and that we are now in a position
to update Hume’s account in line with what modern science tells us about
the world and about our place in it.4
Outline of the thesis
The Darwinian update of Hume begins in Chapter 2 by placing the study
of human nature and human behaviour in the context of modern
evolutionary biology. According to the evolutionary account of
psychology: ‘passions’ become a particular kind of ‘adaptation’; ‘values’
become the goals that adaptations attempt to achieve; ‘reason’ becomes
the information-processing that adaptations perform; and ‘beliefs’
become the states that adaptations can adopt. I show how this account of
psychology incorporates the key insights of Hume’s account whilst
avoiding some of its problems.
                                                 
3 Hume, 1739/1985.
4 “It is customary to study the works of these great political philosophers with the tools of textual
analysis and intellectual history. One considers the writer’s intellectual coherence or historical
context rather than subjecting his theory to currently available scientific evidence. . . [but] the
theories put forth by political philosophers [about human nature] can be evaluated more or less
objectively." Masters, 1991, p144.
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The next two chapters update Hume’s account of the moral passions with
what is now known about the evolution of ‘adaptations for cooperation’
in humans and other animals.
Chapter 3 shows that, contrary to the Hobbesian caricature of life in the
state of nature, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that organisms will
be motivated to cooperate and even be altruistic under certain
circumstances. I introduce the adaptive problems represented by the four
main types of cooperation – kin altruism, coordination to mutual
advantage, reciprocity and conflict resolution – and provide examples of
adaptive solutions from nonhuman species. In this way, evolutionary
theory provides an explanation for the social behaviour of plants and
animals. Biology can explain why and how organisms care for their
offspring and their wider families, aggregate in herds, work in teams,
practise a division of labour, communicate, share food, trade favours,
build alliances, punish cheats, exact revenge, settle disputes peacefully,
provide altruistic displays of status, and respect property.
Chapter 4 reviews the evidence for equivalent ‘adaptations for
cooperation’ in humans. These include: adaptations for maternal care and
for assessing paternity; ‘theory of mind’ and language; cheater-detection
mechanisms and ‘punitive sentiment’; costly and altruistic signals of
fitness; and recognition and respect for private property. I also review the
ways in which humans can be said to have ‘extended their moral
phenotypes’ through the use of tools. I then show how this Darwinian
account of human adaptations for cooperation corresponds to the
Humean account of human moral passions.
Chapter 5 summarises the ‘moral philosophy’ that emerges from this
naturalistic account of morality. I show that the view that moral values
are the proximate goals of adaptations for cooperation makes sense of a
variety of positions in traditional meta-ethics. I show that an account of
the content of adaptations for cooperation provides a rich deductive
framework in which to locate and make sense of a wide variety of
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otherwise unruly, and apparently contradictory, positions in traditional
normative moral philosophy. And I show how the account of decision-
making implicit in evolutionary psychology provides a framework for the
investigation of moral reasoning and moral discussion in the context of
applied ethics.
Chapter 6 defends this Humean-Darwinian account of morality against
the charge that it commits ‘the naturalistic fallacy’. I show that ‘the
naturalistic fallacy’ refers to a variety of different arguments, none of
which pose any challenge to the Humean-Darwinian version of ethical
naturalism.
Finally, Chapter 7 considers the future of ethics from this naturalistic
perspective. I argue that if morality is an adaptation, then moral
philosophy should be thought of as a branch of natural history, and moral
philosophers should be biologists, psychologists and anthropologists. I
then review some of the problems that such a naturalised moral
philosophy should be tackling. These include: extending the list of
adaptive problems of cooperation; filling the gaps in the existing
empirical literature on moral psychology; and assessing whether Stone-
Age intuitions continue to provide efficient solutions to Space-Age
collective-action problems.
Historical precedents
The attempt to apply evolution to ethics is not new. Charles Darwin
himself argued that "the moral sense" was an adaptation, designed by
natural selection to facilitate cooperation between members of tribes.5 But
in the years immediately following Darwin, the opportunity to use the
theory of evolution by natural selection to shed some light on the origins
and status of moral values was squandered. For much of the 20th century,
the idea that morality was an adaptation was overlooked in favour of
theories that used evolution as a metaphor or fable of moral progress, or
took various features of evolution or its products as the criteria of moral
                                                 
5 Darwin, 1871.
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worth. These theories did much to bring 'evolutionary ethics' into
disrepute.6
Evolutionary ethics didn't really return to the idea that morality was an
adaptation until the flowering of evolutionary theory in the 1960s and 70s
– as represented by the work of William Hamilton, George Williams,
Robert Trivers, John Maynard Smith and Richard Dawkins.7 EO Wilson
can perhaps be credited with getting the ball rolling again. In Sociobiology,
his massive synthesis of animal behaviour, he suggested that "Scientists
and humanists should consider together the possibility that the time has
come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the
philosophers and biologicized".8 In subsequent years, Peter Singer has
argued that "human ethics has its origins in evolved patterns of
behaviour among social animals".9 Robert Trivers has argued that our
"sense of fairness", and emotions such as amity, revenge, gratitude,
sympathy, guilt, and a sense of justice, can be explained as adaptations
for cooperation.10 Robert Frank and a host of other 'behavioural
economists' have argued that many human emotions – such as guilt, or
revenge – can be seen as natural selection's solutions to various collective-
action problems.11 Geoffrey Miller has argued that human morality is a
result of sexual selection: "a system of sexually selected handicaps – costly
indicators that advertise our moral character".12 Even John Rawls sees
human moral sentiments as "the outcome of natural selection". "[T]he
capacity for a sense of justice and the moral feelings," says Rawls, "is an
adaptation of mankind to its place in nature."13 And, closest to my own
project, Michael Ruse sees himself as providing a Darwinian update of
                                                 
6 Farber, 1994.
7 Dawkins, 1976; Hamilton, 1964; Maynard Smith, 1982; Trivers, 1971; Williams, 1966.
8 Wilson, 1975, p562.
9 Singer, 1981, p29.
10 Trivers, 1983; Trivers, 1971.
11 Elster, 1999; Frank, 1988; Nesse, 2001b; Schelling, 1978.
12 “We have the capacity for moral behavior and moral judgments today," argues Miller, "because
our ancestors favoured sexual partners who were kind, generous, helpful, and fair.” Miller, 2000a,
p294, p292.
13 Rawls, 1971, pp503-4. Other notable attempts to investigate morality from an evolutionary or
biological perspective include: Alexander, 1987; Arnhart, 1998; de Waal, 1996.
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Hume, and has argued that “Darwinian meta-ethics . . . is almost exactly
what one would expect from the pen of Hume, were he writing today.”14
My account differs from these previous versions of evolutionary ethics in
several important ways.
First, some theorists have been unclear as to the status of their argument,
and have ended up moving from biological facts about human nature to
normative statements about how we ought to live. (And have thus
become unnecessarily tangled up in "the naturalistic fallacy".) The most
important feature of Humean-Darwinian ethics is that it is primarily a
meta-ethical theory about what values are. It is not a simple-minded attempt
to derive normative statements from descriptive premises. In this respect,
Humean-Darwinian ethics is no different from other meta-ethical theories
– such as the view that values are thoughts in the mind of God, or
arbitrary social conventions, or the conclusion of rational reflection – that
begin by stating what, in fact, values are.
Second, many theorists have been unclear about the difference between
gene-level and individual-level selection. Despite works with such
unambiguous titles as The Selfish Gene, they have persisted in assuming
that natural selection operates at the level of the individual and that, as a
result, evolutionary theory expects individuals to be selfish.15 Individual
altruism is then seen as an anomaly to be explained by something other
than evolutionary biology, or by postulating mechanisms that 'constrain'
natural selfishness and rationality. In this thesis I take it for granted that
genes are the units of selection, that under certain circumstances selfish
genes will build selfless people, and that it is not necessary to go outside
mainstream biology to explain human altruism.
                                                 
14 Ruse, 1986, p266. "I think of my position as being essentially that of David Hume brought up
to date by Charles Darwin. . . . Hume is my mentor because he went before me in trying to
provide a completely naturalist theory of ethics. He was no evolutionist, but he wanted to base his
philosophy in tune with the best science of his day." Ruse, 1995, p256. Dennett discusses how
close Hume came to foreshadowing the theory of evolution itself: Dennett, 1995, p28-33.
15 "[T]he unit of selection in the Darwinian model is the individual. . . . If human nature, too, was
shaped by the forces of natural selection, the apparently inescapable conclusion is that people's
behaviour must be fundamentally selfish". Frank, 1988, p23.
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Third, some evolutionary theorists have taken the Aristotelian view that
the good life consists of fully developing and expressing all one's natural
faculties; and that the significance of evolutionary theory is that it reveals
what is natural for humans. These theorists then have to defend the
premis that 'what is natural is good'. Humean-Darwinian naturalism
makes no such assumption. Instead of taking all natural human goals as
the standard of good, the Humean-Darwinian account takes ‘the common
good’ as the standard, and uses this criterion to distinguish moral goals
from the rest. Hence the account does not argue that all natural goals are
good, but merely that good goals happen to be natural, which is a very
different proposition.
Fourth, many theories have emphasised some adaptations for
cooperation but not others. This results in an attempt to shoehorn all
ethical phenomena into a few explanatory theories. When that fails, the
conclusion is usually that there is ‘more to ethics than evolution’. In this
thesis I emphasise that there are many pathways to the evolution of
human moral sentiments, and discuss four main categories of adaptations
for cooperation – kin altruism, coordination to mutual advantage,
reciprocity and conflict resolution. As far as I can tell, this has not been
done before in evolutionary ethics. I show how starting from this broader
base provides a more secure foundation for evolutionary ethics, and I
argue that only after providing the most comprehensive treatment of
adaptations for cooperation will we be in a position to assess whether or
not there is more to ethics than evolution.
The current terrain
There exists in contemporary moral philosophy something of a standoff
between scientists and philosophers. Scientists have in their possession a
working model of moral psychology, but they don’t realise that,
according to Hume at least, this is also a theory of moral value. As a
result, they are reluctant to draw any conclusions about morality per se for
fear of trespassing on moral philosopher's turf and coming face to face
with the fearsome ‘naturalistic fallacy’. Moral philosophers, meanwhile,
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express a passing interest in the biologist's endeavours but, chastened by
previous dalliances with evolutionary theory, and convinced that theirs is
a discipline set apart from natural science, argue that evolution can be of
little relevance to ethics.16 But moral philosophers cannot avoid making
empirical assumptions about the way that the world works, about human
nature, or about the nature of moral values. The result is that moral
philosophers often fall back on intuitive, folk, ancient and medieval
theories of psychology when investigating human morality.
This standoff cannot continue indefinitely. The scientists’ model of moral
psychology is set to improve in the wake of discoveries in genetics,
animal behaviour, developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience,
artificial intelligence, robotics, and brain-imaging. There will come a time
when it is no longer possible to ignore the chasm between what science is
telling us about human nature and morality, and the outdated framework
in which moral philosophy is conducted. At this point, scientists and
philosophers will realise that they need to work together in order to
identify the genuine problems of moral philosophy and to make progress
towards their solutions. The over-arching purpose of this thesis is to bring
about this new way of conducting moral philosophy sooner rather later.
                                                 
16 For a recent manifestation of anti-naturalism in contemporary ethics, see: Held, 2002.
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Chapter 2 – The origin of value
[I]t is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that
should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate
philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking.
– G. E. M. Anscombe17
Introduction
According to David Hume’s account of psychology, human behaviour is
the product of desires (or ‘passions’), reason and belief. Desires set the
goals of action; and reason operates over beliefs to work out how to
achieve these goals. Hume thought that values should be understood as
the product of desire. Desires determine what states of the world humans
find agreeable, pleasurable, and valuable. Hume thought that desires
project value on to the world in much the same way that the visual
system projects colour onto the world; and he dismissed as ‘vulgar
philosophy’ the idea that values, or colours, exist independently of
human nature.
The purpose of this chapter is to ground Hume’s psychology in modern
evolutionary biology, and thereby present a Darwinian update of his
subjectivist theory of value. To this end, I review: how evolution by
natural selection gives rise to adaptations; how adaptations pursue goals;
and how the goals of adaptations can provide a theory of value.
According to the Darwinian update of Hume, a ‘desire’ is a particular
kind of adaptation; a ‘value’ is the goal that an adaptation attempts to
achieve; and objects or states of the world are ‘valuable’ to the extent that
they are conducive to achieving that goal. I end the section by explaining
why Humean ethical naturalism is to be preferred over Aristotelian
ethical naturalism.
An additional advantage of the Darwinian update is that its account of
information processing overcomes several problems with Hume’s
                                                 
17 Anscombe, 1981, p26.
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psychology that have to do with how organisms acquire knowledge
about their environments. Hence I argue that ‘reason’ should be seen as
the information-processing that adaptations perform; and ‘belief’ should
be seen as the different states that adaptations can adopt. And I show
how this model of reasoning overcomes various versions of ‘the frame
problem’ and ‘the problem of induction’.
Hume’s purpose in setting out a naturalistic, ‘desire theory’ of value was
to lay the foundations for a naturalistic, ‘desire theory’ of moral value.18 In
a similar way, the discussion of the nature of adaptations in this chapter
sets the scene for the discussion of adaptations for cooperation in the next
chapter.
Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection
Why do giraffes have long necks? Why are plants and animals so
exquisitely well-suited to their environments? Why do species change,
and where do new species come from? What is life, and how did life start
in the first place? Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural
selection provides an answer to all these questions.19
Darwin observed that, in a given population of plants or animals,
individuals varied slightly in their ability to survive and reproduce. He
also noted that individuals passed these abilities on to their offspring.
Darwin then showed that if there were competition for the scarce
resources needed to survive and reproduce, it would inevitably follow
that the composition of the population would change. Individuals with
traits that were better-suited to survival and reproduction would have
more offspring, and hence these traits would become relatively more
common in subsequent generations. So, for example, suppose that in a
population of giraffes, a) some have longer necks than others, b) offspring
inherit ‘neck length’ from their parents, and c) longer necks enable the
giraffes to reach more leaves and subsequently have more offspring than
                                                 
18 See Ernest C. Mossner’s introduction to Hume, 1739/1985.
19 Darwin, 1859.
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giraffes with shorter necks. If these three conditions hold, then it will
inevitably follow that the average neck length of the giraffes in the
population will increase over time. Given a constant supply of variation,
this process could go on indefinitely, with members of the population
accumulating features that enabled them to survive and reproduce better
in their respective environments. Populations of similar organisms living
in different environments may evolve in completely different directions,
giving rise to new species. Conversely, if you were to wind the tape
backwards, you would see complicated organisms evolving from simpler
common ancestors, all the way back to the first glimmers of life: the
chemicals in the primordial soup that had the unusual property of
making copies of themselves.
Whereas Darwin focused on individual organisms as the locus of
adaptation, modern biologists now focus on genes.20 This is because
individuals do not make replicas of themselves when they reproduce; but
their genes do. As Richard Dawkins puts it: "The true unit of natural
selection has to be a unit of which you can say it has frequency. It has a
frequency which goes up when its type is successful, down when it fails.
This is exactly what you can say of [buffalo] genes in gene pools. But you
can't say it of individual buffaloes. Successful buffaloes don't become
more frequent."21 According to this ‘gene’s eye view’ of evolution, genes
replicate themselves by virtue of the effects that they have on the world.
These effects include the construction of organisms. (Organisms can
therefore be seen as the means by which genes replicate.) Genes that
equip organisms with traits that are better-suited to survive and
reproduce under prevailing conditions become more frequent in the
                                                 
20 Dawkins, 1976; Williams, 1966.
21 Dawkins, 1998b, p217. The view that natural selection consists of the differential replication of
genes is often, erroneously, thought to contradict the view that biological systems are organised
hierarchically into levels such as chromosomes, cells, individuals, and groups. However, these
two views are not in conflict. It is simply the case that genes replicate themselves by means of
their effects on the world, and that these effects include the formation of chromosomes, cells,
individuals, groups and so on. The problem for biology is to specify the conditions under which
genes for such 'higher-order' entities are favoured. (As a part of that project, this thesis aims to
explain how gene-selection can give rise to adaptations for cooperation between individuals.) For
this reason it is useful to distinguish between the "unit of selection" (which is always the gene)
and the "level of adaptation" (which can be at any point along the resulting phenotype). For an
overview of recent literature in this area, see: Keller, 1999.
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population – the gene pool – than alternative genes (alleles). This process
of differential replication is called natural selection; the resulting gradual
change in the frequency of genes in the population is called evolution; and
resulting well-designed replication-promoting features of organisms are
called adaptations.
Adaptations and their goals
Biologists often distinguish between the ultimate and proximate goals of an
adaptation. The ultimate goal of an adaptation is always to promote
genetic replication; but, as we shall see, adaptations achieve this ultimate
goal by pursuing a variety of more immediate or proximate goals, such as
maintaining a certain body temperature, finding food, resisting parasites,
or attracting mates.22 In order to give a rounded picture of how
adaptations achieve their proximate goals, it is necessary to draw
attention to three aspects of the ways that adaptations can work:
conditionality, movement and feedback.
Conditionality and information-processing
Adaptations – and the bundles of adaptations called organisms – can be
seen as the genes’ ‘hypotheses’ (theories, expectations, assumptions)
about how to replicate in the kind of world into which they will be born.23
Mutation generates novel hypotheses, and natural selection puts these
hypotheses to the test, retaining the successful ones. So, a bird's wing is a
hypothesis about how to get from A to B given the principles of
aerodynamics; a snail’s shell is a hypothesis about how to protect the
snail’s body given the earth's gravity and the typical strength of
predators; a polar bear's fur is a hypothesis about how to remain hidden
from prey given the colour of the world that it will inhabit; and so on.24 In
                                                 
22 As George Williams puts it: “Each part of the animal is organized for some function tributary to
the ultimate goal of the survival of its own genes." Williams, 1966, pp255-6. The ultimate-
proximate distinction is often used to distinguish between why and how questions. So, sometimes
biologists are interested in why natural selection designed an adaptive mechanism in a particular
way; at other times, biologists are interested in how a given adaptation works.
23 Dawkins, 1976, p55; Popper, 1972.
24 Of course, none of these predictions need be explicit; the phenotype might not make any
'mention' of the level of gravity. It's just that we can see these adaptations as having been built on
- 19 -
this sense, thanks to millions of years of trial-and-error on the part of
natural selection, organisms come into the world knowing what to
expect.25
Some adaptations – such as the snail’s shell – ‘expect’ a certain aspect of
the world to be stable, and do their job of promoting replication (in this
case, by protecting the snail’s body from physical trauma) by remaining
relatively fixed. Other adaptations ‘expect’ the world to vary, and do their
job by adopting different states under different conditions.26 These
‘conditional’ adaptations are ‘uncertain’ about which state to adopt; the
uncertainty is resolved – a decision is taken – by attending to the
conditions specified by the adaptation.27 For example, a certain species of
sea moss ‘expects’ that it will sometimes be preyed upon by sea slugs.
This moss has the option of growing defensive spikes to protect against
the predatory slugs. But the spikes are costly, and they are worth growing
only if the slugs are present. Hence the sea moss is sensitive to the
particular chemical cue indicating the presence of the slugs, and operates
according to the rule: “If slugs, then spikes”.28
In the moss’s case there are only two possible states, and so the degree of
prior uncertainty is halved when the slugs are detected. In information
theory, the reduction of uncertainty by one half constitutes one ‘bit’ of
information; hence the moss’s adaptation is a one-bit information-
processor.29 Conditional adaptations can of course consist of an
indefinitely large number of rules. Such adaptations are uncertain about
more aspects of their world, process more information before making a
                                                                                                                                     
the assumption that the world works in a certain way. Consequently, a Martian biologist would be
able to infer the gravitational pull of the earth by inspecting the snail’s shell.
25 "The tentative solutions which animals and plants incorporate into their anatomy and their
behaviour are biological analogues of theories . . . Just like theories, organs and their functions
are tentative adaptations to the world we live in." Popper, 1972, p145.
26 Natural selection will favour conditional phenotypic effects when the benefits of changing state
in response to changes in environmental conditions outweigh the costs of setting up the
machinery required to do so. Godfrey-Smith, 1996.
27 Other terms for conditional adaptations include: facultative, plastic, 'if/then' rules, and
conditional strategies.
28 As this example illustrates, a conditional adaptation embodies “a genetically based program
(decision rule) that results [in]. . . alternative phenotypes (tactics)”; and this program operates
“through a mechanism (physiological, neurological, or developmental) that detects appropriate
cues and puts the strategy's decision rule into effect . . . ". Gross and Repka, 1998, p169-70.
29 Dawkins, 1998a; Dawkins and Dawkins, 1973.
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decision, and hence are capable of generating more sophisticated
behaviour.30
Movement and motivation
Some conditional adaptations result in movement. These adaptations are
uncertain about the location of various adaptive targets and hazards, and
are equipped with systems that allow them to detect and move towards
some things and away from others. Some single-cell organisms, for
example, migrate up chemical gradients towards food; heliotropic plants
move their leaves so as to maintain maximum exposure to sunlight.31 But
the “trick of rapid movement” has been developed most by the group of
organisms known as animals.32 Whereas plants tend to sit and wait for the
good things in life to come to them, animals are go-getters.33
For example, noctuid moths are equipped with bat-avoider mechanisms.
The moth's wing muscle is connected, via its nervous system, to an 'ear'
on the opposite side. The moth's ear is sensitive only to the echolocation
frequency of an approaching predatory bat. It operates like a simple
circuit, which we might describe as embodying the strategy: "If 60khz,
then dive". When the sonar hits the ear, the switch is triggered, the muscle
is turned off, and the moth tumbles out of harm's way.34
                                                 
30 As Daniel Dennett has said: “Switches (either on/off or multiple choice) can be linked to each
other in series, in parallel, and in arrays that combine both sorts of links. As arrays proliferate,
forming larger switching networks, the degrees of freedom multiply dizzyingly…”. Dennett,
2003, p162.
31 Darwin, 1880/1994.
32 Dawkins, 1976, p47.
33 In plants, communication between effector and detector cells is largely chemical. In animals, it
is electric. This allows animals to update their state in response to a changing world at speeds fast
enough to avoid falling over or bumping into things. As Sir Fred Hoyle puts it: "Looking back [at
evolution] I am overwhelmingly impressed by the way in which chemistry has gradually given
way to electronics. . . . [P]rimitive electronics begins to assume importance as soon as we have a
creature that moves around . . . The first electronic systems possessed by animals were essentially
guidance systems . . . analogous to a guided missile" quoted in Dawkins, 1982. Dawkins
comments that this is "what . . . any evolutionist must think about nervous systems".
34 The actual mechanism is much more sophisticated than this, but it will serve as a useful
example. Alcock, 1998, pp135-142.
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It is relatively easy to make a simple animal on this basis.35 All you need
are two motors and two detectors. The motors provide the ‘get up and
go’, and the detectors act as a kind of ‘guidance system', steering the
animal towards its target or away from hazards.36 In order to build
animals that pursue more than one target, all natural selection need do is
to stack several of these systems on top of one another, and rank them in
order of their respective contribution to reproductive success.37 Which
targets? Animal behaviourists joke that most of animal behaviour is
captured by the 4 Fs: feeding, fighting, fleeing, and sexual intercourse.
Feedback
Some adaptive control systems, including some that generate movement,
can be compared to thermostats, because they attempt to maintain a
particular optimal state, detect departures from that state, and act to
return a system to the optimal state. For example, the mammalian
thermo-regulatory system detects departures from an optimal body
temperature, and prompts particular behaviours – such as shivering,
sweating, or moving to a different location – designed to return the body
to the optimal state. Other systems make use of things in the world in
order to return to the optimal state. For example, if the digestive system
detects departures from optimal blood-sugar levels, it motivates the
animal to go in search of food. As Bos, Houx and Spruijt put it:
“Motivational states such as hunger, thirst, and libido arise because of a
difference between actual and reference values in an animal’s
physiological systems, and subsequent behavior – appetitive and
consummatory (Craig, 1918) – is directed at eliminating this difference.”38
Or, to quote Steven Pinker: "Wanting and trying are feedback loops, like
the principle behind a thermostat: they receive information about the
discrepancy between a goal and the current state of the world, and then
                                                 
35 Brooks, 1999; Clark, 1997. Brooks claims to have developed robots that exhibit “insect-level”
intelligence.
36 See Appendix 1, Figure 1.
37 In robotics, a “subsumption architecture” ensures that System A always trumps System B, and
System B always trumps System C… and so on, thereby forestalling internal conflict should more
than one system be activated at once.
38 Bos, et al., 2002, p99.
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they execute operations that tend to reduce the difference."39
So, the picture of an animal that emerges from evolutionary biology is of
a bundle of goal-seeking, information-processing adaptations, that are
capable of generating sophisticated, environmentally-contingent
behaviour (including, in some cases, movement).40 And natural selection
can design more sophisticated creatures by equipping them with more
adaptations, and hence more goals, and by rendering each system more
uncertain  about the world, and thus requiring them to ask more
discriminating questions before coming to a decision about how to act.
It follows that, in order to explain or predict an animal’s behaviour, a
biologist needs a description of its (motivational) adaptations (including
the conditions upon which its adaptations are dependent), and an
account of current conditions. For this reason, the study of animal
behaviour consists, in large part, of the attempt to come up with an
accurate ‘circuit diagram’ of an organism’s motivational systems.
(Appendix 1, Figure 2 illustrates the kind of sophisticated,
environmentally-contingent, adaptive system needed to control the
courtship behaviour of even a relatively simple creature, in this case a
newt.) Hence evolutionary theory does not explain behaviour by positing
an unconscious desire to spread one’s genes; natural selection is not a
theory of motivation. Rather, natural selection is a theory of design that is
to be used to explain the particular specifications of adaptations,
including motivational systems. Behaviour is the product of these
adaptations at work – whether that involves protecting against physical
trauma in the case of the snail shell, maintaining efficient photosynthesis
in the case of the heliotropic plant, or avoiding predators in the case of the
moth.41 Evolutionists adopt the same approach when studying human
                                                 
39 Pinker, 2002, p32. See also: Dawkins, 1976, p51; Rosenblueth, et al., 1943.
40 Note that, from the perspective of evolutionary biology, there is no hard and fast distinction
between what an organism 'is' and what an organism 'does'. ‘Behaviour’ is just biology in motion.
As the anthropologists John Tooby and Irvine DeVore put it: "there is no fundamental distinction
between behavioural and morphological traits". Tooby and DeVore, 1987, p191. Or as Real puts
it: “Behavior can be viewed as an exceedingly plastic aspect of the organism’s phenotype.” Real,
1994, p6.
41 As Tooby and DeVore have said: "The psychology of an organism consists of the total set of
proximate mechanisms that control behaviour. Natural selection, acting over evolutionary time,
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behaviour.42
A Darwinian theory of value
We are now in a position to see how the biologist’s account of adaptations
and their proximate goals can serve as a replacement for Hume’s ‘desire
theory’ of value. Hume argued that humans (and other animals) possess a
range of desires or passions, and that these desires determine what they
value. The Darwinian, meanwhile, argues that organisms (including
humans) consist of bundles of adaptations; and the proximate goals of
adaptations (including sophisticated ‘desire-like’ motivational systems)
determine what organisms value. As the theorist Larry Arnhart puts it:
"In all animal behavior . . . there are natural goals, which are standards of
achievement that we can identify as 'values' or 'goods'. If we define 'value'
or 'good' in relational terms as whatever satisfies a desire, then all animals
have values because they all have natural desires that they strive to
satisfy as they gather information about their world."43
This Darwinian update of Hume’s theory of value demystifies ‘value’ –
making clear the place of value in a world of facts – and suggests that we
                                                                                                                                     
shapes these mechanisms so that the behaviour of the organism correlates to some degree with its
fitness. However, in the lifetime of any particular animal, it is the proximate mechanisms that
actually control behavior. If these can be understood, behavior can be predicted exactly...". Tooby
and DeVore, 1987, pp197-8.
42 As with other species, the picture that emerges of human motivational systems built on these
principles is not one of brute urges and drives, but rather of vast computer programs of potentially
unlimited sophistication. The psychologist Steven Pinker puts it as follows: "Most intellectuals
think that the human mind must somehow have escaped the evolutionary process. Evolution, they
think, can fabricate only stupid instincts and fixed action patterns: a sex drive, an aggression urge,
a territorial imperative, hens sitting on eggs and ducklings following hulks. Human behaviour is
too subtle and flexible to be a product of evolution, they think; it must come from somewhere else
– from, say, ‘culture’. But if evolution equipped us not with irresistible urges and rigid reflexes,
but with a neural computer, everything changes. A program is an intricate recipe of logical and
statistical operations directed by comparisons, tests, branches, loops, and subroutines embedded
in subroutines. . . . Human thought and behaviour, no matter how subtle and flexible, could be the
product of a very complicated program, and that program may have been our endowment from
natural selection." Pinker, 1997, p27.
43 Arnhart, 1998, p21. Or, to quote Karl Popper: "All organisms are problem finders and problem
solvers. And all problem solving involves evaluations and, with it, values. Only with life do
problems and values enter the world." Popper, 1990, p50. And, as Martin Daly puts it: “Natural
selection doesn’t have goals, but it’s the reason organisms do”. “Purposive ('teleological')
concepts are properly applied to organisms because they have goal-seeking processes instantiated
in their structures as a result of the evolutionary process . . .”. Daly, 1991, p219. I intend to use
‘goal’ interchangeably with end, purpose, interest, preference, want, need, desire, value, and so
on.
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can investigate them in the same way we would investigate any other
aspect of the natural world. Given that organisms are bundles of
adaptations, each with its own proximate goal, for any given organism
we can draw up a list of goals, or desiderata, that constitutes what the
organism wants, needs or values. It follows that in order to arrive at a list
of human values we must come up with a list of the adaptations of which
humans are composed. Thus the investigation of human values is, in the
first instance, a series of problems in evolutionary biology. This was
certainly Hume’s view. Hume expected there to be a continuity between
the motivational systems (‘passions’) of humans and other animals – so
much so that he suggested that cross-species comparative psychology
might be used to shed light on human nature:
'Tis usual with anatomists to join their observations and
experiments on human bodies to those on beasts, and from
the agreement of these experiments to derive an additional
argument for any particular hypothesis. 'Tis indeed certain,
that where the structure of parts in brutes is the same as in
men, and the operation of those parts also the same, the
causes of that operation cannot be different, and that
whatever we discover to be true of the one species, may be
concluded without hesitation to be certain of the other. . . .
Let us, therefore, apply this method of enquiry, which is
found so just and useful in reasonings concerning the body,
to our present anatomy of the mind, and see what
discoveries we can make by it.44
Subsequent research conducted along these lines has tended to vindicate
Hume’s comparative approach. Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in
Man and Animals was devoted to demonstrating the continuity of the
anatomical and physiological bases of motivation, as well as the
behavioural – and even facial – expression of the emotions.45 More recent
work has revealed a surprising degree of conservation across
                                                 
44 Hume, 1739/1985, pp375-6.
45 Darwin, 1872/1998.
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evolutionary history of the basic motivational systems.46 All of this allows
us to conclude, as does Simon Blackburn, that: "the basic emotions of
anger, fear, disgust, sadness, and happiness or joy can be thought of as
the upshot of fairly specific ‘affect programs’ . . . homologous with similar
systems found in other mammals, and especially primates".47
So, David Hume thought that human values were the products of such
passions as: love, hatred, anger, malice, envy, and amorous passion,
sympathy, meekness, beneficience, charity, generosity, clemency,
moderation, equity, greatness of mind, industry, perseverance, patience,
activity, vigilance, application, constancy, temperance, frugality,
economy, resolution, prudence, courage, due pride, and humility.48 A
Darwinian, meanwhile, would argue that human values are the product
of adaptations that include the usual mammalian motivational
adaptations for thermoregulation, feeding, predator-avoidance, habitat-
selection, mating, and – as we shall see in subsequent chapters – various
forms of cooperation.49
The varieties of ethical naturalism
Given this updated desire-theory of value, the ethical naturalist has two
options, as represented by the moral philosophies of Aristotle and Hume.
The Aristotelian observes that humans have a range of natural goals, and
argues that ‘the good life’ consists in achieving these goals. For example,
Arnhart argues that because "[t]he good is the desirable", the good life
consists of fulfilling these natural desires. And we can "judge societies as
better or worse depending upon how well they satisfy those natural
desires".50 The Aristotelian faces a problem when it comes to manifestly
‘anti-social’ adaptations. What if we were to find that some people, or all
people some of the time, had adaptations for murder? for rape? for
                                                 
46 Lawrence and Calder, 2004 discusses work that shows that the ‘emotional’ systems
underpinning fear, disgust and anger are homologous across mammals, reptiles and birds (and, in
some cases, even fish and insects).
47 Blackburn, 1998, p126.
48 Hume, 1739/1985, p629.
49 See, for example, Barkow, et al., 1992; Buss, 2000b.
50 Arnhart, 1998, p17.
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domestic violence? for sexual infidelity? for cheating?51 In such cases the
Aristotelian is forced to maintain that these acts are moral on the grounds
that they are the product of natural desires. Arnhart attempts to escape
this conclusion by arguing that, compared to the range of goods pursued
by the rest of us, psychopaths lead impoverished self-defeating lives.52
But either it is good to act on one’s natural desires or it is not. Arnhart
seems to be helping himself to some super-ordinate criterion of (moral)
goodness not supplied by the theory.
The Humean faces no such problem. Hume intended his general desire
theory of value to be only the backdrop to the more specific investigation
of moral value, which he saw as the products of passions that aimed at the
common good of society. So the Humean observes that humans have a
range of natural desires or goals, but reserves the term ‘moral’ for goals
that promote ‘the common good’ – the "publick interest"; the "public
good"; a "common end"; "the general interests of society"; "the good of
mankind".53 The Humean therefore distinguishes passions in general
from moral passions in particular. As we shall see, Hume’s moral passions
promote the common good by solving certain recurrent problems of
social life, such as certainty of paternity, coordination problems,
prisoner's dilemmas, the negotiation of hierarchies, and the defence of
industry and property. So although Hume thought that all moral passions
were natural, he did not think – and it does not follow – that all natural
passions are moral. And so murder, rape, and theft are deemed immoral
by our moral sentiments because such acts are contrary to the common
good, irrespective of whether they are ‘natural’ or the product of
adaptations or not. For the remainder of this thesis I will follow Hume in
arguing that moral passions are to be distinguished from the entire range
of passions on the basis of their contribution to ‘the common good’.
                                                 
51 Buss, 2000a; Daly and Wilson, 1988; Dugatkin, 1997b; Mealey, 1997; Thornhill and Palmer,
2000
52 Arnhart, 1998, Ch, 8.
53 Hume, 1739/1985, p532, p580, p590, p620, p628. In general, argued Hume, "men receive a
pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and an uneasiness from
such as are contrary to it." (p585).
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The question, then, is whether human nature comprises passions aimed at
the common good, as Hume supposed. That question is the subject of the
next two chapters. The remainder of this chapter reviews some of the
ways that the Darwinian view of psychology differs from the Humean
view, and how the Darwinian view may provide possible solutions to
some of the problems inherent to Hume’s psychology.
The acquisition of knowledge
Hume had a standard ‘desire-belief’ – or ‘passion-reason’ – model of the
mind. He adopted the traditional assumption that the passions were
locked in combat with reason, but went on to argue, contrary to tradition,
that the passions won. Indeed, Hume famously concluded that: "Reason
is, and ought to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any
other office than to serve and obey them."54 The Darwinian, however, has
a different ontology of mental entities. Instead of expecting there to be
two different types of mental state, the Darwinian sees multiple adaptive
motivational systems, each of which, as we have seen, processes
information that leads it to adopt different states. If we begin with
adaptation, and if we identify value with the proximate goal of the
adaptation, then we might identify ‘reasoning’ with the information
processing that adaptations perform, and ‘belief’ with the states that
adaptations adopt. (To give a very simple example, we might say that the
noctuid moth wants to avoid bats, that it reasons that if it hears a certain
sound then it ought to dive, and that if it hears and dives then it believes
that a bat is present.) Thus, desire, reason and belief are not alternative or
competing mental entities; they are terms that refer to different aspects of
the operation of (psychological) adaptations. For the Darwinian,
“Information-processing is, and ought to be, the slave of the
adaptations”.55
                                                 
54 Hume, 1739/1985, p460.
55 This alternative way of dividing up the mind leads evolutionary psychologists to characterise
human decision-making as the product of "reasoning instincts", "strategic emotions", "fast and
frugal heuristics" and so on. Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Frank, 1988; Gigerenzer, et al., 1999.
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This Darwinian account solves or avoids a number of problems inherent
to Hume’s account of how organisms acquire knowledge of the world,
including how they learn from experience.56
Hume had a standard empiricist view of how humans and other animals
acquired information and formed beliefs about their surroundings. In
Book I of The Treatise – entitled "Of the Understanding" – Hume argues
that our knowledge of the world is arrived at through the senses. He
claims that sensation creates impressions, which on ‘reflexion’ become
‘ideas’. The faculty of reason – ‘the understanding’ – combines ‘simple’
ideas together to form ‘complex’ ideas according to seven principles or
‘relations’: "resemblance, identity, relations of time and place [contiguity],
proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety, and
causation".57 For example, if you discover that you like apples, then you
might infer that you like oranges also because apples ‘resemble’ oranges
in some ways. In this way, the relation of ‘resemblance’ allows you to
generalise from one situation to another. To take another example, if one
has the idea of ‘putting one’s hand in a flame’ followed closely by the
sensation of ‘pain’, then ‘the understanding’ might come to ‘associate’
putting one’s hand in a flame with the painful consequences by means of
the relation of ‘contiguity’. These associations are, according to Hume,
strengthened or reinforced by repetition, in much the same way that a
path becomes worn with use. If putting one’s hand in a flame is
repeatedly followed by pain, then the association between these two
events becomes increasingly strong.
There are several well-known problems with this standard empiricist
view of the mind. For example, there is the problem of which aspects of
the world an organism should attend to. Given that there is an infinite
number of things that an organism could pay attention to – an infinite
number of potential sources of information, stimuli, cues – how does an
organism know which ‘sense data’ to let in, and which to ignore as
irrelevant? This problem, sometimes referred to as “the frame problem”,
                                                 
56 The argument of this section closely follows the arguments set out by Karl Popper: Popper,
1999; Popper, 1972; Popper, 1990.
57 Hume, 1739/1985, p117.
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has led some to propose that animals “filter out” irrelevant information,
or that the solution lies in equipping organisms (or robots) with sufficient
“ignoring power”.58
There is also the problem of what to do with the sense data once it is ‘let
in’ – in particular, how to direct it to the ‘right’ bit of circuitry in the brain
(sometimes referred to as ‘the input problem’). How does information
about food arrive at the food module, and not at the mate selection
module? It seems as if there must be some super-ordinate mechanism
responsible for recognising and directing different packets of information
to their respective domains.
Once the information gets where it’s going, there is also a problem with
how the information is processed. Take ‘resemblance’, one of Hume’s
‘relations’. Any two objects in the universe are similar in an infinite
number of ways and dissimilar in an infinite number of ways. Apples
resemble oranges in being small, round, fruits, full of vitamin C,
composed of atoms, to be found on Earth, and so on. But they are
dissimilar in that they have different colours, different chemical
compositions, are members of different species, you can’t make orange
pie, and so on. What counts as ‘resemblance’ differs depending on the
purposes for which the objects are being used or the comparison is being
made. There is no objective standard of ‘similarity’ for the content-free
‘resemblance’ faculty to latch on to; similarity is in the eye of the
beholder. And so merely positing a ‘resemblance’ faculty cannot explain
how inferences are made from one object to another, or from one event to
another. What one needs instead is a specification of the particular
mechanisms that enable an organism to make particular inferences from
certain classes of objects to others.
It is also a problem for Hume’s empiricist psychology to explain how
                                                 
58 Alcock, 1998, pp135-142; Dennett, 1998, Ch. 11. Note that this approach sets up a problem of
which one of the premises is: ‘organisms are sensitive to an infinite number of things in the
world’. And it sees the solution of this problem as mechanism that can ignore ‘infinity minus n’
things, where n is the number of things that the organism in question is sensitive to. Of course, it
is not possible – for natural selection or anything else – to design a mechanism that can ignore an
infinite number of things. Fortunately, natural selection never had to (see below).
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organisms learn from experience. Take ‘contiguity’. The common-sense
view is that one learns by associating events that occur close together in
time (or space). This is the basic associationist view of learning, and it
remains the dominant view of learning in biology and psychology. For
example, in the context of discussing the predictions that genes make
about their world, Richard Dawkins comments:
One way for genes to solve the problem of making
predictions in rather unpredictable environments is to build
in a capacity for learning. Hence the program may take the
form of the following instructions to the survival machine:
'Here is a list of things defined as rewarding: sweet taste in
the mouth, orgasm, mild temperature, smiling child. And
here is a list of nasty things: various sorts of pain, nausea,
empty stomach, screaming child. If you should happen to
do something followed by one of the nasty things, don't do
it again, but on the other hand repeat anything that is
followed by one of the nice things.'59
This neat summary of the commonsense view of learning illustrates why
such a psychology is impossible. The problem is that any one event is
preceded and followed by an infinite number of other events. How is an
organism supposed to know which of these infinite events are to be
associated with one another? How is the survival machine supposed to
know which of the infinite number of things that it has just done –
scratched its nose, looked at the sky, eaten a mushroom, walked east, and
so on – has resulted in the good (or bad) consequence? How is an
organism supposed to know what constitutes ‘an event’ in the first place?
In the absence of a particular hypothesis, theory or expectation of which
kinds of things are likely to cause which other events, an organism has no
hope of learning anything in this way. There is no such thing as a ‘general
purpose hypothesis’, hence there can be no such thing as ‘general
purpose learning’. A “capacity for learning” or “association” is not an
explanation; it is merely a relabelling of the phenomenon that we wish to
                                                 
59 Dawkins, 1976. p57.
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explain.
Hume and others have often supposed that this kind of association can be
saved by repetition or ‘induction’. An animal may not be able to work out
that eating mouldy food caused nausea the first time; but if it happens
again, several times, and if the animal observes the connection repeatedly,
then it has a better chance of detecting the connection, and of being more
sure of that connection. But this is no help. ‘Repetition’ presupposes a
repetition of something, and it is the absence of the something – that is, of a
hypothesis – that causes the problem in the first place. Unless the animal
has picked up on the connection in the first place, there is no possibility of
it observing it again. No amount of further ‘statistical data’ can help if the
creature has no idea what to look for.
Incidentally, Hume himself provided the logical refutation of induction.
Hume noted that although inductive inferences claimed to rely on
nothing but experience and observation, they tacitly assumed that the
future would be like the past, which itself cannot be confirmed by
experience. For example, in order to infer from past experience that
placing one’s hand in a flame will be painful in the future, one must also
assume that 'the future will resemble the past' in the relevant ways. (You
might, after all, contract a neurological disorder that numbs your hands.)
But then the question is: From where did you derive the additional
premise that the future would resemble the past? Either this premise is a
priori, or else you learnt it. Admitting the existence of a priori knowledge
invalidates the empiricist assumption that all knowledge is acquired
through the senses. But arguing that the assumption was learnt (by
induction) simply moves the problem one stage back, and opens an
infinite regress. Hume recognised this problem, but fudged its solution.
He conceded that inductive inferences are logically invalid, and cannot be
relied upon, but argued that we nevertheless come to make inductive
inferences through habit and custom. Hume did not take the extra step
and see that what is logically impossible must also be psychologically
impossible – after all, the problem is not that the premises of the inductive
inference are unreliable, it is that they are unavailable. In Popper’s words:
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“Having cast out the logical theory of induction by repetition he [Hume]
struck a bargain with common sense, meekly allowing the re-entry of
induction by repetition, in the guise of a psychological theory.”60
The Darwinian update neatly avoids all of these problems.
First, organisms do not gather information in the same way that they, for
example, gather food; there are no little packets of information sitting out
in the world waiting to be consumed. Rather, the acquisition of
information by an organism consists in the reduction of the prior
uncertainty of its adaptations. As we saw, organisms confront the world
with a range of conditional adaptations that are ‘uncertain’ as to which
state to adopt. In other words, a creature approaches the world with
certain questions, and it acquires knowledge by having its questions
answered. (To quote Popper: "our senses can serve us . . . only with yes-
and-no answers to our own questions".61) The reduction of this
uncertainty – the processing of information62 – constitutes the acquisition
of knowledge. And, as we have seen, natural selection designs an
adaptation to be sensitive only to those aspects of the world that reduce
uncertainty about which state to adopt (and ultimately, how to survive
and reproduce). So, what constitutes ‘sense data’ in the first place is a
function of the conditions upon which the adaptation is dependent. And
as a result, what constitutes ‘sense data’ for one creature is not what
constitutes sense data for another. Bees are sensitive to ultraviolet light in
ways that bats are not; bats are sensitive to sonar in ways that lobsters are
not; lobsters are sensitive to the earth’s magnetic field in ways that bees
are not; and so on. Each species, including humans, inhabits its own
particular sensory world that is different from the worlds of all other
species.63
Hence organisms do not face the problem of having to ‘ignore’ infinite
amounts of information. They are simply sensitive to a particular subset
                                                 
60 Popper, 1963, pp45-6.
61 Popper, 1990, pp46-47.
62 Dawkins, 1998a; Dawkins and Dawkins, 1973.
63 Uexküll, 1934/1957.
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of things in the world and not to any other of the infinite alternative
subsets. As Popper puts it: “Classic epistemology which takes our sense
perceptions as 'given', as the 'data' from which our theories have to be
constructed by some process of induction, can only be described as pre-
Darwinian. It fails to take account of the fact that the alleged data are in
fact adaptive reactions."64
Second, it follows from this view of knowledge acquisition that there are
no ‘sensations’ or ‘ideas’ floating around in the foyer of the mind, waiting
for ‘the understanding’ to organise, redirect or combine them. The
information that ‘sense data’ refers to is the particular state adopted by a
particular adaptation. The structure of this information, and the uses to
which it will be put, is already determined by the possible states of the
adaptation. For example, the noctuid moth’s nervous system does not
first encode a representation of a bat and then face the problem of
shunting this representation to the appropriate bat-avoiding mechanism.
This portion of the moth’s nervous system just i s a bat-avoiding
mechanism, and the presence of the bat is ‘represented’ by the
mechanism adopting a particular state (in this case, a dive). This
‘representation’ of the bat – which takes the form not of a ‘picture’, but of
an activated circuit – is then available for other circuits to latch on to. Of
course, it is no easy task to explain how this model of the mind ‘scales up’
to accommodate human thought. But we can at least we can be confident
that we are starting in the right place with the right problems; and given
that natural selection managed to solve these problems, we have good
reason to hope that where evolution has led science shall surely follow.65
Third, the Darwinian account of psychology avoids the problems of
induction by not relying on induction at all. Hence, learning is explained
with reference to the prior expectations or theories that the organism is
equipped with. In the simplest case we might suppose that ‘learning’
involves the execution of second-, third-, and nth-order decision-rules. A
first-order conditional can be described as "If X, then Y". For example, a rat
                                                 
64 Popper, 1972, p146, p145.
65 Cosmides and Tooby, 2000.
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might operate according to the rule: "If you smell cheese, then move
towards it and eat it". A second-order conditional would be "If A, then (If
X, then Z), else (If X, then Y)". For example, a rat might operate according
to the rule: "If a particular cheese has made you ill, then (If you smell the
cheese, then ignore it), else (If you smell the cheese, then move towards it
and eat it)".66 Thus, the rat ‘learns’ not through the accumulation of
(potentially fatal) experiences, but through the application or a prior
‘theory’ of what kinds of things are likely to induce nausea.67 To quote the
psychologists Garcia and Koelling: "The hypothesis of the sick rat, as for
many of us under similar circumstances, would be ‘it must have been
something I ate’."68 So, organisms do not learn through the gradual
accumulation of ‘data’; instead they “jump to a conclusion" and then put
that conclusion to the test.69 And more sophisticated creatures can
generate more sophisticated hypotheses, and thereby discover more
about their worlds. As Popper put it: "all knowledge is a priori,
genetically a priori, in its content. For all knowledge is hypothetical or
conjectural: it is our hypothesis. Only the elimination of hypotheses is a
posteriori, the clash between hypotheses and reality. In this alone consists
the empirical content of our knowledge. And it is enough to enable us to
learn from experience; enough for us to be empiricists"70 Or, to quote
Noam Chomsky: “the general form of a system of knowledge is fixed in
advance as a disposition of the mind, and . . . the function of experience is
to cause this general schematic structure to be realized and more fully
differentiated."71
                                                 
66 This example is taken from Alcock, 1998, pp102-3. It is representative of a large ethological
literature that developed in reaction to behaviourist and Skinnerian views of learning as
conditioning and reinforcement. See, for example: Breland and Breland, 1961; Lorenz, 1966a.
67 We may say that "an organism 'learns from experience' only if its dispositions to react change
in the course of time, and if we have reason to assume that these changes do not depend merely
on innate [developmental] changes in the state of the organism but also on the changing state of
its external environment." Popper, 1972, p343.
68 Garcia and Koelling, 1966, p124, quoted in Kamil, 1994, p29.
69 ‘Jumping to a conclusion’ also explains how ‘one-shot learning’ is possible; that is, how
animals can learn, for example, to avoid a foodstuff after only one unpleasant experience, instead
of requiring many such experiences.
70 Popper, 1999, p47.
71 Chomsky, 1965, pp51-2. Chomsky continues: "It is a matter of no concern and of only
historical interest that such a hypothesis will evidently not satisfy the preconceptions about
learning that derive from centuries of empiricist doctrine. These preconceptions are not only quite
implausible, to begin with, but are without factual support and are hardly consistent with what
little is known about how animals or humans construct a 'theory of the external world'." (p58).
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Thus we escape Hume’s problem of induction by accepting that
expectations about the future – that 'the future will resemble the past' in
the relevant ways – are a priori. Hume was reluctant to take this step
because at the time of writing, God was the principal theory as to the
origin of a priori knowledge, and this was the view that Hume was trying
to get away from. It was left to Kant to develop the notion of a priori
knowledge; and to Darwin to wrest a priori knowledge from God and
from transcendental realms, and instead provide an entirely naturalistic
explanation of the form and content of innate knowledge. Under this
view, “the regularities we try to impose are psychologically a priori, but
there is not the slightest reason to assume that they are a priori valid, as
Kant thought”.72 It comes as no surprise, therefore, to find that prominent
evolutionary psychologists see themselves as providing “an evolutionary
Kantian position” with regard to innate knowledge.73
It follows that there will have to be many different mechanisms for many
different kinds of knowledge acquisition. For example, in the domain of
food and foraging, an organism may ‘discover’ that there is fruit in a
particular valley; it may ‘learn from experience’ that green fruit makes it
ill; it may ‘develop’ a particular metabolism in response to shortages of
food during a critical period of development; it may ‘acquire’ certain food
preferences by attending to the smell of its mother; it may learn how to
wash sweet potatoes by ‘imitating’ others; and so on. And there will be
equivalent mechanisms for other domains, such fighting, fleeing, mating,
and cooperating. There is no single mechanism that could accomplish
these diverse feats; and these different processes are not sufficiently
distinguished or suitably explained with reference to ‘a capacity for
learning’.74 Hence we arrive at the conclusion – which seems counter-
intuitive on the standard view – that rich and diverse a priori knowledge
is necessary for learning to occur. By making explicit the content of this
evolved a priori knowledge, evolutionary psychologists are attempting to
explain how learning is possible; they not presenting prior knowledge as
                                                 
72 Popper, 1972, p24.
73 Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, p70.
74 See: Gallistel, 1999.
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an alternative to ‘learning’ or other forms of knowledge acquisition.
Incidentally, in Conjectures and Refutations Popper used the notion of
building “an induction machine” to illustrate why it is impossible in
theory for natural selection, or anything else, to build an organism
capable of induction:
To sum up this logical criticism of Hume's psychology of
induction we may consider the idea of building an induction
machine. Placed in a simplified 'world' (for example, one of
sequences of coloured counters) such a machine may through
repetition, 'learn', or even 'formulate', laws of succession
which hold in its 'world'. If such a machine can be
constructed (and I have no doubt that it can) then, it might be
argued, my theory must be wrong; for if a machine is capable
of performing inductions on the basis of repetition, there can
be no logical reasons preventing us from doing the same. The
argument sounds convincing, but it is mistaken. In
constructing an induction machine we, the architects of the
machine, must decide a priori what constitutes its 'world';
what things are to be taken as similar or equal; and what
kinds of 'laws' we wish the machine to be able to 'discover' in
its 'world'. In other words we must build into the machine a
framework determining what is relevant or interesting in its
world: the machine will have its 'inborn' selection principles.
The problems of similarity will have been solved for it by its
makers who thus have interpreted the 'world' for the
machine.75
Unfortunately, not everyone heeded Popper’s warning. Indeed, in some
ways, the early history of artificial intelligence can be seen as the attempt
to build just such “an induction machine”. The guiding assumption has
been that humans learn by induction (or ‘association’), and that in order
to create a machine that recreates the scope and power of human-like
                                                 
75 Popper, 1963, p48.
- 37 -
intelligence, one must build a machine capable of learning by induction
(or ‘recognising patterns’, or having its ‘connections reinforced’). The
suggestion that one must equip an artificially-intelligent machine with
‘prior’ knowledge was met with suspicion, hostility, and the vague sense
that this would be ‘cheating’. Not surprisingly, artificial-intelligence
engineers encountered numerous problems in the course of attempting to
build machines that lacked any “framework determining what is relevant
or interesting in its world”, and these problems came to be known as
‘frame problems’.76 Fortunately, in the 1980s, some AI-engineers and
roboteers began to turn their backs on what they dubbed ‘good old
fashioned AI’, and began to develop robots inspired by evolutionary
biology. In this way, they managed to avoid ‘frame’ and related problems
altogether.77
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a Darwinian update of Hume’s account of
psychology, and Hume’s naturalistic account of value. Evolutionary
theory sees organisms as bundles of adaptations designed by natural
selection to solve the problems of survival and reproduction that faced
their ancestors. In mobile organisms such as animals these adaptations
include 'motivational systems' that move the organism towards adaptive
targets (such as food and mates) and away from adaptive hazards (such
as predators). The information-processing performed in pursuit of these
goals constitute ‘reason’; and the different states that adaptations can
adopt constitute ‘belief’. The proximate goals of these adaptations
constitute desiderata, or what that organism values.
Having made explicit the Darwinian theory of value, the next task is to
provide a Darwinian update of Hume’s theory of moral value. This will
require demonstrating that Darwinian theory can explain the existence of
‘passions aimed at the common good’. In Chapter 3 I show that: contrary
to the Hobbesian caricature of ‘life in the state of nature’ evolutionary
                                                 
76 Lormand, 1999.
77 Brooks, 1999; Clark, 1997. For a discussion of how natural selection avoids ‘the frame
problem’ see: Sifferd, 2002.
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theory leads us to expect that organisms will be designed to be social,
cooperative and even altruistic under certain circumstances. And in
Chapter 4 I show that such ‘adaptations for cooperation’ can be found in
humans. In Chapter 5 I shall show that this Humean-Darwinian account
of the moral sentiments is consistent with a wide range of traditional
views of the nature and content of moral values.
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Chapter 3 – Life in the state of nature
The position I have always adopted is that much of animal nature
is indeed altruistic, cooperative, and even attended by benevolent
subjective emotions, but that this follows from, rather than
contradicts, selfishness at the genetic level. Animals are sometimes
nice and sometimes nasty, since either can suit the self-interest of
genes at different times. That is precisely the reason for speaking
of 'the selfish gene' rather than, say, 'the selfish chimpanzee'.
– Richard Dawkins78
Introduction
According to Thomas Hobbes human nature is entirely selfish; life in the
state of nature is ‘nasty brutish and short’; and morality and political
society are artificial inventions that must be imposed on humans by an
external authority.79 David Hume took issue with Hobbes’ account and
argued that human nature was not entirely selfish, but comprised a range
of passions that are aimed at the common good. Hume called these ‘the
moral passions’, and hence argued that morality and to some extent
political society are not artificial inventions, but that they are the products
of natural human sentiments.
Hume relied on introspection, everyday observations, and
anthropological evidence that seemed to suggest that sociality and
morality were human universals, to make the case for natural human
moral passions. But, as we saw in the previous chapter, Hume also
suggested that cross-species comparisons – “the correspondence of
passions in men and animals”80 – might be used to establish the
naturalness of certain human passions. This chapter adopts just such a
comparative approach, and reviews the literature presenting the theory of
-- and evidence for -- the evolution of adaptations for cooperation in
                                                 
78 Dawkins, 1998b, p212.
79 Hobbes, 1651/1958.
80 Hume, 1739/1985, p376.
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nonhuman species. Recent developments in evolutionary theory lead us
to expect that organisms will be social, cooperative and even altruistic
under certain conditions. For example, evolutionary theory can explain
why animals are motivated to care for family members, to coordinate to
mutual advantage, to punish free-riders, to settle disputes peacefully, and
to respect property. The finding that such adaptations are widespread
vindicates Hume’s comparative approach, and bolsters his optimistic
assessment of human nature. And having familiarised ourselves with the
logic and structure of ‘adaptations for cooperation’ in general in this
chapter, we will be in a better position to identify examples of such
adaptation in humans in the next chapter, and thereby give Hume’s
account of human moral passions a Darwinian update.
The ‘state of nature’
Some standard interpretations of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural
selection seem to support the Hobbesian view that life in the state of
nature is ‘nasty, brutish and short’. Thomas Henry Huxley wrote that:
"From the point of view of the moralist, the animal world is on about the
same level as the gladiator's show. . . . the weakest and the stupidest went
to the wall, while the toughest and the shrewdest, those who were best
fitted to cope with their circumstances, but not the best in any other way,
survived. Life was a continuous free fight, and . . . a war of each against
all was the normal state of existence." The conclusion that Huxley drew
was that: "the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the
cosmic process [evolution], still less in running away from it, but in
combating it". But against this view of the natural world has always stood
the well-documented existence of extensive cooperation among animals.81
As Petr Kropotkin put it: "The ants and the termites have renounced the
'Hobbesian War' and they are better for it". Again, the moral was clear:
"Don't compete! . . . [C]ombine – practice mutual aid! That is what Nature
teaches us."82 The tension between what the theory of natural selection
seemed to suggest and what the evidence clearly showed – between
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irresistible force and immovable object – created 'the problem of
altruism’, which EO Wilson called “the central theoretical problem of
sociobiology”.83
The advent of 'selfish gene' theory in the 1960s and 70s seemed to some to
support Hobbes’s and Huxley's side of the argument, placing selfishness
at the very core of animal and human nature.84 But, as the quote at the
beginning of the chapter points out, that is not the conclusion to draw
from selfish gene theory; in fact, the theory provides a way of reconciling
the two apparently incompatible positions. This is principally because
‘selfish gene theory’ is not a theory of motivation; it is a theory of design.
And it is simply the case that the differential selection of genes can
produce phenotypic effects that we characterise as cooperative and
altruistic. The next section provides a brief summary of the logic of
cooperation. This is followed by sections that review the evolution of
adaptations for four distinct types of cooperation: kin altruism,
coordination to mutual advantage, reciprocity and conflict resolution.
The evolution of cooperation
The very first replicators to emerge on Earth were lone agents. But, as the
population size increased, their selective environment soon came to be
filled with other replicators and their effects. We might say that social life
began when replicators constituted a significant part of the selection
pressures on other replicators.
The caricature is that relations between these replicators are necessarily
competitive, but this is not the case. Interactions in which one replicator
advances at the expense of another are only one of four logically possible
interactions. A selfish replicator can promote its replication at the expense
of another (+/-); a cooperative replicator can promote its replication
whilst also promoting the replication of another (+/+); an altruistic
replicator can promote the replication of another at a cost to itself (-/+);
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and a spiteful replicator can harm its replication whilst also harming the
replication of another (-/-). But because replicators that are, on balance,
altruistic or spiteful remove themselves from the gene pool, we are left
with replicators that have 'selfish' and 'cooperative' phenotypic effects.85
Hence evolutionary theory expects genes to be 'self-interested', in the
sense of promoting their own replication; but it does not expect all genes
to be ‘selfish’ in the sense of always promoting their replication at the
expense of others’.86
What opportunities does nature provide for the selection of cooperative
replicators? Evolutionary theorists, making use of game theory, have
identified at least four categories of cooperative interactions: kin altruism,
coordination to mutual advantage (coordination), reciprocity (prisoner's
dilemma) and conflict resolution (chicken).87 Kin altruism refers to
situations in which a gene helps copies of itself that happen to reside in
other individuals. Coordination to mutual advantage (mutualism) refers
to situations in which genes benefit from working together, and have
solved various problems of spatial or temporal coordination in order to
do so. Reciprocity refers to a particular solution to the problems of
delayed or uncertain mutualism. And conflict resolution refers to the
means by which genes avoid some of the costs of conflict and dispute.
Each of these opportunities presents different pathways to cooperation,
and each of these paths contains different obstacles. The theory behind
these four types of cooperation, and examples of adaptations in action,
are given below.
                                                 
85 Replicators that are decreasing in frequency are not targets of the cumulative selection that is
necessary for adaptation. So, while an adaptation might suddenly find itself in an environment in
which it reliably delivers benefits to others, there can be no adaptations that have been
specifically designed for this kind of altruism.
86 This distinction between selfish and cooperative interactions maps onto the distinction in game
theory between zero-sum and nonzero-sum games. In game theory, interactions in which one
player's gain is another's loss are called zero-sum or constant-sum games. Interactions in which
one player's gain can be another's gain are called nonzero-sum or variable-sum games.
'Cooperative' is usually reserved to describe games in which players can communicate; but I will
use the term in the more colloquial sense here. Note also that I am following the convention in
evolutionary biology of using game theory to model the effects of natural selection on a
population of genes, and not to model the decision-processes of individual organisms. According
to the biological use of game theory, natural selection ‘chooses’ the best available phenotypic
‘decision-rules’, and individual decision-making is seen as the execution of these rules: Dawkins,
1980.
87 See Appendix 1. For example, see Nunn and Lewis, 2001.
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Note that I am using game theory to illustrate ‘ideal types’ of cooperation,
and that I have chosen examples from the animal behaviour literature
that tend to exemplify these types of cooperation. In the real world,
however, adaptive problems are not always as clearly defined as this, and
there is no guarantee that all adaptations for cooperation will fall neatly
into one or other of these four categories. For example, in order to
successfully hunt in packs, a creature may need to coordinate on an
equilibrium in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma with members of its family
– hence the adaptation (or adaptations) responsible for such a behavioural
trait may be designed to solve multiple, overlapping problems. Note also
that I am using ‘toy games’ merely as analytic categories to distinguish
between different types of cooperation; I am not proposing any
quantitative accounts of actual selection pressures – filling in the relevant
variables with ecologically-valid measures of costs and benefits – in order
to arrive at detailed predictions about, for example, the precise amount of
time members of a particular species will devote to one form of
cooperation or another.
Finally, note that a complete account of the origin and evolution of
cooperation would begin with 'naked replicators', proceed through the
emergence of chromosomes and single cells, and the emergence of multi-
cellular organisms, and it would include a full account of the social lives
of microorganisms and plants.88 However, my interest here is not so much
with adaptations for intra-individual cooperation as with adaptations for
inter-individual cooperation – that is, cooperation between replicators
housed in different individuals. Hence this chapter will focus on
adaptations for cooperation between multicellular organisms, usually
animals.
                                                 
88 For intra-individual cooperation between genes, see: Haig, 2003; Maynard Smith and
Szathmáry, 1995; Ridley, 2000; Skyrms, 1996. Microorganisms, meanwhile, "demonstrate all the
hallmarks of a complex and coordinated social life" including "cooperation, division of labour,
eusociality, cheating, complex communication networks, high genetic relatedness and recognition
of kin". Crespi, 2001, p178. Trivers discusses the evolution of chemical 'warning calls' in plants:
Trivers, 1985, pp60-62. For more on the social behaviour of plants see: Charnov, 1984.
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Kin altruism
One of the principal sources of common interest between organisms is
that they share genes. Under such circumstances, a gene that bestows a
benefit on another organism will spread if the benefit is greater than the
cost, modified by the probability that they share the relevant gene.89
As we saw in the previous chapter, natural selection can be characterised
as “the process whereby replicators out-propagate each other” by virtue
of the effects that they have on the world.90 A curious but inevitable
feature of this process is that replicators can have effects on copies of
themselves. Hence the frequency of a particular type of replicator in a
gene pool will be a function not only of the replicator’s effects on its own
replication, but also of its effects on the replication of other copies of itself.
And this applies even if the replicas happen to reside in other individuals.
As Dawkins has said:
What is the selfish gene? It is not just one single physical bit
of DNA. . . it is all replicas of a particular bit of DNA,
distributed throughout the world. . . . [W]hat is a single
selfish gene trying to do? It is trying to get more numerous
in the gene pool. Basically it does this by helping to
program the bodies in which it finds itself to survive and
reproduce. But now we are emphasizing that 'it' is a
distributed agency, existing in many different individuals at
once. . . . [A] gene might be able to assist replicas of itself that
are sitting in other bodies.91
So, genes that benefit other copies of themselves will be selected if they
benefit other replicas more than they cost themselves (where both benefit
and cost are measured in terms of increase or decrease in frequency). The
                                                 
89 Hamilton, 1964.
90 Dawkins, 1982, p133.
91 Dawkins, 1976, p88. David Haig provides an alternative way of making the point that 'selfish
genes' are distributed. Haig distinguishes between the material gene and the informational gene.
The material gene is the stretch of DNA, the informational gene is the information that this
stretch of DNA carries. It follows that there can be multiple material copies of the same
informational gene; indeed, Haig suggests that the material gene can be seen as a vehicle for the
informational gene. Haig, 1997.
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result is that genes will be selected to bring about an efficient allocation of
reproductive effort across replicas of itself. Hence, we should expect to
find adaptive phenotypic effects in one organism that have been designed
to benefit replicas in another, under certain circumstances. Which others?
And under what circumstances?
Individuals with whom one is likely to share genes are called one's
genetic relatives or family. Evolutionary theory expects a gene in one
individual to benefit a family member up to the point where the benefits,
modified by the probability of sharing that gene, are greater than the
costs (Br>C). So, a gene in one individual has, on average, a 50% chance
of finding a replica in its parents, its offspring or its full siblings; a 25%
chance of finding a replica in grandparents, grandchildren, aunts and
uncles, nieces and nephews; a 12.5% chance of finding a replica in first
cousins; and so on.
Under what circumstances might it pay for a gene to stop promoting its
own replication and instead promote the replication of replicas; to stop
using up its own resources, but pass them on to others? Clearly, if genes
are similarly situated, then there is no gain to transferring resources
between them. But we might expect kin altruism to be selected when they
are differently situated, for example, when one organism is experiencing
diminishing marginal returns on consumption of a resource.
One particular source of asymmetry occurs between parents and their
offspring. When designing the 'life history strategy' of an organism,
natural selection "discounts the future" in line with the risk of death
present in the organism's ecology. Thus, organisms are not built to last
indefinitely, but exhibit 'planned obsolescence'. The result is that, as
Trivers observes, "Since the reproductive value of a sexually mature
organism declines with age, the benefit to him or her of a typical altruistic
act also decreases, as does the cost of a typical act he or she performs."92
Hence a transfer of resources from the older organism to the younger can
represent a net gain to the genes involved.
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Hence parental investment in offspring is perhaps the most familiar
product of kin selection – from water bugs carrying eggs on their back, to
birds feeding chicks in the nest, to suckling in mammals.93 In sexually-
reproducing species, equal parental investment by both sexes is unstable,
and one sex usually specialises in ‘parenting effort’, while the other
specialises in ‘mating effort’.94 Early on in the evolution of sexual
reproduction, these differences were manifest only in different sized
gametes: one sex (females) produced a few large immobile resource-laden
gametes, while the other sex (males) produced numerous, small, mobile
gametes. But over evolutionary time, these initial differences have
snowballed to produce the differences in parental investment
characteristic of all sexually-reproducing species.
Mammals are characterised by an especially high degree of parental, and
almost always maternal, investment.95 In female mammals, well-
documented differences in genes, and subsequently hormones, give rise
to adaptations for gestation and lactation, orchestrated by the hormones
prolactin and oxytocin.96 Commenting on the neural substrate of the
psychology of maternal investment, the neurobiologist Jaak Panksepp
notes: "It was a momentous passage in biological evolution when neural
circuits emerged in the brain that encouraged animals to take care of each
other. The fact that these urges evolved from pre-existing sexual circuits
should come as no surprise to those who appreciate the tinkering ways of
evolution. Thus, one of the key neuromodulators that helps sustain
female sexuality – namely, oxytocin – is also a key player in the initiation
of maternal urges in first-time mothers."97
Altruism between siblings is rarer than between parents and offspring,
largely because there is less asymmetry between potential donors and
recipients. Nevertheless, there is still plenty of it. 'Helpers at the nest' –
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where mature offspring stick around to help their parents raise their
young – have been reported in over 100 species of bird, as well as
numerous examples in mammals, including our closest relatives.98
Cooperation among siblings reaches its most extreme form in the case of
the social or eusocial insects, such as ants, bees and termites, which
practise a division of labour that includes a reproductive caste and sterile
workers. William Hamilton showed that this extreme division of labour
was facilitated by a quirk of these insects' genetic system. In a
multicellular organism, the probability that a neighbouring cell shares a
copy of a gene is close to 1; in mammals, the chance that a full sibling will
share a gene is, on average, 0.5. In certain species of social insect the
probability that a worker shares a gene with the Queen is around 0.75.99
In such species, genes in worker bees can produce sterility and self-
sacrifice because by doing so they promote the replication of copies of
themselves, in the Queen bee, more efficiently than if they tried to go it
alone.
In short, kin selection is an inevitable result of how natural selection
works on genes. Adaptations for kin altruism are widespread and, as a
result, family groups are a ubiquitous feature of the social lives of
animals. But kinship is only one source of common interest. Other sources
of common interest flow from the benefits that animals derive from
‘working together’ in various ways. Cooperation between unrelated
individuals raises two main problems that animals have to overcome.
First, they have to identify and coordinate their behaviour with other
members of the ‘team’; second, they have to defend cooperative schemes
against free-riders. Let’s look at each of these problems, and how they are
solved, in turn.
                                                 
98 Goodall, 1994; Trivers, 1985, pp184-198.
99 This difference between the relatedness of cells in a body and bees in a hive means that there is
greater scope for conflicts of interest among bees. Under certain conditions female worker bees
lay their own eggs, an activity that is countered by the 'policing' activities of other bees that
destroy worker-laid eggs. Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995, pp264-265.
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Coordination to mutual advantage
An organism might benefit another if by doing so it receives a direct
benefit in return.100 Typical examples of this kind of mutually-beneficial
exchange, or 'mutualism', include herding and cooperative hunting.
Individuals may benefit others as a mere by-product of their ordinary
activity – as in the case of penguins huddling together for warmth, or
when birds eat parasites from the backs of rhinos – or as a product of
adaptations specially designed for mutualism. This section will focus on
the second kind of benefit – those bestowed by specially-designed
adaptations for mutualism – and on the problems that animals face in
trying to work together. In particular, it will focus on cases where
individuals are uncertain about how to coordinate to mutual advantage –
about what to do, when to do it, or where to do it – and where they
reduce their uncertainty by attending to the behaviour of others. For
example, an individual fleeing from a predator wants to remain in the
herd in order to reduce his exposure to danger; he will reduce his
uncertainty about which way to run by attending to the behaviour of
other members of the herd. A prairie dog wants to flee from a predator at
the same time as other prairie dogs, but might be uncertain as to when
that will be; it will reduce this uncertainty by attending to the warning
calls made by others. A hunting lioness wants to adopt the most effective
position in the hunt; she will reduce her uncertainty about whether to
adopt the position of ‘wing’ or ‘centre’ by attending to the positions
adopted by other members of the hunt. Situations of this kind are
modelled in game theory as 'coordination problems'.101
Adaptations for coordination to mutual advantage have received
relatively little attention in the evolution of cooperation literature (as
compared to the attention given to kin altruism, reciprocity and costly
signalling). This is largely because coordination to mutual advantage
does not involve any apparent altruism, and its explanation requires no
major theoretical advance. As the animal behaviourist John Alcock has
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101 See Appendix 2, Table 2.
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said: "When both helper and recipient enjoy reproductive gains from their
interaction, they have engaged in mutualism or cooperation, which
requires no special evolutionary explanation."102 The result of this relative
neglect of coordination has been that the evolutionary theory of
coordination has not been richly developed; the scope of evolutionary
explanations of social and cooperative behaviour has been unnecessarily
restricted; and adaptations for signalling and for ‘social intelligence’
(amongst others) have not been recognised as adaptations for
cooperation. This section attempts to correct these oversights.
In the simplest case we might suppose that an adaptation for
coordination to mutual advantage consists of a conditional decision rule
in which the ‘condition’ is some aspects of another’s behaviour. Such
strategies could be elaborated in numerous ways, in terms of the number
of decision points, and the types of cues that it relies upon. In order to be
more specific, and to impose some order on the nascent literature on the
evolution of coordination I have adopted the theoretical framework
proposed by Thomas Schelling and, especially, David Lewis. Schelling
and Lewis mention several different ways in which uncertainty about
others’ behaviour might be reduced and hence coordination problems
might be solved: salient focal points, prediction, communication, shared
expectations, agreements, precedent, and leadership.103 Salience refers to a
feature of an equilibrium that makes it more 'noticeable' to the players
(also referred to as a "focal point").104 Players coordinate their actions by
choosing the equilibrium that they expect to be salient to others.
Individuals can make predictions about the behaviour of others based on a
familiarity with their goals and the information that they have available
to them. Communication can help to facilitate or confirm those predictions,
leading to the generation of mutual or shared expectations.105 (When
communication is used to generate shared expectations about the future,
it becomes an agreement.) Precedent is a source of salience that "achieves
coordination by means of shared acquaintance with the achievement of
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coordination in a single past case exactly like our present coordination
problem".106 Leadership refers to situations in which players converge on
the equilibrium chosen by a salient individual. In the next few sections I
provide examples of each of these types of coordination from the animal
behaviour literature.
Salience
To illustrate the notion of coordinating by means of a salient focal point,
Thomas Schelling gives the example of a game in which two parachutists
are dropped somewhere in a territory and are required to meet. Neither
knows the location of the other, and they cannot communicate in any
way. The territory includes one bridge and several houses. Most players
choose to go to the bridge, because they expect that that is where the
other player will choose to go also. There is nothing about the bridge per
se that makes it a focal point; in versions of the game where there are
several bridges and only one house, people chose to meet at the house. It
is merely that the uniqueness of the bridge serves to "precipitate" or
"crystallize" the players’ expectations: "to fill the vacuum of
indeterminacy that otherwise exists". Schelling observes that in order for
something to act as a focal point, it must enjoy "prominence, uniqueness,
simplicity, precedent, or some other rationale that makes it qualitatively
different from the continuum of possible alternatives."107
Midges face a similar coordination problem, and solve it in a similar
way.108 Like many sexually-reproducing species, male and female midges
face a potential coordination problem when it comes to finding a mate.
They would both benefit from arriving at the same place at the same time;
but the world is big and midges are small. Males, it seems, solve this
problem by hovering above a "conspicuous object" such as a post, or a
human head. So, males operate according to the rule: "If you want a mate,
then hover above the nearest conspicuous object" (where 'conspicuous'
would have some more precise specification in terms of the midge's
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visual system). Females, it would seem, have been designed by natural
selection to 'take it for granted' that males will behave in this way, and so
operate according to a similar rule. In this case, natural selection has seen
to it that flying to the highest conspicuous object has become the only
stable strategy in the population, although it could have been otherwise
(for example, ‘hover above shiny objects’).
Midges resolve their uncertainty about others’ behaviour by attending to
certain features of the world. Coordination problems are more difficult to
solve if you are attempting to coordinate with a moving target.
Prediction, expectation and anticipation
Members of coordinating groups are often uncertain of the position or
activities of other members of their team, and must resolve this
uncertainty, by attending to the behaviour of others, in order to
successfully coordinate. Theory requires that in order to coordinate to
mutual advantage, individuals must have adaptations that motivate and
enable them to do so; that is, they must have adaptations that embody
theories or expectations about how to behave in order to successfully
coordinate, and hence react in specific ways to specific aspects of their
teammates’ behaviour. However, the literature on coordination to mutual
advantage has yet to fully develop this aspect of the theory. Researchers
often talk as if animals can merely ‘learn’ how to behave by ‘observing’
others, without ever specifying the mechanisms that make this possible.109
There is, however, no doubt about the fact that animals coordinate their
behaviour, in ways that cry out for explanation by suitably-developed
evolutionary theories of coordination.
For example, individuals benefit from being part of a herd, a flock or a
school because other animals can act as 'cover' against predators.
(Members of such aggregations also benefit from there being multiple sets
of sensory systems on the lookout for predators.)110 The tendency for
                                                 
109 Boinski and Garber, 2000.
110 'Sensory integration' has been observed in urchins, mysid shrimp, birds and fish, Thompson’s
gazelle, and dolphins. Norris and Schilt, 1988, p157.
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animals in such aggregations to attempt to adopt central positions or to
otherwise reduce their exposure to predators gives rise to what are called
'selfish herds' and 'polarized schools'.111 Polarized schooling has evolved
in a wide variety of taxa, including "echinoderms, schooling mollusks,
arthropods, fish, amphibians, diving and flocking birds, herding
ungulates, and dolphins".112 In other species, reactions to predators may
involve a coordinated division of labour, as in the case of the defensive
formations formed by musk ox under attack by wolves, or the different
sentry positions adopted by prairie dogs under attack by different types
of predator (see below).113
Some predators have also taken advantage of the benefits of working
together. Species that practise cooperative hunts include: bacteria,
spiders, tuna, gulls, hawks, wolves and other wild dogs, lions and other
big cats, dolphins, whales, and some primates – some 22 vertebrate
species in total.114 Some species operate a division of labour when hunting.
For example, yellowtail tuna form teams to hunt mackerel. About six
Yellowtails swim in a line along the seaward side of a shoal of mackerel.
They then adopt a crescent formation and herd a small group of the
mackerel away from the main shoal, and towards the shore. There, in
shallower water, and with one exit blocked by the shore, they form a
semi-circle around the prey. One of the Yellowtails then darts into the
shoal, forcing the mackerel to flee into the mouths of the other members
of the hunting party. To take another example, Harris hawks have at least
three different strategies for cooperative hunting; one involves a surprise
pounce from several different angles, another involves one hawk flushing
the prey out from cover while the other two wait to ambush it, and a
third involves a kind of relay attack. Group hunts among coyotes, wolves,
spotted hyenas, lions, bottlenose dolphins, killer whales and chimpanzees
                                                 
111 Hamilton, 1971.
112 Norris and Schilt, 1988, p151.
113 Mech, 1970; Slobodchikoff, 2002.
114 Examples of cooperative hunts can be found in: Dugatkin, 1997a. See also: Boesch, 1994;
Lenski and Velicer, 2000; Smolker, 2000. The coordinated action of several predators can be
enough to overcome the defences (even the collective defences) of their prey. For example, by
approaching a school of fish from different angles, predators can send 'contradictory messages'
through a school, creating a 'zone of confusion' at the point where the messages meet – long
enough to individuate those fish and make them vulnerable.
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have also been observed to involve "intelligent coordination and division
of labour".115 In lions, chimpanzees and some wild dogs, participants
"regularly assume particular hunting positions relative to the prey and to
their companions".116
In other situations, it is not enough merely to react to what others are
doing; animals must make predictions about future behaviour in order to
anticipate it. Making such predictions merely involves natural selection
taking existing expectations about the behaviour of others, and
extrapolating them into the future. So, during the course of the arms race
between predator and prey, or during the more benign co-evolution
between cooperative partners, we might expect selection to favour more
sophisticated hypotheses about the behaviour of others. We should
expect A’s hypotheses about B to reflect the fact that B itself is a collection
of hypotheses – of conditional adaptations that adopt different states
under different conditions. Hence, we might expect A’s theory of B will
come to reflect B’s various adaptive goals (desires), and be sensitive to
aspects of the world that indicate what state B might be in (beliefs). (For
example, "If there's a loud noise, I can assume that he's heard it" or "If he
looks at something, then he knows that it is there".) Eventually, this
system of theories and expectations might develop to the point where one
would want to call it a 'model' or 'simulation' of the other organism.117
And perhaps further innovations might see one animal's model of
another including the second animal's model of the first, and so on. (Of
course, what one does with this theory depends on the interests of the
parties involved. A predator may use a predictive theory of its prey to
intercept and devour it; one organism may use its theory to frustrate the
behaviour of a rival or combatant; a teammate may use it to generate
mutual benefits.)
                                                 
115 Holekamp and Engh, 2002, p372.
116 Holekamp, et al., 2000, p618. The researchers go on to say that differences in position may
stem from “morphological differences among individual hunters that result in differential hunting
success”. Alternatively, the organisms may be using arbitrary morphological differences to break
the symmetry that might otherwise hamper attempts to coordinate upon an efficient division of
labour.
117 Whiten, 1996. Of course, one organism's model of another need not be an exact or complete
match of the other's motivational systems; it need only model what is adaptively relevant in as
efficient a manner as necessary.
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This would be the ideal jumping off point to discuss the evolution of
‘theory of mind’.118 However, many researchers have been reluctant to
attribute rudimentary forms of theory of mind to nonhuman species. For
example, some researchers distinguish between behaviour that is the
result of ‘decision rules’ and behaviour that is the product of a real
‘theory of mind’ without ever specifying what the difference is, or why
the latter is not merely a particularly sophisticated instance of the
former.119 Thus, the emergence of early theories of mind represents
another future growth area for evolutionary theories of cooperation.
Communication, mutual expectation, and agreement
Whereas prey might attempt to frustrate the predictions of a predator, to
the extent that an organism has an interest in being predicted, we should
expect it to act in ways that make the prediction more accurate. To the
extent that it is in the interests of the participants, and to the extent that it
is cost-effective to do so, we should expect one organism to facilitate the
prediction of another by exaggerating those aspects of its phenotype that
the other uses to resolve uncertainty – in other words, by signalling.120
As Darwin noted, signals evolve by exaggerating, amplifying or stylising
previously arbitrary aspects of the phenotype, including size, colour,
odour, sound and behaviour patterns.121 The results, as the primatologist
Marc Hauser puts it, are that: "Fireflies flash, honeybees dance, ants lay
perfumed trails, midshipmen hum, electric fish zing high voltages, lizards
flash dewlaps, bullfrogs belch, chickens crow, kangaroo rats drum, horses
whinny, wolves howl, lions roar, dolphins click, whales sing, baboons
grunt, gibbons duet, human infants babble, and human adults talk."122
                                                 
118 Baron-Cohen, 1995; Byrne and Whiten, 1988; Humphrey, 1976; Povinelli and Godfrey, 1993;
Whiten and Byrne, 1997.
119 For example, see: Holekamp, et al., 2000.
120 Johnstone, 1998.
121 For more on signalling and communication, see: Darwin, 1872/1998; Johnstone, 1998.
122 Hauser, 2001, p221.
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Some species use signalling to maintain group cohesion whilst on the
move. "Coatis, social mongooses, giant river otters, and some canids emit
quiet contact vocalizations more or less continuously during group
travel."123 In many social species – including ground squirrels, chickens
and several species of monkey – the individual that first detects a
predator will emit a warning call to the others, thereby coordinating the
behaviour of the rest. And in some species, individual foragers alert
others with whom they associate to the presence and location of food so
as to better defend it against rival groups of foragers. For example, ravens
will alert their nestmates to the location of fresh carcasses.124
These signalling systems can be fairly sophisticated. Vervet monkeys
have specific alarm calls for leopards, lions and hyenas, hawks, snakes,
baboons and unfamiliar humans. Each different call elicits a different
response from the other members of the group. Vervets don't give
warning signals if they are on their own, and are more likely to give the
signal the more kin members there are around.125 North American prairie
dogs use a variety of calls to communicate to the other dogs in its colony
not only the identity of the approaching predator (coyote, human,
domestic dog, or red-tailed hawk), but also the colour, size and shape of
the predator, and information about its speed and movement. The other
prairie dogs react differently, with different tactics, depending on the
nature of the threat. Slobodchikoff observes that the “sources of
information in alarm calls appear to function as a primitive grammar,
composed of nounlike, adjectivelike, and verblike elements".126
Communication can be used to confirm relatively elaborate expectations
about future behaviour. Troops of baboons often sleep together, but
fragment whilst foraging during the day, only to meet up later at a distant
watering hole. Before dispersing, different groups will initiate movement
towards their preferred watering hole, and the troop will disperse only
                                                 
123 Holekamp, et al., 2000, p607.
124 Dall, 2002.
125 Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990.
126 The combinatorial nature of the system allows them to describe entirely novel objects, such as
the experimenter's 'black oval. And calls vary between colonies, exhibiting dialects
Slobodchikoff, 2002, p258.
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once a consensus has been established as to which hole to meet up at. As
the primatologist Richard Byrne observes:
In some populations, baboons communicate about out of
sight locations that are not immediate goals by mass
initiations of movements in the direction of these locations,
usually shady water holes in desert habitat. The direction of
movement eventually chosen predicts which water hole will
be visited some hours later, but not the paths of baboon
groups in between. This seems to be the strongest evidence
in wild nonhuman primates for an ability to conceive and
communicate about events displaced in time and space . . .
127
Precedent
In some cases, the behaviour of others is not available to inspection, and
the animal will have to remember what others did in the past, and act on
the assumption that they will act the same way in the future. For
example, many species of birds congregate annually for the purposes of
selecting mates. These congregations – known as 'leks' after the bird in
which they were first studied – could take place in any number of
possible sites. Each bird wants to arrive at the same site as every other
bird (as presumably more individuals means more choice and more
chance of being chosen). It seems that the birds (and some species of bat)
solve this problem by returning to "traditional" display sites every year.128
Juveniles may learn the location of these sites from their parents.129
Leadership
Leadership provides another solution to the problem of coordination.130
For example, animals that travel in groups often face coordination
problems as to when and where to move. As the primatologist Sue
                                                 
127 Byrne, 2000, p518.
128 Alcock, 1998, p510.
129 For examples, see: Avital and Jablonka, 2000.
130 See Foss, 2000 for a review of leadership theory.
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Boinski puts it: "Who leads group travel, decides where the group will
travel, using what information, and how  do they accomplish these
tasks?"131 One solution is for dominant individuals to make the decision.
For example, in African baboons, alpha males "have a disproportionate
share in deciding travel direction", and signal their decision with a variety
of "[s]pecialized visual and vocal displays". The process is not autocratic:
"Other individuals regularly initiate moves that may be accepted or reject
by the decision maker . . . There is also evidence that ‘weight of numbers’
favoring a particular direction of movement has some influence on the
final decision."132 Dominant individuals also take the lead in group hunts.
Alpha wolves and cape hunting dogs "usually [lead] . . . the pack and
makes the first lunge".133
From selfish herds to sympathy
In addition to adaptations for coordination, mutualism seems to have
fostered the extension of ‘sympathy’ from kin to unrelated individuals.
To the extent that an animal comes to rely on the participation of others in
cooperative schemes – especially if the animal interacts repeatedly with
the same individual(s) – then that individual may come to have a direct
interest in the continued existence and well-being (measured in terms of
ability to contribute to the cooperative scheme) of those other
individuals.134 Members of regularly interacting teams might come to
have a stake in one another's continued welfare. In such cases we might
expect the evolution of adaptations that benefit others not only as a direct
result of participation in cooperative teams, but also indirectly, as a result
of adaptations designed to ensure that the individual will be fit to
cooperate in the future. As Frans de Waal observes, kin altruism seems to
provide ample 'pre-adaptations' for more generalised sympathy:
[W]ith the evolution of parental care in birds and mammals
came feeding, warming, cleaning, alleviation of distress,
                                                 
131 Boinski and Garber, 2000, p4.
132 Byrne, 2000, p517.
133 Holekamp, et al., 2000, p614.
134 Tooby and Cosmides, 1996.
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and grooming of the young, which in turn led to the
development of infantile appeals to trigger these activities.
Once tender exchanges between parent and offspring had
evolved – with the one asking for and the other providing
care – they could be extended to all sorts of other
relationships, including those among unrelated adults.135
Hence, dolphins carry struggling associates to shallow water, elephants
stand guard around injured herdmates, chimps lick one another's
wounds. As de Waal observes: "We are not surprised to find that
dolphins, elephants, canids, and most primates respond to each other's
pain and distress, because the members of these species survive through
cooperation in hunting and defense against enemies and predators."136
When unrelated individuals form stable, mutually-advantageous
associations of this kind, animal behaviourists tentatively use the term
"friendships".137 And when one animal has a stake in the welfare of
another, and hence acts to alleviate their distress, animal behaviourists
tentatively use the term "sympathy".138
In summary, some adaptations for mutualism must overcome
coordination problems in order to cooperate successfully. These
adaptations include: the ability to generate and share expectations about
the behaviour of others; to confirm expectations by signalling; to copy the
behaviour of one’s group; to adopt local solutions to coordination
problems, such as precedents; to lead and be led; and, in some cases, to
exhibit ‘sympathy’ for regular members of one’s group. These
adaptations give rise to herds, teams, partnerships, and friendships. We
will now look at what is in effect a special case of mutualism: delayed
mutualism, or reciprocity.
                                                 
135 de Waal, 1996, p43.
136 de Waal, 1996, p80.
137 Dunbar, 1996; Silk, 2002; Smuts, 1985.
138 de Waal, 1996, Ch. 2; Flack and de Waal, 2000.
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Reciprocity
The second problem facing cooperating animals is they must defend
themselves against free-riders, who take the benefit of cooperation
without paying the cost. Perhaps one member of a hunting team will fall
back and let others do the work. Or perhaps an individual will accept
your help when she’s in trouble, but refuse to help you in return when
the situation is reversed.
Situations in which there is uncertainty about whether a benefit is being
returned, or whether it will be returned in the future, are usually
modelled as a prisoner's dilemma.139 Defect (cheat) is the only stable
strategy in such games. In evolutionary game theory terms, delayed
exchange could not evolve in an ecology that was characterised by one-
shot prisoner's dilemmas. But in a repeated game, under certain
conditions the situation can come to resemble an assurance game. In such
a game, the problem becomes one of how to coordinate on and maintain a
superior equilibrium.
Exchanges cease to be prisoner's dilemmas, and become more tractable
assurance games, if the players value future cooperation (R) more than
they value immediate defection (T) – modified by the rate at which the
player discounts the future (d) – and if the players are sufficiently likely to
meet again (w). In other words, a delayed exchange will resemble an
assurance game if: wd>T-R/R-P.140
In some species, background features – such as the fact that members are
long-lived, are physically joined to one another, live in groups, or share
neighbouring territories – ensure that the possibility and expected value
of future interaction is high enough to sustain cooperation.141 In other
species, w and d may be more variable, and so reciprocity requires that
                                                 
139 See Appendix 2, Table 3. For an extended discussion of assurance games, see Skyrms, 2004.
140 As Axelrod puts it, “Mutual cooperation can be stable if the future is sufficiently important
relative to the present”. Axelrod, 1984, p126.
141 As Trivers reports, sparrows, vervet monkeys and Belding's ground squirrels respond more
aggressively to strangers than they do to neighbours. They seem to behave according to the rule:
"This is my neighbour. As long as he stays in his territory he is fine with me. I will not waste
energy in foolish strife". As a result, "[r]elations between neighbours to become more peaceful
the longer the neighbours associate". Trivers, 1985, pp366-7.
- 60 -
potential cooperators ‘reassure’ one another by displaying (costly) signals
of immobility or low discount rate that demonstrate that it will be in their
interests to reciprocate when the time comes, and thereby prompt the
other player to begin with a cooperative move.142
Having established that the payoffs constitute an assurance game, the
next thing to do is to coordinate on a superior equilibrium. One simple
and successful way of coordinating on the superior equilibrium is to open
with a cooperative move in the expectation that it will be in the interest of
the other player to follow suit. In an assurance game with only two
players, two available moves, and two equilibria, it is relatively easy to
see which equilibrium is superior, and hence which move is cooperative.
In more complicated games, with more players, more moves, and many
more equilibria, a more sophisticated strategy may be needed to
successfully coordinate on an equilibrium. In such situations it might be a
good rule of thumb to open with the move that you would like others to
play, so that your move is available as a focal point for others to
coordinate upon.
Players that successfully coordinate on a superior equilibrium can be
expected to continue to cooperate until such time as circumstances
change and the situation reverts to a prisoner's dilemma. Should this
happen, and one player defects, then we should expect the other player to
follow suit. The policy of meeting defection with defection ensures that
cooperators are not exploited by defectors, and that it is never in the
interests of a long-term partner to defect.
Some strategies respond to defection with defection or by breaking off
relations, thereby depriving the defector of future opportunities for
exploitation and cooperation. Some strategies go further and impose an
                                                 
142 Eric Posner explains the logic as follows: "Because a good type [i.e., a reciprocator] is a person
who values future returns more than a bad type does, one signal is to incur large, observable costs
prior to entering a relationship. For example, if a good type values a future payoff of 10 at a 10
percent discount and a bad type values the same payoff at a 30 percent discount, the good type
can distinguish himself by incurring an otherwise uncompensated cost of 8, which is less than the
good type's discounted payoff (9) and greater than the bad type's discounted payoff (7). Because
the recipient of the signal realizes that only the good type could afford 8, the recipient is willing
to enter the relationship." Posner, 2000, p19.
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additional cost on defectors – they punish.143 Punishment can help to make
cooperation stable over shorter time periods, or with individuals with
higher discount rates.
(Punishment can be used to overcome some obstacles to cooperation in a
repeated prisoner’s dilemma. If a penalty (F) imposed on a cheat is
greater than the benefit attained from cheating (T-R), modified by the
chances of being caught (w), and the rate at which the cheater discounts
the future (d) – in other words, if F>T-R/wd – then the payoffs in the
game no longer resemble a prisoner’s dilemma.144 If the cost of inflicting
punishment is in part a function of its severity, then punishment will be
an efficient strategy only if the costs (cF) are less than the net gain from
cooperation; if cF<R-P. In turn, the costs of imposing a penalty might be
dependent on the condition of the punisher – his relative strength, the
size of his kin group, the number of allies he has, and so on. All in all,
punishment will be more successful in maintaining cooperation the more
likely the cheat will get caught, the sooner he is caught, and the cheaper it
is to administer the penalty.)
What if the circumstances that lead a player to cheat were to change, and
once again come to resemble an assurance game? Or what if the original
defection was a mistake? Can mutually-beneficial cooperation be re-
established under such conditions? In order to remove any incentive for
cheating, we might expect the cheated player to cooperate only if the
cheater divested himself of the benefit of the original defection. This cost
could be imposed by punishment, or perhaps the cheat could provide a
costly benefit to the cheated player, for example, by playing a cooperative
move against the cheated player's defection. Such a strategy ensures that
the relationship is robust against error or changing circumstances, and
can return to a superior equilibrium after a period of mutual defection.
                                                 
143 The availability of other partners, transaction costs, costs of imposing penalty, and so on are
among the factors that determine which will be the most efficient response to defection.
144 For example, if the temptation (T-R) is 10, and the probability that the cheat is caught is 1 (w),
then the cost imposed will have to be greater than or equal to 10. But if the probability that the
cheat is caught is 0.5, then the cost imposed will have to be greater than or equal to 20. Likewise,
for a benefit of 10, if the cheat's discount rate is 0.5 per time period, and the cheat is caught on
average after two periods, then the penalty will have to be 40 (that is, 10/0.5 x 0.5).
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In a now famous computer tournament, Robert Axelrod showed that a
relatively simple strategy – Tit-for-Tat – that combined many of these
features was stable and successful against a range of equivalent strategies
in a repeated prisoner's dilemma. (We might describe such a strategy as:
"IF wd>T-R/R-P, THEN Cooperate. IF the other player Cooperates,
THEN Cooperate in the next round. IF the other player Defects, then
Defect in the next round. Repeat.") So, TFT opens with a cooperative
move, and then does whatever the other player did in the previous
round. Defecting against defectors defends against exploitation; and
cooperating with cooperators maintains a mutually-beneficial equilibrium
and makes it possible to restart cooperation after a bout of mutual
defection.
So much for the theory.145 Has reciprocity ever evolved in practice?
There have been numerous reports of reciprocal cooperation in the
animal behaviour literature since Robert Triver's landmark paper in
1971.146 Examples include: reciprocal grooming (cleaner wrasse, impala,
numerous primates); reciprocal parental-care (pied kingfishers, dwarf
mongoose, green woodhopoe, hyena females, silver backed-jackals);
reciprocal food sharing (brown vampire bats); reciprocal predator-
inspection (sticklebacks, guppies); and reciprocal alliances (vervet
monkeys, Rhesus macaques, stump-tail macaques, bonnet macaques,
baboons, chimpanzees, lions and dolphins).147 The problem is that,
                                                 
145 The ‘folk theorem’ in game theory states that there are an infinite number of stable strategies in
an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. CDCCD… is the best response to CDCCD…
DCCCD… is the best response to DCCCD… and so on. The theory of games, and even
Axelrod’s tournaments, provides no guarantee that a tit-for-tat-like strategy will inevitably
evolve. We may nevertheless proceed to investigate whether, in fact, such a strategy has actually
evolved. (This is generally the case with evolutionary theory; an adaptationist prediction about
the form that an ‘optimal’ strategy might take is no guarantee that any such adaptation exists. It
merely tells us what to look for.)
146 Trivers, 1971.
147 Dugatkin, 1991; Harcourt and de Waal, 1992; Leimar and Axén, 1993; Ligon, 1991; Milinski,
et al., 1990; Seyfarth and Cheney, 1984; Wilkinson, 1988; Wilkinson, 1984. The payoff structure
between genes on a chromosome, and between parasite and host, also seem to resemble repeated
prisoner's dilemmas; with the result that cooperation breaks down under predictable
circumstances. See: Axelrod, 1984, Chapter 5; Cronin, 1992, p259; Nesse and Williams, 1994,
pp57-61. But, as before, in this section I will be focusing on the explicit reciprocal exchange of
goods and services between mobile multicellular organisms.
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because mutualism shades almost imperceptibly into reciprocity, it has
not been easy for field-workers to distinguish between the two. And not
all these examples of cooperation are universally accepted as examples of
reciprocity. What we need is a clear, unilateral provision of benefit at a
cost to the actor, followed either by the return of the benefit, and then
perhaps repeated interactions with trusted cooperators; or failure to
return the benefit, leading to refusal to aid in future or punishment, and
perhaps some kind of reparation.
However, two celebrated examples of reciprocity – cleaner fish and their
clients, and blood-sharing between vampire bats – do seem to display the
requisite features.
Many fish make use of smaller cleaner fish, usually wrasse, to remove
debris and ecto-parasites from their mouth and gills.148 The client fish are
groomed, and the cleaners get an easy meal. The interaction between
client and cleaner can be modelled as a prisoner's dilemma. Clients can be
cleaned and then let the wrasse go (cooperate); or they can be cleaned and
then eat the cleaner (defect). The cleaners, meanwhile, can clean the
grouper (cooperate); or they can clean the client and then take a bite out
of its exposed and vulnerable mouthparts (defect). What makes
cooperation possible in this situation? First, clients need to be groomed
regularly, and cleaners need to feed regularly, and so both value future
opportunities for cooperation. Second, cleaners maintain fixed territories,
which makes them easy to find; and because it costs time and energy to
find alternative cleaners, it pays the client to return to the same cleaner.
Hence both cleaner and client can expect to interact repeatedly in the
future. Cooperation occasionally breaks down because cleaners take a bite
from less sensitive areas of the client's mouth which they hope will go
undetected. If they are detected the response of the client depends on
whether they have access to other cleaners. Clients with only one cleaner
on their territory will respond by chasing the cleaner, thus imposing a
cost on it. Clients with access to more than one cleaner will respond by
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taking its business elsewhere.149 In order to re-establish cooperation after
such a breach, cleaners will stop feeding in order to massage their client's
dorsal area with their fins.150
Vampire bats regurgitate blood to unrelated roost mates who have failed
to find a meal that night.151 The exchange constitutes a significant benefit
to those involved, because hunting is a risky way of life, and blood-
sharing acts as a kind of insurance policy that can save individuals from
starvation. The exchange between bats can be modelled as prisoner's
dilemma. A bat can beg for blood, and give blood when asked
(cooperate), or it can beg blood, but refuse to give blood when asked
(defect). What makes cooperation possible in this situation? Hunting, and
unsuccessful hunts, are an everyday occurrence for vampire bats, and so
the benefits of immediate defection are outweighed by benefits of future
opportunities for cooperation. Second, bats live in communal roosts for
several years and so have a high probability of meeting again. Individuals
recognise one another by their calls, and tend to preferentially regurgitate
to those with whom they have associated in the past. An individual who
fails to regurgitate when asked (thereby cheating) will be punished by
having her subsequent requests for blood refused.
However, the picture is much less clear when we turn to examples of
nonhuman primate reciprocity. Coalition formation between male
baboons provided, for a long time, one of the most celebrated examples of
primate reciprocity.152 Two male baboons will often team up to defeat a
third, usually in a dispute over a female. Because individuals tend to
solicit and receive assistance from those whom they have assisted in the
past, it was assumed that this constituted reciprocal altruism between the
two males. However, males may have been cooperating because both had
an immediate interest in doing down the third. The solicitation could be
translated as "I want to attack that individual, you want to attack him too.
Shall we do it together?" If this was the case, then it is no surprise that
                                                 
149 Bshary and Grutter, 2002; Bshary and Schäffer, 2002.
150 Bshary, 2001.
151 Wilkinson, 1988; Wilkinson, 1984.
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individuals with similar interests – and similar rivals – regularly assist
one another. Moreover, as Ronald Noë has argued, in order for the
cooperation to count as reciprocity, the baboons would have to take turns
mating with the female. If baboon A helps baboon B win the female this
time, then baboon B should help baboon A win the female next time. But
this is not what happens. After the coalition has successfully defeated the
third-party, the allies enter a scramble competition for the female, which
the dominant member usually wins. It seems that the members of the
coalition are cooperating to defeat the rival, and taking their chances
when it comes to the prize. As Noë points out, there need be nothing
reciprocal about this. A subordinate may have only a 10% chance of
‘getting the girl’, but will cooperate anyway because 10% is better than
nothing. Furthermore, argues Noë, individuals may be choosing partners
on the basis of ability (rather than reciprocity), and hence ending up
choosing the best available fighters each time.153
At the very least, primates seem to operate a kind of modus vivendi, a live-
and-let-live form of 'negative reciprocity'. That is, they will retaliate
against those who aggress against them. Individual chimpanzees will
exact revenge against those that aggressed against them, including "allies
that fail to support them in competitive interactions with third parties."154
Retaliation can even be aimed at relatives of the aggressor.155 These feuds
are sometimes brought to an end by reparations and attempts to make
amends through affiliative behaviour such as grooming.156 At other times
it takes the intervention of dominant individuals to bring the cycle of
violence to an end and restore order.157
                                                 
153 Noë, 1992.
154 Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995, p214. See also: de Waal, 1994.
155 "In vervet monkeys, adult females who have been displaced from food sources may seek out
and attack their displacer's relatives. In macaques, members of different matrilineal groups ally
with eachother and individuals that have been displaced or attacked by members of another
matriline commonly respond by attacking a vulnerable member of their aggressor's matriline.
Attacks on a member of a matriline are commonly followed by retaliation against members of the
aggressor's matriline by relatives of the victim." Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995, p211.
156 Aureli and de Waal, 2000; Silk, 1998.
157 Aureli and de Waal, 2000; de Waal, 1989. "In many social vertebrates, dominant individuals
will also intervene to end aggressive exchanges . . . " Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995, p214.
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This behaviour could be interpreted as a kind of implicit social contract in
which everyone cooperates by not using violence to get what they want,
but where retaliatory violence – perhaps as an extension of self-defence –
is acceptable as a deterrent. If this were to count as reciprocity, then it
would be hard to tell who was reciprocating with whom, because you
have to conclude that, in the absence of open hostilities, everybody was
cooperating with everyone else all the time. Alternatively, retaliatory
aggression could be seen as a coercive strategy used by some animals to
threaten others into doing what they want or punish them for not doing
so (as opposed to aggression used to punish defectors and pave the way
for cooperation), and the ensuing conflicts could be seen as a breakdown
of the usual mechanisms used to resolve conflicts (as discussed in the next
section).
It may be that reciprocity is rare among primates because they have little
to exchange, and when they do, as in the case of a successful hunt,
reciprocal relations are swamped by strong kinship bonds and
hierarchical social relations. However, the absence of abundant evidence
for reciprocity is not necessarily evidence of absence. As de Waal
comments: "Monkey groups may be veritable marketplaces in which sex,
support, grooming, food tolerance, warnings of danger, and all sorts of
other services are being traded. To us scientists falls the task of figuring
out the worth of each service and of following the relationships over a
long enough period to understand that deals are being struck."158
In summary, while few species seem to have mastered full-blown
reciprocity, many species exhibit aspects of it. And whether or not
nonhuman primates turn out to practise reciprocity, it is clear that they
have ample preadaptations for it – in terms of long-term cooperative
associations, individual recognition, performance assessment,
punishment, appeasement and so on – should the conditions for its
evolution arise.
                                                 
158 de Waal, 1996, p156.
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Conflict resolution
The view that life in the state of nature is 'a war of all against all' is further
contradicted by ways in which animals manage and resolve conflicts of
interest. The widespread tendency of animals to 'restrain' themselves
during combat, or replace actual fighting with ritual contests was once
attributed to group selection or to 'the good of the species'.159 It took the
injection of game theory to formalise how such strategies could benefit
the genes involved. In the paper that introduced evolutionary game
theory – The Logic of Animal Conflict – John Maynard Smith and George
Price showed that, contrary to what was once widely assumed, natural
selection does not favour all-out aggression in competition between
organisms, for the simple reason that fighting has costs that are
sometimes best avoided.160
Suppose that two evenly matched organisms are competing for a resource
(V), and that they can choose to fight or to withdraw. If they both fight,
then they have an equal chance of winning the resource, but suffer the
costs, in terms of time, energy and injury, of the fight (c). If one fights and
the other withdraws, then the fighter gets the resource and the other one
gets nothing. If they both withdraw, then we might suppose that they
each have an equal chance of walking away with the prize. The
evolutionary-stable strategy in this game is to fight with a probability of
V/c. If V<c then each player will withdraw a certain proportion of the
time.161
In this simple version of the game, both players prefer the outcome in
which one player threatens to fight and the other withdraws over the
worst outcome, in which both players fight. Despite appearances, the
players have a common interest in minimising the costs of a dispute.
However, with mixed strategies, the players are leaving the outcome to
                                                 
159 The ethologist Konrad Lorenz noted that: "[N]obody with a real appreciation of the
phenomena under discussion [use of ritual in animals] can fail to have an ever recurring sense of
admiration for those physiological mechanisms which enforce, in animals, selfless behaviour
aimed towards the good of the community, and which work in the same way as the moral law in
human beings." Lorenz, 1966b, p94.
160 Maynard Smith and Price, 1973.
161 See Appendix 2, Table 4. If V>c then the situation resembles a Prisoner's Dilemma, and the
players will always fight.
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chance – they will still come to blows (V/c)2 of the time. Maynard Smith
has shown that a range of conditional strategies that make use of some
asymmetry between the players are better at coordinating on one of the
equilibria outcomes and are evolutionarily stable against a range of other
strategies.162 These conditional strategies can be divided up according to
whether they make use of correlated or uncorrelated asymmetries to settle
the dispute.
Correlated asymmetries
Correlated asymmetries refer to differences between players that correlate
with the probability that they would win if it came to a fight – often
referred to as the player's 'resource holding power' (RHP). In the simple
game, the players are equal in every respect. But in practice, animals are
likely to differ in their fighting ability (hence their chance of winning the
fight will not be 0.5), in how much they value the resource (V), or in their
ability to endure the costs of the fight (c). These differences mean that the
players differ in their willingness to fight. The more likely a player is to
win, the more he values a resource, or the more he can endure the costs of
fighting, the more likely he is to opt for a fight (and hence the more sense
it makes for the other to give way). Given that these asymmetries will
tend to settle the conflict, it pays both players to discover them before the
conflict rather than afterwards. The outcome is the same, but both winner
and loser benefit from avoiding the costs of conflict. So we might expect,
prior to – or instead of – coming to blows, participants to display traits
relevant to their chances of success, to assess the other's traits, and to
moderate their willingness to fight accordingly. They might, for example,
come to adopt a strategy such as: "Display. If opponent is
bigger/stronger/faster/heavier/hungrier… then retreat."
The signals used to settle disputes – referred to as costly signals, honest
signals, fitness indicators – can take a variety of forms depending on the
nature of the contest and the qualities needed to win it.163 In competition
                                                 
162 Maynard Smith, 1982.
163 The signals used to settle disputes are a particular instance of the general rule that information
transfers between parties with conflicts of interest requires some mechanism to ensure their
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over resources or territory, the signals will reflect the physical prowess of
the participants. The classic example comes from a study of stag red deer
competing over the control of harems.164 The contest begins with a roaring
match lasting several minutes. Roaring is an honest signal of size and
strength. If the stags are too closely matched for this to settle the dispute,
the contest moves to a 'parallel walk' stage where the combatants have
the chance to size one another up. If this doesn't settle the dispute, then
the stags lock antlers and begin a pushing contest, and the loser retreats.
In other competitions, age, size, weight, strength, skill, experience, or
number of allies may carry the day.165
Settling disputes through costly signalling also occurs in the context of
female choice of mates. In such cases, males compete with one another for
access to females by displaying the qualities – usually 'good genes', or
some form of paternal investment – that constitute the criteria of female
mate choice.166 This 'sexual selection' of fitness indicators has produced
some of the most elaborate displays in the animal world. The most
celebrated example is the peacock's tail. This enormous and cumbersome
tail imposes a cost on its bearer that only the highest-quality males could
endure. Moreover, the tail acts as a billboard advertising the peacock's
genetic quality both directly, and through the individual's parasite load.
Other examples of sexually-selected fitness indicators include: birdsong,
bower bird's nests, and dolphin "air art".167
It is worth drawing attention to two further features of costly signalling.
The first is that costly signals can often produce 'positive externalities' for
                                                                                                                                     
'honesty'. 'Honesty' or 'credibility' is usually achieved by making the signal 'hard to fake' or
'costly' such that low-RHP individuals cannot, or cannot afford to, display them. (Obviously, if
the signal led the signaller to win more fights was 'cheap', then it pays use the signal irrespective
of one's actual RHP. Consequently, receivers would not benefit from responding to the signal,
and should no longer pay attention to the signal, so both players would be back where they
started, incurring costly fights.) For example, 'large size' cannot be displayed by low-RHP
individuals because they do not possess it. Alternatively, 'charging' is a behaviour that both low-
and high-RHP individuals can display, but that might prove prohibitively expensive for low-RHP
individuals, in the sense that the cost that they incur outweighs any benefits they may acquire
through bluffing. Furthermore, what start out as a fairly 'crude' signals of resource-holding power
can become more exaggerated, elaborate and 'symbolic' over evolutionary time.
164 Clutton-Brock and Albon, 1979.
165 For a review, see: Riechert, 1998.
166 Miller, 2000a; Ridley, 2000.
167 Miller, 2000a; Zahavi and Zahavi, 1997.
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their audience. For example, in many species of insects, birds, and
mammals, males compete by providing females with packets of food –
"nuptial gifts" – which provide benefits to the recipient female and her
offspring in addition to honestly signalling the male's foraging prowess.168
Ravens feed on the carcasses of dead animals; but it is risky business to
check whether an animal is in fact dead, and not asleep or injured, or
whether the carcass is being protected by some other scavenger. The best
strategy would seem to be to hang back and let others take the risk of
establishing the status of the body, and only come forward when they
sound the all clear.169 But, as experiments with stuffed models of
predators have shown, males actually compete to take risks. It appears that
"the occasional boldness of corvids serves to enhance status and impress
potential mates by demonstrating that they have the courage, experience,
and quickness of reaction to deal with life's dangers". This interpretation
is supported by the observation that males often "alternate between acts
of bravery and courtship of female onlookers".170
The second feature is that, in stable social groups, the results of ritual
contests can form the basis of 'dominance hierarchies'. In stable social
groups in which members interact repeatedly, there may be no need for
repeated displays; individuals can merely remember what happened last
time, or else watch how others fare. Situations in which the results of
previous contests are used to settle current disputes – in other words,
when players trade on their reputation – are referred to as "dominance
hierarchies". Dominance hierarchies represent a further de-escalation of
hostilities, reducing the costs of even the ritual contests for players, and
ensuring a greater degree of stability (until, of course, a player decides to
challenge the 'status quo'). To quote Preuschoft and van Schaik:
"dominance in groups seems to function as a conflict management device,
preventing escalated competition by conventionalizing means and
                                                 
168 Alcock, 1998, pp457-61.
169 As we have seen, ravens often recruit others to feeding sites so as to better defend them against
other groups of ravens and other scavengers.
170 de Waal, 1996, p134.
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priority of access [to scarce resources], thus allowing for peaceful
coexistence of group members."171
Some species combine these two features of costly signalling: they
compete for status in social groups by performing acts that benefit
onlookers. For example, male Arabian Babblers (a social songbird, about
the size of a sparrow) compete for status by acting as lookouts or
"sentinels", alerting other members of their group to the approach of a
predator.172 Acting as sentinel is costly, as it prevents the bird foraging,
and leaves it exposed to predators. But instead of trying to shirk their
responsibilities – as one might expect from a Hobbesian perspective –
males actually compete to act as the sentinel.
Competition through ‘public service’ also seems to be a feature of primate
dominance hierarchies, especially among chimpanzees. De Waal reports
that chimpanzee males take risks in order to provide the group with food,
are generous with their own kills, and confiscate the kills of others and
redistribute them. "Possibly, then, generosity serves political ends: food
distribution enhances an individual's popularity and status. . . . [I]nstead
of dominants standing out because of what they take, they now affirm
their position by what they give."173
Some primates have gone even further. They compete for status by
shouldering the costs of solving collective-action problems, thereby
turbo-charging cooperation. We have seen how dominant individuals
provide leadership when it comes to coordinating the activities of groups
of roaming foragers, and in the context of cooperative hunts. Individuals
are apparently competing for dominance through their experience, their
                                                 
171 Preuschoft and van Schaik, 2000, p90.
172 Zahavi and Zahavi, 1997.
173 de Waal, 1996, p144. The notion of 'tolerated theft' provides a framework in which to
understand the evolution of altruism as a costly signal of fitness. Successful hunters bring meat
back to camp; itself a costly signal of fitness. There is more meat than he and his family can eat.
It does not pay for him to defend the surplus, and so he tolerates/lets occur scrounging. Tolerating
scrounging itself becomes a signal of high-status; amplified by being 'public', that is the fact that
it is witnessed by an audience of scroungers at least. "Tolerating theft" becomes "showing off".
So the hunter begins to positively encourage 'scrounging', by providing more meat and more
surplus. And so on. Thus there is selection for generosity and other forms of provision of public
goods. Blurton Jones, 1984.
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knowledge, and the wisdom of their decisions.174 Dominant chimpanzees,
as well as stump-tailed monkeys and gorillas, also seem to compete by
intervening to end disputes among subordinates.175 Performing the so-
called 'control role' may not be entirely altruistic. By breaking up fights,
dominant individuals may be protecting their own position or the
position of their allies; they may be shoring up the hierarchy from which
they benefit; or they may be securing the support of those that they help.
But neither is such behaviour entirely self-serving. Unlike the
interventions of most group members – who support family and allies –
control males seem to intervene in a way that is most likely to restore
order. "Dominant chimpanzees generally break up fights either by
supporting the underdog or through impartial intervention. . . . They
seem to interfere on the basis of how best to restore peace rather than
how best to help friends."176 And ultimately, to the extent that individuals
benefit from group living, taking action to secure the cohesion and
functioning of groups is to the benefit of all. It would appear, then, that
male chimpanzees compete for status in part by being an effective and
impartial mediator, a keeper of the peace. As de Waal comments, "the
group looks for the most effective arbitrator in its midst, then throws its
weight behind this individual to give him a broad base of support for
guaranteeing peace and order. . . . A fair leader is hard to come by, hence
it is in the community's interest to keep him in power as long as possible.
. . . A higher authority who takes care of these problems [disputes] with
impartiality and minimum force must be a relief for all."177
Finally, we should spare a thought for the subordinates, the 'good losers',
the doves, without whom the resolution of conflict would not be possible.
Just as costly signals of fitness involve the exaggeration and elaboration
                                                 
174 "Circumstantial evidence indicates that competent leadership of troop movement requires
familiarity with the ranging area. . . . [O]lder, and presumably more experienced, troop members
predominating in leadership roles . . . Ungulates provide stronger evidence than primates that
leaders are the oldest group members and also the most complete repositories of knowledge of the
ranging area. Upon the death of their leader, family units of African elephants become
disoriented, seemingly rudderless, and lose their normal ranging patterns. Thin-horn mountain
sheep (Ovis dalli) acquire their adult ranging patterns as a direct consequence of which adult
leader they elect to follow as juveniles." Boinski, 2000, p457.
175 Das, 2000; de Waal, 1989.
176 de Waal, 1996, p129.
177 de Waal, 1996, pp130-1.
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of attributes predictive of success, cues of submission involve the
exaggerated concealment of these same attributes. "While threat displays
accentuate size and weapons and elicit yielding on the part of the
recipient, displays of submission reduce apparent size, conceal weapons,
and correlate with yielding on the part of the sender."178 The same
exchange of signals – albeit in a swifter, and more symbolic form – takes
place when members of dominance hierarchies meet. These 'greeting
rituals' "function to reassure partners that are uncertain or ambivalent
about their relationship. Reassurance is accomplished by demonstrations
of trust and trust worthiness: partners make themselves vulnerable to
each other." There are also more formal, symbolic signals of
subordination. Macaques give a 'silent bared-teeth display', and
chimpanzees "use a vocal-gestural signal of subordination consisting of
repetitive pant-grunting and bowing towards the dominant."179
Uncorrelated asymmetries
Uncorrelated asymmetries refer to differences between the players that do
not correlate with the probability that a player would win a fight. In
theory, these differences can be entirely arbitrary.180 In practice, however,
uncorrelated asymmetries usually have to do with prior possession of a
resource, and the strategy takes the form of: "If owner fight, if intruder
submit". The point, in either case, is that the strategy provides a fast and
efficient way of arriving at one of the equilibria outcomes and hence
avoiding fights; and that, once established, the strategy is stable against
invasion by alternative strategies that don't obey the convention. In a
population of owner-occupiers, a mutant strategy such as "If intruder
fight, if owner submit" would incur the costs of fighting on every
occasion, and be removed from the population.
                                                 
178 Preuschoft and van Schaik, 2000, p85.
179 Preuschoft and van Schaik, 2000, p90, p93, p96.
180 Cronin gives the example of the strategy "Fight if you approach from the North, submit if you
approach from the South". Cronin, 1992, p315.
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The recognition of prior ownership as a means of settling disputes over
scarce resources – territory, mates, food – is widespread in nature.181 For
example, male speckled wood butterflies take possession of small patches
of sunlight on the forest floor. Should another butterfly arrive at the same
patch there is a brief tussle, but the interloper will defer to the previous
owner. By temporarily removing the butterflies, experimenters can fool
both into thinking that they 'own' the patch. Now deprived of their
conventional means of settling disputes, when the butterflies next meet,
the fight that usually last for a few seconds continues for up to 40
seconds.182 In another elegant experiment, two sticklebacks were allowed
to establish and defend territories at the far ends of an aquarium. The fish
were then placed in large glass test-tubes, and, predictably, when the two
tubes were brought together they tried to attack one another. Moreover,
the experimenter could cause one to attack and the other to retreat by
moving the two tubes from one end of the tank to the other. The point at
which each fish was equally belligerent constituted the boundary
between their respective territories.183
Given that insects and fish can recognise and respect the property of
others, it comes as no surprise to find that, as Marc Hauser notes, "in
almost all territorial species, intruders respect territory ownership”.
Hauser goes on to say that “The space that a territory owner defends is
functionally equivalent to his property, and an intruder’s respect reveals
his acknowledgment of ownership and property rights."184
Animals usually have little property to defend other than their territories.
But the same recognition of ownership seems to apply on those occasions
when they do have valuable (and mobile) resources, such as food and
mates. Experiments by Hans Kummer and others have shown that,
                                                 
181 Robert Ardrey's The Territorial Imperative provides the classic summary – although, like
Lorenz’s On Aggression, it suffers from being somewhat group-selectionist. Ardrey, 1966.
182 Reported in: Cronin, 1992, pp315-6.
183 Dawkins, 1976, pp79-80.
184 Hauser, 2001, p303. The notion of 'property' or 'ownership' presumably evolved as an
extension of the 'zone' surrounding an individual. So, many animals might be expected to keep
away from other animals – respect their 'personal space' – lest they make themselves vulnerable
to attack or retaliation. It would be relatively easy for natural selection to extend this no-go zone
to include whatever area or resource is likely to be defended by the individual, and hence subject
to reprisal.
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among macaques and baboons, 'carrying an object close' acts as a cue of
ownership.185 As Kummer notes, among the species of monkey studied so
far, "the respect for prior ownership of a valuable object is well
established even when the rival is dominant".186 de Waal reports that
among chimpanzees, once "food is firmly in a subordinate's hands, his or
her ownership is generally respected".187 And many animals take a
similarly proprietary attitude to their sexual partners. For example,
hamadryas baboons "do not interfere with each other's bonds with
females: even large, totally dominant males are inhibited from taking
over the female of another male after having seen the two together for a
couple of minutes".188
In summary then, a variety of species use displays of prowess, genetic
quality, generosity and leadership to settle disputes, and these displays
give rise to stable social hierarchies, lubricated by ritualised greetings.
Many species also rely on the recognition of prior ownership to settle or
forestall disputes over scarce resources such as territory, food and mates.
Conclusion
This brings to an end our brief summary of the social lives of animals. We
have seen how, contrary to the caricature of life in the state of nature,
evolutionary theory leads us to expect organisms to be motivated to
cooperate and even be altruistic under certain circumstances. Under the
headings of kinship, coordination, reciprocity and conflict resolution we
have seen that a variety of animals: care for their offspring and their
wider families; form teams and partnerships, coordinate to mutual
advantage, and value the welfare of other team-mates; practise a
rudimentary form of reciprocity, including punishment and restitution;
resolve disputes by means of ritualised contests and dominance
hierarchies, which may in turn provide benefits for onlookers and other
members of the group; and respect the property of others.
                                                 
185 Kummer and Cords, 1991; Sigg and Falett, 1985.
186 Kummer, 1991, p70.
187 de Waal, 1996, p152.
188 de Waal, 1996, p245
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It would appear that cooperation is far more widespread, sophisticated,
and deeply entrenched in the animal world than Hume would have
imagined or dared hope. Equipped with this catalogue of adaptations for
cooperation, we may now proceed to investigate whether or to what
extent humans have retained – or evolved equivalent versions of – these
adaptations.
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Chapter 4 – Human adaptations for cooperation
[I]t can hardly be disputed that the social feelings are instinctive
or innate in the lower animals; and why should they not be so in
man?
– Charles Darwin189
Introduction
In the previous chapter we saw that, contrary to the Hobbesian caricature
of life in the state of nature, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that
organisms will be social, cooperative and even altruistic under certain
circumstances. Under the categories of kin altruism, coordination to
mutual advantage, reciprocity and conflict resolution, evolutionary
theory can explain why and how some organisms care for their offspring
and their wider families, aggregate in herds, work in teams, practise a
division of labour, communicate, share food, trade favours, build
alliances, punish cheats, exact revenge, settle disputes peacefully, provide
altruistic displays of status, and respect property.
Given that adaptations for cooperation are widespread in other species,
and seem especially well-developed in non-human primates, the default
assumption of research on human psychology should be that humans
have retained versions of these primate adaptations. And indeed,
research conducted on this basis has begun to uncover many of the
predicted features of such a suite of adaptations. The purpose of this
chapter is, first, to review this literature, and second, to ask whether
human adaptations for cooperation correspond to what Hume called ‘the
moral passions’. If humans do have adaptations for cooperation, and if
they correspond to Hume’s moral passions, then we may conclude that
evolutionary biology provides a firm foundation for Hume’s account of
moral psychology and the subjective nature of moral value.
                                                 
189 Darwin, 1871, p71.
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The burden of proof
Before getting into the details of human adaptations for cooperation, it is
important to be clear about the form that the argument takes. It runs as
follows. First, adaptations for cooperation are widespread in other species
and seem extremely well-developed in primates. Second, humans are
descended from social primates. Therefore, in the absence of any
explanation of how or why natural selection would have removed
adaptations for cooperation from the human line, the default assumption
should be that humans continue to possess such adaptations.
As such, the question facing psychologists is not whether humans have
adaptations for cooperation, but which adaptations for cooperation do
they have? In particular, how have human adaptations for cooperation
been modified by the specific set of selection pressures at work since we
split from our last common ancestor with chimpanzees six million years
ago? According to the anthropologists John Tooby and Irvine DeVore, the
principal difference between pongid and hominid evolution was the
reliance of the latter on hunting as a means of subsistence.190 Hunting,
they argue, created the right selective environment for the evolution of
increased male parental investment, extended coalition-formation, and
full-blown reciprocity. Hunting also seems to constitute an additional
arena for costly signalling. So, we should expect humans to possess
adaptations for: maternal care, paternal investment and kin affiliation;
forming interest groups, coordinating behaviour and extending sympathy
to regular collaborators; detecting and punishing cheats; settling disputes
and forming dominance hierarchies by means of costly – sometimes
altruistic – signalling; and for respecting prior ownership.
Against this background, it would be reasonable to assume that humans
are equipped with such adaptations even in the absence of any further
positive evidence. This is because in order to argue that humans do not have
such adaptations for cooperation, one would have explain how and why
natural selection erased or removed such adaptations from the human line.
It is difficult to imagine what such an argument would look like, and, as
                                                 
190 Tooby and DeVore, 1987.
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far as I am aware, no-one even attempts to make it. Fortunately, however,
there is considerable empirical evidence for the continued presence of
human adaptations for cooperation. As Appendix 3 suggests, evidence
for human adaptations for cooperation could come from genetics and
heritability studies, from research into hormonal, neurological and other
proximate mechanisms, from behavioural and experimental studies, and
from anthropological, sociological and historical surveys of large-scale
patterns of human behaviour. In an ideal world, evidence would come
from all these sources, and this chapter would present a full circuit-
diagram – a Gray's Anatomy – of human adaptations for cooperation. But
adaptationist research into human psychology is at a very early stage, and
such a complete description is not available.191 Instead there is a handful
of preliminary – but suggestive – evidence from experiments on human
psychology, and plenty of circumstantial evidence of these adaptations at
work. Below, I provide a brief sample of this evidence, from each of the
four categories of cooperation: kin altruism, coordination to mutual
advantage, reciprocity and conflict resolution.192
Kin altruism
As we saw in the previous chapter, genes can spread by helping copies of
themselves that reside in other individuals. One common result of this
‘kin selection’ is parental investment, but it has also led to cooperation
among siblings and forms the backdrop to numerous other forms of
social and altruistic behaviour.
When it comes to parental investment, we saw how, in sexually-
reproducing species, equal parental investment by both sexes is unstable,
and that one sex usually specialises in ‘parenting effort’, while the other
specialises in ‘mating effort’. This division of labour is particularly
pronounced in mammals, in which the females have adopted an intensive
paternal investment strategy that includes gestation and lactation as well
                                                 
191 I return to what needs to be done to complete such an account in the final chapter.
192 As mentioned above, the collective-action problems faced by any particular species do not
necessarily fall neatly into one or other category, but are combination of them. As a result, the
adaptations for cooperation of a given species may bear the stamp of various combinations of
selection pressures.
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as costly periods of care of the infant. Humans are no exception to this
pattern.
Humans continue to manifest typical patterns of mammalian sex
differences: men and women have different genes and chromosomes,
leading to different hormones, which lead to differences in the design of
their bodies and brains, and ultimately in their reproductive strategies
and mate preferences.193 Later in this chapter, we shall look at the role of
androgens in preparing males to be more aggressive, competitive and
risk-taking. At this point, however, we merely need to note that, in the
absence of such hormones, the default female developmental track
produces individuals that are, relative to males, less aggressive,
competitive, and risk-taking, and are more nurturing, ‘people oriented’,
and interested in infants.194 (These traits are noticeably reduced or lacking
in girls who have been exposed to abnormally high levels of male
hormones.)195
The end product is a predictable sex difference in willingness and ability
to provide primary childcare – a sexual division of labour that continues
into the modern world: "Females in all known societies exhibit more
nurturing behavior than males both inside and outside the family . . . Sex
differences in parental care are universal across cultures. While the level
of paternal involvement varies considerably among societies, there is no
society in which the level of direct paternal care approaches that of
mothers."196 Again, in order to argue that women’s primary role in
                                                 
193 Buss, 1994; Geary, 1998; Symons, 1979.
194 Baron-Cohen, 2003 p33-4. Alexander and Hines report that the 'unsocialised' toy-preferences
of female and male vervet monkeys manifest a sex-difference similar to that observed in human
girls and boys. Given the choice, female vervets preferred a doll and a pot, whereas male vervets
preferred a car and a ball Alexander and Hines, 2002. For a review of the sophisticated software
underlying female reproductive and mothering strategies, see: Hrdy, 1999.
195 Congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) refers to a condition in which the fetal adrenal gland
produces an excess of androgens during critical periods of embryonic development. Females with
CAH are born with male external genitalia, but female internal reproductive organs. With the help
of corrective surgery, and treatment for the original condition, girls with CAH usually grow up to
become normally fertile females. Compared to controls, CAH girls exhibit more typical
masculine male behaviour and less feminine behaviour – in short, they tend to be tomboys. In a
review of the literature, Kingsley Browne reports that girls with CAH: "exhibit substantially less
interest in infants and express a lesser desire to marry and have children when they grow up, and
they have more male-like occupational preferences". Browne, 2002, p110.
196 Browne, 2002, p21.
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childcare is not the result of the asymmetry between male and female
reproductive strategies as manifest in mammalian biology, but is instead
the product of arbitrary socialisation or ‘culture’, one must first explain
how and why – and provide evidence that – natural selection removed
the psychology of maternal investment from the human line. I am not
aware of any such arguments.
Turning to fathers, the increased dependency of human infants on their
parents, and the increased reliance on hunting over the past six millions
years, seems to have increased the demand for, and the supply of, male
parental investment. The result is that, unlike the 95% of mammalian
fathers who invest nothing at all in their offspring, and unlike the
majority of primate fathers, who do little more than occasionally protect
their offspring from lethal violence, human fathers seem to invest heavily
in their offspring under the right conditions.197
Which conditions? In species with internal fertilisation, fathers can never
be as sure as mothers that ‘their’ child is really their own, and so
evolutionists predicted that male parental investment would vary with
‘certainty of paternity’.198 Although it is not known exactly how humans
identify kin, one suggestion is that men use facial resemblance to regulate
their uncertainty about paternity, and that the degree of resemblance
would effect their investment decisions (whereas there would be no such
effect for women). To test this prediction, the psychologist Steven Platek
presented subjects with an array of five children’s faces, one of which had
been morphed with their own, and asked them about their feelings
towards the children. As predicted, Platek found that:
                                                 
197 For comprehensive treatment of human paternal investment, see: Geary, 2000.
198 Robin Baker reports that in the modern, Western world: "On average, about 10 percent of
children are not sired by their supposed fathers. Some men, however, have a higher chance of
being deceived in this way than others – and it is those of low wealth and status who fare worst.
Actual figures range from 1 percent in high-status areas of the United States and Switzerland, to 5
to 6 percent for moderate-status males in the United States and Great Britain, to 10 to 30 percent
for lower-status males in the United States, Great Britain and France. Moreover, the men most
likely to sexually hoodwink the lower-status males are men of higher status." Baker, 1996,
pp124-5. See also: Betzig, 1993.
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[M]ales were more likely to choose the face that resembled
their own as the one that they would be most likely adopt,
the most attractive, the child they would spend the most
time with, the child they would spend money on, and the
child would least resent having to pay child support for.
Unlike males, females were relatively indifferent to whether
the children's faces resembled their own.199
Subsequent imaging research has shown that “the male, but not the
female, brain responds differentially to children’s faces that are morphed
with their own face”, leading Platek to suggest that “the male brain
possesses specific neurocognitive substrates responsible for responding to
resemblance expressed in children’s faces.”200 These discoveries dovetail
neatly with an earlier finding that other interested parties seem to be
sensitive to uncertainty about paternity: in maternity wards, the mother’s
family, more than the father’s, can be expected to comment on how much
the baby looks like its father.201
Indirect evidence of the importance of ‘certainty of paternity’ comes from
cross-cultural studies of male parental investment. One study of 186 pre-
industrial societies found that where confidence of paternity is high, men
invest far more in terms of wealth, position, and personal involvement
than where it is low.202 Uncertainty of paternity also has effects beyond
the nuclear family. As kin selection theory accurately predicts, when
confidence of paternity falls below 33%, a man will invest not in his wife's
children but in his sister's children (his nieces and nephews), for they are
likely to be his closest genetic relatives in the next generation.203 In the
                                                 
199 Platek, et al., 2002, p164.
200 Platek, 2003; Platek, et al., under review.
201 Daly and Wilson, 1982. Evolutionary theory suggests that different members of the family
may recognise kin in different ways. Genetic fathers share 50% of their genes with their
offspring, hence phenotypic cues such as facial resemblance provide reliable cues of relatedness.
Full siblings, however, share 50% of their genes only on average – some siblings share more
some share less. Hence other cues, such as residing in the same home, or being cared for by the
same parents, may be more reliable cues of relatedness (Cronin, personal communication). For
evidence that siblings use ‘co-residence’ to establish relatedness, see: Lieberman, et al., 2003.
202 Gaulin and Schlegel, 1980.
203 Alexander, 1979, p72. A man’s degree of relatedness (r) to his son is 0.5 modified by his
probability of paternity (p): 0.5p. A man’s degree of relatedness to his sister is also modified by
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anthropological literature this is referred to as the 'avunculate' or
'mother’s brother' system. More recently, it has been discovered that
uncertainty of paternity leads to a sex difference in the altruism of
grandparents. The father's father has two degrees of uncertainty between
him and the child, whereas the mother's mother has none. As expected,
most grandparental investment comes from the mother's mother and
least from the father's father, with mother's father and father's mother
intermediate.204
Generally speaking, the commonality of interests among family members
is reflected in the fact that: humans continue to live in family groups, and
wider networks of kin relations;205 human priorities in rescuing people
from a burning house, leaving money in our wills or choosing who to
turn to for advice neatly track genetic closeness;206 and social relations
between genetic relatives tend to be more harmonious than between non-
genetic relatives and strangers. Daly and Wilson report that, despite the
proximity of family members, and the amount of time spent with them,
only 6% of homicide victims are genetic relatives of the perpetrator.207
Common interests among family members has also been reflected in legal
systems. Until relatively recently: crimes against an individual were also
considered crimes against that individual's kin group; kin groups were
often the agents of revenge; retribution was visited upon the perpetrator
and on the perpetrator's kin; and kin groups were the recipients of
reparations – peone, wergild, blood money – supplied by the kin of the
offender. The deterrent function of one's kin group, and the self-policing
that they could enforce, constituted the majority of what passed for law in
pre-political societies. The role of kin groups in the maintenance of social
                                                                                                                                     
his father’s probability of paternity (0.25+0.25p). If brother and sister had the same father, then
r=0.5; if they had different fathers, then r=0.25. And the sister’s degree of relatedness to her
children is 0.5. So, a man is more closely related to his sister’s children than his wife’s children
when: 0.5p < 0.5(0.25+0.25p) or when p<0.333.
204 Euler and Weitzel, 1999.
205 Alexander, 1979, pp144-7; Brown, 1991. And all attempts to erase the family, as in Israeli
kibbutzim, Soviet Russia, or religious communities, have routinely failed. See, for example, Tiger
and Shepher, 1975.
206 Buss, 1999, pp230-40.
207 Daly and Wilson, 1988.
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order seems to have declined with the relative decline of kin groups
themselves, as well as the rise of a centralised authority.208
Kin altruism is conspicuous also by its absence. Because parental
investment is a costly resource, psychologists predicted that the evolved
psychology of parents would be designed to preferentially invest in one's
own genetic children, and to be reluctant to invest in children that are not
one's own. This is indeed the case with step-parents. Compared to their
genetic counterparts, step-parents and children view the relationship as
less loving and less dependable emotionally and materially; step-parents
withhold investment and look forward to the children leaving home; and
step-children do indeed leave earlier. One consequence of this predictable
difference in feelings is an enormous differential in the risk of violence.
Children are at much higher risk of abuse and murder from step-parents
than from genetic parents. The presence of a step-parent turns out to be
the single most powerful risk factor for severe child maltreatment yet
discovered.209
In summary, there is no evidence to suggest that natural selection has
removed the standard mammalian-primate adaptations for kin altruism
from the human line. On the contrary, human mothers continue to have
adaptations for caring for their offspring, fathers have adaptations for
investing in their offspring under the right conditions, and everyone it
seems has adaptations for caring for their family members. We may now
turn to cooperation between unrelated individuals.
Coordination to mutual advantage
As we saw in the previous chapter, individuals with common interests
can often benefit from working together as a team. Typical examples
include collective defence against predators, collective hunting, and the
formation of alliances and coalitions in dominance hierarchies. In
addition to identifying individuals with common interests, successful
                                                 
208 Daly and Wilson, 1988, Chapter 10; Posner, 1981, Chapters 5-8.
209 Daly and Wilson, 1998. Several common objections to the theory are dealt with in Daly and
Wilson, 2001.
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mutualism requires that individuals overcome the ‘coordination
problems’ that arise as a result of uncertainty about where and when to do
what. In such circumstances, selection will favour enhanced predictive
and signalling abilities. We also saw how iterated mutualism between
individuals might foster an independent interest in one-another’s
continuing welfare, and could lead to the evolution of ‘sympathy’ and
‘friendship’.
Once again, there is no reason to suppose that any of these abilities of
other primates have been removed in the course of human evolution. On
the contrary, given that the major difference between pongid and
hominid evolution seems to have been the reliance of hominids on
collective hunting – together with a possible increase in direct inter-group
aggression and warfare – the expectation should be that humans will be
in possession of highly-sophisticated adaptations for coordination to
mutual advantage, including prediction, signalling, coalition-formation
and sympathy. And this seems to be the case: natural selection has taken
the relatively rudimentary predictive abilities possessed by other
primates and given them a massive upgrade in humans.
Like some other creatures, humans have a suite of adaptive heuristics that
attribute goals and beliefs to others in order to predict and interpret their
behaviour – a ‘theory of mind’.210 While other primates, such as vervet
monkeys, are capable only of zero- or perhaps first-order predictions (he
thinks that…), humans seem capable of anything up to fifth- or sixth-
order (he thinks that I think that he thinks that she thinks that they are
going to…).211
‘Theory of mind’ emerges in an increasingly well-charted developmental
sequence. As Griffin and Baron-Cohen report: from one to three months,
infants display expectations about the movement of physical objects, and
                                                 
210 Pitchford, 2001. ‘Theory of mind’ is also referred to as: "mind reading" Baron-Cohen, 1995,
"social intelligence" Humphrey, 1976, "Machiavellian intelligence" Byrne and Whiten, 1988;
Whiten and Byrne, 1997, "political intelligence" Orbell, et al., 2000, and "the intentional stance"
Dennett, 1987.
211 Seyfarth and Cheney, 2002.
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are 'surprised' when their expectations are confounded; from three to six
months, infants distinguish the 'biological' motion of animate objects from
the motion of inanimate objects; from twelve months, infants are capable
of following others' eye-gaze, using contingent reaction to infer animacy,
and begin to use mental state terms when speaking; from eighteen
months, infants begin to attribute goals and intentions to others' actions
(and use them to correct for others' mistakes when imitating their
behaviour), use others' intention to infer the meaning of words, and come
to understand that others may have desires different from their own;
from age two, infants are capable of engaging in pretence; from age four
and a half, children are capable of recognising false beliefs (that others
may have beliefs different from their own); and by age six, children are
capable of full belief-desire description and prediction of the behaviour of
themselves and others.212
Neuroscience is also beginning to home in on the neural location of the
various components of 'theory of mind'. Neurons in and around the
“superior temporal sulcus” – a subset of the visual system responsible for
the detection of motion – are specialised for detecting “biological motion”
(such as “walking dancing and throwing”), "goal-directed” movement
(such as “reaching, grasping, picking, [and] tearing”), as well as the
detection of head- and eye-direction which are required for recognising
shared attention, gaze direction, and cues of submission. The
"orbitofrontal-amygdala-temporal circuit" has been implicated in several
models of social cognition in monkeys, apes, and humans, including
attributing intentions from eye movement, the recognition of facial
expression, especially fear. And neuro-imaging studies have led some
researchers to conclude that "the areas bordering the anterior cingulate
and the medial frontal cortex" is "the locus of the mechanism that
represents the mental states of self and other".213 And some or all of these
mechanisms can be damaged or absent, as is the case with people with
the heritable condition of autism.214
                                                 
212 Griffin and Baron-Cohen, 2002, pp86-90. See also: Baron-Cohen, 1995.
213 Griffin and Baron-Cohen, 2002, pp86-90, pp96-104.
214 Baron-Cohen, 1995.
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Systems for generating expectations about others’ behaviour go hand-in-
hand with systems for reducing uncertainty about behaviour through
signalling. In addition to the usual primate ‘body language’ and facial
expression of emotion,215 humans have of course evolved the recursive,
combinatorial, vocal signalling system known as language. Noam
Chomsky demonstrated that language relies on a basic innate
competence, and Steven Pinker has successfully argued that this innate
competence couldn't be anything other than a Darwinian adaptation.216
The increased reliance on teamwork during the course of human
evolution seems to have increased the stake that individuals have in the
well-being of other members of the team. This has led to a predictable
growth in the human capacity for ‘sympathy’ – the tendency to detect and
attempt to alleviate the distress of others.217 The investigation of the brain
mechanisms responsible for sympathy is well under way.218 Against this
background, friendship can be seen as individualised, iterated
mutualism, in which individuals have a significant stake in one another's
continuing welfare.219 The importance of this type of cooperation may
explain why the absence of friendships is a major source of anxiety, stress,
and ill-health.220
Advanced ‘theory of mind’ and language have opened up a wide range of
novel opportunities for cooperation among humans (and are good
candidates for explaining the difference between the societies of humans
and other animals).
                                                 
215 Darwin was the first to place the study of human communication on a naturalistic footing by
emphasising the continuity in form and function of the mechanisms underlying "body language",
gesture and facial expression of emotion from animals to man: Darwin, 1872/1998. His general
contention, that humans share a basic suite of emotions and in certain contexts signal them to
others with a common repertoire of facial expressions has been generally confirmed: Brown,
1991; Ekman, 1973; Tooby and Cosmides, 1990.
216 Chomsky, 1965; Pinker, 1994. If, like other forms of communication, language is used to
reduce uncertainty, then the meaning of a sentence is a product of the prior expectations of the
audience. Baron-Cohen, 1988; Grice, 1989; Lewis, 1969; Sperber and Wilson, 1986.
217 Hoffman, 2001; Preston and de Waal, 2002.
218 Decety and Chaminade, 2002, p127, reports on a “mass of converging evidence from
developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience” concerning the neural basis of sympathy.
219 Tooby and Cosmides, 1996.
220 Wilkinson, 2001.
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For example, as Leda Cosmides and John Tooby note, the ability to
generate “hypotheses about what other individuals are likely to value”
together with the ability to signal which particular objects one values (by
pointing, looking, saying), vastly increases the scope of social exchange.
Instead of being restricted to fairly limited and stereotypical exchanges –
such as those that take place between cleaner-fish and their clients –
humans can identify, and therefore cooperate with, individuals that share
any of a wide-range of interests.221 This ability is presumably a necessary
pre-requisite for the widespread exchange of goods and services in
modern (that is, post-Pleistocene) societies.
Theory of mind and language make it possible for expectations about
behaviour to be communicated to, and shared by, a large number of
individuals – a process referred to by the sociologists Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann as “the social construction of reality”.222 Berger and
Luckmann’s account of ‘social construction’ runs as follows: Humans face
the problems of how to coordinate their actions over space and time.
Solutions include facial expression, language and other signalling
systems, adoption of predictable roles and routines, and use of artefacts
such as calendars and watches. These solutions to coordination problems
constitute shared expectations about how others will behave; thus social
constructions can be understood as the arbitrary conventions used to
solve coordination problems. Established conventions are called
"institutions". Once in place, others can come to adopt them; when
children do so it is called "socialization".223 These social constructions
constitute “social facts”; and it is the study of these social facts that marks
sociology out as a distinct discipline.224 Berger and Luckmann conclude
                                                 
221 Cosmides and Tooby, 1989.
222 Berger and Luckmann, 1966.
223 "A watches B perform. He attributes motives to B's actions”; as a result, “each will be able to
predict the other's actions. . . . This relieves both individuals of a considerable amount of tension .
. . [and] makes possible a division of labour between them". Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp74-5.
224 Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p204. Berger and Luckmann continue as follows: Sometimes the
original reason for the institution is forgotten, and so new reasons are invented to explain and
justify it (this is called "legitimation"). These reasons form the myths and legends of a society.
(Myths in the service of the partial interests of a particular sector of society are called
"ideologies".) A society must defend its myths against those of sub-cultures, and of other
societies. For the purposes of analysing the behaviour of a society and its members, these
conventions, or "social facts" can be treated as things, and as such compose the "reality" in which
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that "Man is biologically predestined to construct and to inhabit a world
with others"; but they refrain “from any causal or genetic hypotheses”
about – or “assertions about the ontological status" of – social
constructions.225 The evolved psychology of ‘theory of mind’ (and
language) provides the missing link between biology and sociology by
explaining how it is that humans come to generate and share expectations
about behaviour. In this way, ‘evolutionary psychology’ explains and
thereby incorporates ‘social constructionism’.226
Note that, because not all aspects of social life are coordination problems,
not all aspects of social life are coordination solutions (that is, social
constructions) contrary to what some proponents of social
constructionism might argue. To paraphrase George Williams, we might
say that: "Social construction is a special and onerous concept that should
not be used unnecessarily, and a social phenomenon should not be called
a construction unless it is the arbitrary solution to a coordination problem
maintained by shared expectations."
At higher-orders, ‘theory of mind’ also makes ‘common knowledge’
possible. As Chwe explains: "We say that an event or fact is common
knowledge among a group of people if everyone knows it, everyone
knows that everyone knows it, everyone knows that everyone knows that
everyone knows it, and so on."227 Common knowledge is necessary for
certain forms of coordinated social activity. For example, in the story of
the Emperor’s new clothes, everyone knew that the emperor was naked,
but they didn’t know that everyone else knew, and no-one wanted to be
the first and only person to laugh. Even if everyone knew that everyone
else knew, they may nevertheless be unsure about whether everyone else
knew that everyone else knew; hence they would still be reluctant to be
                                                                                                                                     
these societies operate. The book goes on to discuss the various ways in which the details of these
"social processes" are elaborated across cultures and across history.
225 Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p34, p204.
226 Presumably, to the extent that people benefit from others adopting the solution to coordination
problems, it is in their interest to apply sanctions to those that fail to do so. However, I am not
aware of any adaptationist work that has been done on the application of sanctions to deviants, as
opposed to the application of punishment to free-riders. It would be interesting to investigate
attitudes to punctuality and other aspects of etiquette from this perspective.
227 Chwe, 2001, p10.
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the first and possibly only one to laugh. In the story, the child that first
points to the naked emperor and laughs creates common knowledge in
the audience, because, through his actions, everyone now knows that
everyone knows that everyone knows that the emperor is naked, and so
they can all laugh together. Chwe goes on to investigate how certain
public rituals, precedents, forms of communication and other institutions
serve to establish common knowledge in social groups, and thereby
coordinate their behaviour.228 Importantly, for the argument of this
chapter, Chwe notes that, "Common knowledge relies on people having a
'theory of mind,' an ability to understand the mental states of others. . .
".229
Finally, the possession of adaptations for coordination to mutual
advantage would presumably explain why cooperative labour, and
division of labour are human universals.230
In summary, there is no evidence to suggest that natural selection has
removed any adaptations for coordination from the human line. On the
contrary, the evidence suggests that humans have adaptations for
predicting the behaviour of others, for signalling their intentions, for
generating shared expectations about behaviour, and for caring for team-
mates. And they use these abilities to form interest groups (teams),
coordinate behaviour, and create, and adopt social norms.231
Reciprocity
As we saw in the previous chapter, extending mutualism to incorporate
delayed exchanges creates additional problems that, in theory, can be
solved by a tit-for-tat-like strategy. Although few non-human species
                                                 
228 Kurzban, Tooby and Cosmides have investigated the tendency of humans to form interest
groups on the most arbitrary of characteristics – such as clothing and skin colour – which is
perhaps merely because such cues are public, and hence common knowledge: Cosmides and
Tooby, 1992; Kurzban, et al., 2001; Tooby and Cosmides, 1988; Tooby and Cosmides, 1996.
229 Chwe, 2001, p17.
230 Brown, 1991, p137.
231 To quote Daniel Dennett, folk psychology is a "predictive strategy" that enables us to
“cooperate on multi-person projects, learn from each other, and enjoy periods of local peace."
Dennett, 1987, p11. And, as Schelling puts it, coordination involves “nothing more nor less than
intuitively perceived mutual expectations." Schelling, 1960, p71. See also: Lewis, 1969, p27.
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seem to have mastered delayed mutualism, various rudimentary
components of reciprocity seem to be present in primates. In the course of
human evolution, increased reliance of hominids on hunting seems likely
to have provided the impetus for the evolution of adaptations for full-
blown reciprocity. Hunting is a risky business that, compared to
gathering, involves considerably more luck than effort. Successful hunts
also tend to generate more food than can be consumed at one time by an
individual hunter. This combination of risk and surplus creates the ideal
conditions for the evolution of reciprocity, where a lucky hunter can
‘lend’ an unlucky hunter a meal, on the condition that should the
situation reverse, the favour will be returned.
Cheater-detection
As we have seen, successful cooperation of this kind requires that free-
riders (‘cheats’) are detected and punished. In order to test whether
human psychology comprises adaptations designed to detect cheats, the
evolutionary psychologist Leda Cosmides gave subjects different versions
of the Wason selection task.
In this task, subjects are presented with a conditional rule of the form, If P
then Q. Subjects are then presented with four cards with information
about P on one side and information about Q on the other. The visible
sides of the four cards display the information: P, not-P, Q, and not-Q. The
subject’s task is to indicate which of these cards must to be turned over in
order to determine whether or not the rule has been violated. The correct
answer is that cards P and not-Q should be turned over. The P card must
be turned over in order to determine whether Q is on the other side; if Q
is not on the other side, then the rule has been violated. And the not-Q
card must be turned over in order to determine whether it has P on the
other side; if it does have P on the other side, then the rule has been
violated. (Turning over the not-P and the Q  cards will not indicate
whether the rule has been broken.)
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Prior to Cosmides’ work, it was known that very few people (less than
10%) choose the logically correct cards; and that performance varied
across different rules. It had been assumed that this variation in
performance could be explained with reference to the familiarity of the
rule; in other words, people did better on rules with which they were
familiar. Cosmides wondered whether the variation might be the result
not of familiarity, but of the content of the rule. In particular, Cosmides
suspected that people might be better at detecting violations of social
contract type rules – of the kind “If you take the benefit, you must pay the
cost” – than they are at detecting violations of logically equivalent rules
that do not have the structure of a social contract.232
To this end, subjects were asked to look for violations of the same
unfamiliar rule: “If a man eats cassava root, then he has a tattoo on his
face”. One group of subjects was told that this was a descriptive rule (in
other words, men that live where cassava grows happen to have tattoos).
Another group was told that this rule was a social contract (in other words,
cassava root constituted a benefit, and the tattoo was a cost that had to be
paid in order to eat it). In this experiment, 23% of subjects in the
descriptive condition chose the logically correct cards (P  and not-Q);
whereas a whopping 73% chose the correct cards in the social contract
condition. These US results233 have been replicated in Germany,234 Hong
Kong,235 Italy,236 the United Kingdom,237 and the Shiwiar, a hunter-
horticulturalist band living in the Ecuadorian Amazon.238 Subsequent
experiments showed that performance on unfamiliar social contracts was
better even than performance on familiar descriptive rules – supporting
the idea that content and not familiarity explain the difference.239
Cosmides also found that it was possible to manipulate, in predictable
ways, the kind of errors that people made. In another experiment,
                                                 
232 Cosmides and Tooby, 1992.
233 Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides and Tooby, 1992.
234 Gigerenzer and Hug, 1992.
235 Cheng and Holyoak, 1985.
236 Girotto, et al., 1992.
237 Johnson-Laird, et al., 1972.
238 Sugiyamaa, et al., 2002.
239 Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides and Tooby, 1989.
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subjects were asked to look for violations of ‘switched’ social contracts
that took the form “If you pay the cost, then you take the benefit”. In this
case, the logically correct answer remains P and not-Q (that is, one should
look for people who paid the cost but did not take the benefit). But if
people do not reason ‘logically’, but continue to for cheats (people who
took the benefit without paying the cost) then they will choose not-P and
Q. And indeed, in this round of experiments, 71% of subjects chose the
latter, ‘looking for cheaters’, set of cards.240 Gigerenzer and Hug had a
similar result when they switched perspectives on the same social
contract rule. They found that subjects chose different cards when looking
for violations of the rule “If an employee works on the weekend, then that
employee gets a day off during the week” according to whether they took
the perspective of employer or employee. ‘Employers’ tended to look for
cheating by ‘employees’ (not-P and Q); and ‘employees’ tended to look for
cheating by ‘employers’ (P and not-Q).241
Cheng and Holyoak have argued that the finding that people are better at
reasoning about social contracts than about descriptive rules is not
sufficient to conclude that people have a special ‘social contract’
mechanism. It may be that people are just better at ‘social rules’ in general
(including, for example, ‘permission’ rules that take the form “If an action
is to be taken, then the precondition must be met”).242 Cosmides tested
this objection by giving subjects permission rules, some of which were
‘embedded’ in a ‘social contract’ context. Again, only 21% of subjects
chose the correct cards in the straight ‘permission’ condition, whereas
75% chose the correct cards in the ‘permission qua social contract’
condition – indicating that there was something special about social
contracts that distinguished them from ‘social rules’ in general.243
                                                 
240 Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides and Tooby, 1989.
241 Gigerenzer and Hug, 1992.
242 Cheng and Holyoak, 1989.
243 Cosmides, 1989. Subsequently, researchers have investigated whether, in addition to social-
purpose mechanisms for social contracts, the ‘domain’ of social reasoning may also include
special mechanisms for promises, warnings, threats, and precautions. Fiddick presents evidence
for cognitive adaptations for dealing with hazards: Fiddick, forthcoming; Fiddick, 2003.
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Laurence Fiddick reports that deliberate versus accidental violation of a rule
also effects subjects' ability to identify violations of social contracts, but
not of precautions. 80% of subjects chose the logically correct set of cards
for intentional violations of social contracts; whereas only 45.5% chose the
correct set of cards for unintentional violation of social contracts. Subjects
chose the correct cards 82.6% and 79.2% of the time when dealing with
intentional and unintentional violations of precaution rules. In other
words, the intention to deceive triggers the 'cheat detection' mechanism;
but intention is irrelevant to whether or not the 'hazard avoidance'
mechanism is triggered. Fiddick notes that advanced ‘theory of mind’
would seem to be a pre-requisite for such attributions of intention, and
hence for this kind of sophisticated cooperation.244
More recently, the theory that ‘cheater-detection’ is the product of a
specific adaptation has been supported by the finding of a brain-damaged
patient in whom reasoning about social contracts, but not precautions, is
selectively impaired.245
Behavioural economics
Indirect evidence for adaptations for reciprocity comes from behavioural
and experimental economics. This literature consists of illustrations of
how everyday reasoning and decision-making departs in systematic ways
from the predictions of standard applications of rational choice theory.246
For example, it has been shown repeatedly that people tend to cooperate
in one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas when standard rational choice theory
predicts that they will defect.247 And it has been shown that people are
willing to incur a cost in order to punish cheats, whereas standard
rational choice theory suggests that such ‘spite’ is irrational and that it
pays to ‘let bygones be bygones’.248
                                                 
244 Fiddick, forthcoming; Fiddick, 2003.
245 Stone, et al., 1997; Stone, et al., 2002.
246 Kahneman, et al., 1982. For discussion, see: Samuels, et al., 2002; Samuels, et al., 1999.
247 For reviews of the literature, see: Caporael, et al., 1989; Mansbridge, 1990; Ostrom, 1998.
248 Fehr and Gachter, 2002.
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These findings represent a puzzle for standard individual-level
applications of rational choice theory.249 The problem is not only why a
rational agent would act in this way, but how. For example, how does a
rational chooser resist the “temptation” to maximise his short-term
interests and instead “bind” himself to courses of action that will
maximise his welfare in the long-term? How can an agent rationally
choose to be irrational – reducing the number of options available to him,
or committing himself to things that would be counter to his interests
were he to do them? Proposed solutions to these problems often invoke
emotions as exogenous factors that interrupt the process of rational
cognitive decision-making. This analysis suggests that emotions act like
‘spanners in the rational works’, transporting individuals far beyond
where mean-spirited rationality could take them, to dizzying new heights
of cooperation and (‘genuine’) altruism. . .250
However, altruism and spite cease to be anomalies, and indeed make
perfect sense, if, as evolutionary theory suggests: human reasoning is not
the product of rational choice, but is instead the product of evolved
decision-rules, some of which have been designed to follow a tit-for-tat-
like strategy;251 and people tend to rely on these decision-rules, play
single prisoner’s dilemmas as if they were iterated, and remain relatively
unmoved by experimental manipulations (such as assurances of
anonymity and single iteration).252 As the behavioural economist Thomas
S. Ulen has noted: "evolutionary psychology offers the best explanation as
to why human beings are imperfectly rational decisionmakers".253
An additional advantage of the evolutionary approach is that it allows us
to tease apart various different phenomena that have been grouped under
                                                 
249 Frank, 1988; Nesse, 2001b; Schelling, 1978; Schelling, 1960,
250 See, for example, Nesse, 2001a.
251 As we have seen, evolutionary game theory makes different predictions about individual
behaviour to classical game theory. In evolutionary theory, natural selection, not the individual,
plays the role of rational chooser. Natural selection 'chooses' between alternative designs of
organisms; and selection seems to have favoured a tit-for-tat-like design in the context of repeated
prisoner's dilemmas.
252 Price, et al., 2002 adopts this approach to explain various features of human punitive
sentiment. What’s more, people often make the kinds of ‘mistakes’ an evolutionist would expect:
Palameta and Brown, 1999.
253 Ulen, 2001, p936. See also: Gigerenzer and McElreath, 2003; Posner, 1998.
- 96 -
the heading of ‘commitments’ – phenomena such as initiation rites,
wedding rings, and expensive business premises.254 Reciprocity depends
on, amongst other things, reducing uncertainty about a person’s mobility
(w) and discount rate (d). Therefore, in addition to “irrational” niceness
and revenge, we should expect potential cooperators to attend to, and
make available, honest signals of low mobility and low discount rate as a
means of distinguishing themselves from less trustworthy individuals.
These signals make it clear that it would be in the interests of the signaller
to reciprocate cooperation; they do not signal unconditional cooperation,
or a new and distinct form of altruism, as some of the literature
suggests.255
The finding that reciprocity is a universal feature of human societies also
provides circumstantial evidence for the existence of human adaptations
for reciprocity. As Donald Brown reports, everywhere people "use
reciprocal exchanges, whether of labor, of goods, or services, in a variety
of settings. Reciprocity – including its negative or retaliatory forms – is an
important element in the conduct of their lives."256 What’s more, the
presence of adaptations for reciprocity might also help to explain cross-
cultural variation in the cooperative practices of different societies. We
saw above that increased reliance on hunting seems to have been an
important impetus for the evolution of reciprocity. Hunting is a relatively
risky activity – however lucky you were today, you may be less lucky
tomorrow – and so pooling and sharing meat with fellow hunters acts as
a kind of mutually-beneficial social insurance. In contrast, there is
relatively little to be gained from entering into reciprocal exchanges of
resources such as plant food. The amount of plant food gathered is
largely a matter of effort, not luck, and so any redistribution would have
merely taken from those who work hard and give to those who work less
hard, producing no net benefit over time.257 This aspect of the underlying
logic of cooperation perhaps explains why capuchin monkeys and
                                                 
254 Nesse, 2001b.
255 Nesse, 2001a
256 Brown, 1991, p137. See also: Sahlins, 1972 and Singer, 1994, pp63-92.
257 Cosmides and Tooby, 1992.
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chimpanzees share meat but not plant food.258 Assuming that human
adaptations for reciprocity make a similar distinction between ‘luck-
based‘ and ‘effort-based’ goods, we should expect to see a similar pattern
in the sharing practices of human societies. And this seems to be the case.
Anthropologists have found that ‘hunters’ tend to put a premium on
redistributive food-sharing, whereas ‘gatherers’ do not; that luck- and
effort-based goods are distributed differently within the same societies;
and that changes in the economy and ecology of hunter-gather societies
lead to predictable changes in their sharing practices.259
In summary, people display many of the predicted features of a veteran
reciprocator. And the notion that people are intuitive reciprocators,
designed to cooperate under ancestral conditions, can explain how and
why people depart from the predictions of classical rational choice theory.
But there is a lot to be done to map out the full software package of
human reciprocal altruism; evolutionary-minded research into other
aspects of the biological basis of reciprocity – such as trust,260 the intrinsic
rewards of cooperation,261 gratitude,262 behavioural and facial cues of
deception,263 enhanced memory for the faces of cheats,264 guilt,265 and
reputation266 – remains at an early stage.
                                                 
258 McGrew and Feistner, 1992. de Waal reports that food typically shared between chimpanzees
has the following characteristics: "1) Highly valued, concentrated, but prone to decay. 2) Too
much for a single individual to consume. 3) Unpredictably available. 4) Procured through skills
and strength that make certain classes of individuals dependent on others for access. 5) Most
effectively procured through collaboration." de Waal, 1996, pp144-5.
259 Cosmides and Tooby, 1992.
260 Hormonal, physiological and neurological work on the biological basis of ‘trust’ suggests that
the ability to ‘open oneself up’ to the possibility of exploitation is mediated by, and may be an
evolutionary outgrowth of, the mechanism in mammals that enables mothers to tolerate the
proximity of offspring. Grimes, 2003.
261 Rilling, et al., 2002.
262 Bonnie and de Waal, 2004.
263 Various aspects of body language – such as facial expressions, posture, timbre of voice,
respiration rate, or other cues of arousal such as sweating – may display anxiety and preparation
for escape. Anxiety presumably reflects the anticipated costs of being caught cheating. This may
explain why people are more inclined to trust and cooperate with people they have had a chance
to inspect for such cues during face-to-face interactions. Ekman, 1985; Ekman, 1973; Ekman, et
al., 1976.
264 Mealey, et al., 1996; Pinker, 1997, pp272-4.
265 Ketelaar and Au, 2003.
266 Nowak and Sigmund, 1998.
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Conflict resolution: costly-signalling
As we saw in the previous chapter, many social animals, including
primates, resolve potentially injurious disputes through the display of
costly or ‘hard to fake’ anatomical or behavioural signals that reliably
indicate ‘fitness’ or “resource holding power”. In some social species, the
results of these interactions are used to form dominance hierarchies, that
further reduce the incidence and costs of conflict. And, in addition to
imposing a cost on the signaller, these signals can sometimes provide a
benefit to the audience. Again, there is no reason to suppose that these
adaptations have been erased over the past 6 million years. On the
contrary, the evidence suggests that humans have retained the typical
primate apparatus – anatomical, hormonal and psychological – for
settling disputes and resolving conflict by means of the display of costly
signals.
In men, as in other male mammals, genes on the Y chromosome turn
embryonic asexual gonads into testes. Testes then produce a range of
hormones, including testosterone, that masculinise the default female
body plan. This difference in body plan and levels of circulating
hormones leads to stereotypical male behaviour in boys – such as greater
competitive 'rough and tumble' play. At puberty, testosterone activates
changes that lead to increased size, height, muscle mass; to the
development of secondary male sexual characteristics, such as growth of
the genitals, larynx, jaw, beard, body hair; and to increased
'combativeness' and interest in the opposite sex. Once the basic male body
plan is in place, circulating testosterone induces men to seek
opportunities to compete with other men for status and resources.267
Whether it is in chickens, other primates or humans, the role of
testosterone in these contests is the same. Testosterone rises in
anticipation of a challenge, thereby boosting "coordination, cognitive
performance, and concentration". Ethologically speaking, dominance
                                                 
267 Mazur and Booth, 1998. Levels of circulating testosterone peak in late adolescence and early
20s, and decline slowly thereafter, creating what Wilson and Daly call “the young male
syndrome”. Wilson and Daly, 1985.
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contests in primates often involve “staring down” one’s opponent:
“[W]hen one animal is obviously the more powerful and assertive or the
other appears fearful . . . a simple stare by the powerful animal, followed
by the fearful animal's eye aversion or by its yielding something of value
(perhaps food or a sitting place), may suffice. Sometimes a single contest
is all that is needed to allocate ranks or to verify a pre-existing rank
relationship, but often the outcome is settled only after a series of
contests."268
After the contest, levels of testosterone remain high in the winners –
causing them to feel elated, and to seek out further opportunities to
compete – but fall in losers – causing them to feel dejected, and to
withdraw from future challenges. Mazur and Booth comment:
Within hours of this outcome, we assume Ego (the loser)
experiences a drop in T[estosterone], reducing his
assertiveness, diminishing his propensity to display the
dominant actions associated with high status, and
increasing his display of such submissive signs as stooped
posture, smiling, or eye aversion (Mazur 1985). Faced with a
new dominance encounter, Ego is more likely than before to
retreat or submit. On the other side Alter, the winner,
experiences the opposite effects: rising T, increased
assertiveness, and a display of dominant signs such as erect
posture, sauntering or striding gait, and direct eye contact
with others. Alter may seek out new dominance encounters
and is bolstered to win them.269
                                                 
268 Mazur and Booth, 1998. Mazur and Booth provide the following description of a typical face-
to-face dominance contest: "Consider two strangers, Ego and Alter, whose eyes meet, by chance,
across a room. Let us say that one of the strangers, Ego, decides to hold the stare. The chance eye
contact now becomes a dominance encounter. Ego's stare makes Alter uncomfortable. Alter may
then avert his eyes, thus relieving his discomfort while, in effect, surrendering, or he may stare
back, making Ego uncomfortable in return. In the latter case, the staredown would continue, with
each individual attempting to outstress the other until finally one person succumbed to the
discomfort (and the challenger) by averting his eyes. The matter thus settled, the yielder usually
avoids further eye contact, though the winner may occasionally look at the loser as if to verify his
victory." (p359).
269 Mazur and Booth, 1998, p359. Mazur and Booth also refer to a study of “sports fans who are
not themselves participants in the physical competition”: “Following the 1994 World Cup soccer
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The result is, as Mazur and Booth note: "Like all primates, humans in
face-to-face groups form themselves into fairly consistent
dominance/status hierarchies so that higher-ranked members have more
power, influence, and valued prerogatives than lower-ranked ones."270
Men seem also to compete for status through costly signals of altruism,
such as bravery, generosity and ‘public service’. For example, in Ronald
C. Johnson’s analysis of the Attributes of Carnegie Medalists Performing Acts
of Heroism and of the Recipients of Those Acts, "About 92% of the [total of
676] acts of heroism were performed by males.” And whereas women
tended to rescue “relatives or people they knew”, a higher proportion of
men “rescued people they did not know".271
To take another example, several anthropologists have advanced sexual-
selection of costly fitness-indicators as explanations of generosity, charity
and their many cultural manifestations (such as potlatch feats, bonanzas,
and festivals).272 Hawkes et al, for example, argue that the sharing of big
game among the Hazda does not conform to an 'exchange model' as
would be predicted by mutualism or reciprocity. Unsuccessful hunters do
not get less than others from kills, nor does there appear to be any
exclusion or punishment of unsuccessful providers. On the contrary, a
carcass appears to be a 'public good' simply because the hunter cannot
exclude others from a portion, or it would not be cost-effective to do so.
Indeed, the hunter does not seem to exert any influence over who gets
what. Instead, sharing is conducted on a 'tolerated theft' or 'demand
sharing' model. Only after the meat has been distributed do people ‘own’
it and can it become the subject of reciprocal exchanges.273 If big game is a
public good, then the question is what incentive do the hunters have to
                                                                                                                                     
tournament in which Brazil beat Italy, T[estosterone] increased significantly in Brazilian fans
who had watched the match on television, and decreased in Italian fans."
270 Mazur and Booth, 1998, p359.
271 Johnson, 1996. Johnson correctly notes that the rescuing of strangers is not explained either by
kin selection or reciprocity, but concludes that these acts of altruism therefore constitute evidence
for group selection. He does not consider that they are perfect examples of costly signalling.
272 If altruism is sometimes used to signal superior status, it would explain why, as George Orwell
noted, “The man receiving charity always hates his benefactor; it is a fixed characteristic of
human nature.” (http://www.weeks-g.dircon.co.uk/quotes_by_author_o.htm).
273 Hawkes, et al., 2001.
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provide it? Why incur the costs of hunting, why not let others do the
work and just turn up at the kill site? The answer, argues Hawkes, is that
although the hunter does not exert any influence over the kill, everyone
knows who killed it. Indeed, a big dead animal is especially good at
broadcasting this information as it attracts individuals from far and wide.
Thus the hunter benefits in terms of increased popularity and status
among men, and increased sexual access to women. Hawkes reports that
successful hunters are more often named as lovers, and have more
surviving offspring. As such, Hawkes considers big game hunting as a
costly signal of genetic quality and condition; it is the product of male
status competition, but a competition that generates positives benefits for
its audience.274 Selection of such costly altruistic signals is consistent with
the observation that ‘generosity’ is universally favoured among leaders.275
Human status competition seems to be an instance of the general primate
model of dominance hierarchies in which individuals compete for status
by solving collective-action problems, especially those involved in
supporting other cooperative schemes – coordinating behaviour,
distributing the spoils of collective action, punishing cheats, intervening
to resolve conflicts, and so on – and in which the audience support high-
status individuals (and their allies) on the basis of their ability to perform
these functions. As de Waal observes: “In short, the dismantling of
despotic hierarchies in the course of hominoid evolution brought an
emphasis on leadership rather than dominance, and made the privileges
of high status contingent upon services to the community (such as
effective conflict management)."276
While there seems little doubt that men rely on a variety of physical and
behavioural cues – of size, speed, strength, agility, bravery, charity – to
settle disputes and compete for status (and seem to have invented a
variety of conventional and highly ritualised ways of conducting these
                                                 
274 Smith et al have applied a similar analysis to turtle hunts. They point out that turtle hunting is
inefficient relative to netting sardines, but that the successful capture of a turtle is the occasion for
a feast of up to 200 people. Successful hunters gain in status and popularity, as well as sexual
access to women. Smith, 1999; Smith and Bleige Bird, 2000.
275 Brown, 1991. pp137-40. For more on leaders and leadership, see Foss, 2000.
276 de Waal, 1996, p132.
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contests, see below) there remains a question over the extent to which
male costly signalling includes displays of intelligence, aestheticism, and
creativity – the human equivalent of the peacock’s tail or the nightingale’s
song. While there is little as yet by way of direct test of this idea, there is
considerable supporting circumstantial and anecdotal evidence. The
evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller points out that in every
cultural sphere – such as art, music and literature – men are responsible
for around 10 times as much cultural production as women; that male
cultural production peaks at the same time that testosterone and mating
effort peaks (that is, during early adulthood); and that displays of
intelligence, wit, creativity, form an important part of human courtship.277
The prediction implicit to costly-signalling theory is that, in the context of
male-male competition, men should attend to, be intimidated by, and
defer to cues of high-testosterone and high status – such as physical
prowess, bravery, generosity, intelligence, creativity – in other males.
Unfortunately, perhaps because the answer seems so obvious, this
prediction has yet to be rigourously tested by contemporary evolutionary
psychology. However, because male-male competition is ultimately about
access to females, and because some male costly signals are designed to
appeal directly to choosy females, a parallel prediction is that to the
extent that women prefer to mate with ‘winners’ they will find cues of
dominance and status sexually attractive. This prediction has been put to
the test; and it has been found that women do find such cues attractive.278
As Gregersen concludes from a study of almost 300 cultures: “for women
the world over, male attractiveness is bound up with social status, or
skills, strength, bravery, prowess, and similar qualities.”279 Not
surprisingly, high-testosterone males also report more sexual partners.280
Research on costly signalling has tended to focus on male displays
because evolutionary theory predicts that males will put more effort into
                                                 
277 Miller, 2000a.
278 Buss, 1994; Ellis, 1992; Miller, 1998.
279 Gregersen, 1982.
280 "Although sexual activity in both sexes correlates with T levels . . . dominance appears to
correlate with sexual attractiveness and number of sex partners in men but not women."
Townsend, 1998.
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producing large conspicuous displays to as many mates as possible. But
to the extent that males invest anything at all in females and their
offspring, we should expect males to be choosy too, and for females to
compete to display the characteristics that males look for in mate. So
whereas men compete to display attributes that women regard as
attractive – such as correlates of good genes, health, intelligence,
generosity, status and access to resources – women compete to display
attributes that men find attractive – fertility (which has to do with
underlying genetic quality as manifest in symmetry, as well as cues of
youth and health) and, in the context of long-term mating, fidelity,
kindness and intelligence. Together, these cues constitute cross-cultural
standards of female beauty and ‘feminine virtue’.281
Finally, in humans, as in other primates, cues of submission consist of the
opposite of cues of dominance; and these signals are further ritualised in
the context of the greeting, manners, etiquette and protocol used to
lubricate the negotiation of formal dominance hierarchies.282 And the
inability to recognise and respond to cues of submission is one of the
symptoms of psychopathy.283
Conflict resolution: property
In the previous chapter we saw that many species resolve disputes over
territory, property and mates through the recognition of prior
‘ownership’. Again, there is no reason to suppose that adaptations for
recognising and respecting property have been removed during the
course of human evolution. As Dennett notes, "many species manifestly
do exhibit innate territoriality, and it is hard to think of what force there
might be to remove such a disposition from our genetic makeup."284
                                                 
281 Buss, 1994; Miller, 2000a; Singh, 1993; Symons, 1995; Symons, 1979. This research presents
evidence that a 0.7 waste-to-hip ratio, lighter-than-average skin colour, symmetry, low
testosterone, and nulliparity are among the cues of female youth and fertility that form the basis
of universal standards of female beauty.
282 Ekman, 1985.
283 Blair, 1997.
284 Dennett, 1995, p487. Or, as Beagle notes, “Psychologically the acquisition impulse (or
instinct), as it has been called, seems to be rooted very deeply and demands recognition. The
existence of this instinct is a refutation of the opinion which considers the rights of property as
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Ever since Darwin, there have been theorists who have argued that
humans have some kind of ‘acquisitive instinct’ or ‘hoarding instinct’. But
these accounts have been correctly dismissed as too vague and lacking in
detail to be useful in explaining the human psychology of property.285
Besides, these accounts tend to refer only to the acquisition of goods, not
to their recognition and respect by others. Unfortunately, there has been
little attempt to test any modern evolutionary-game-theoretic predictions
about the psychology of property.
One possible exception comes from the 'heuristics and biases' literature.
The "endowment effect" refers to the finding that people value things that
they own more than things that they don't own. In other words, they are
willing to sell things for more than they would be willing to buy them.
This represents something of an anomaly for standard applications of
rational choice theory, because items 'cost' the same independent of
whether they are in your possession or not. Behavioural economists
attempt to explain this anomaly with "prospect theory" – the idea that
losses loom larger than gains.286 But this seems to do little more than
relabel the phenomena. It may well be that the tendency to over-value
goods in your possession is a reflection of the willingness to defend one’s
property against usurpers.
The psychology of ‘ownership’ also seems to govern human thinking
about sexual proprietariness. In their article The man who mistook his wife
for a chattel, Daly and Wilson document the various ways – from sexual
jealousy to legal systems – in which men have tended to think of women
as if they were property, or at least, have used the same kind of approach
to settle disputes over ‘ownership’.287
                                                                                                                                     
something conventional and artificial. Even with animals one finds the recognition of meum and
tuum and that not only with regard to other individuals like the young of the family, but equally
with regard to things. The bird claims the nest and even the whole tree as its own, and the dog
defends its kennel with its life." Quoted in Litwinski, 1942, p36.
285 Beaglehole, 1931; Dittmar, 1992.
286 Kahneman and Tversky, 1979.
287 Wilson and Daly, 1992.
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The existence of a system of adaptations for recognising and respecting
prior ownership would explain why people everywhere "have concepts
of property, distinguishing what belongs – minimal though it may be – to
the individual, or group, from what belongs to others",288 and why some
form of territoriality seems to be a feature of all human societies.289
This review of human conflict resolution draws our review of the
evidence for adaptations for cooperation to a close. This brief review of
the relevant literature gives us no reason to reject the default hypothesis
that humans possess typical primate adaptations for cooperation,
modified by several millions years of hunting on the African Savannah.
We may tentatively conclude that humans remain in possession of
adaptations for cooperation that include: adaptations for maternal and
paternal investment, and for preferentially associating with and aiding
kin; high-order theory of mind, language, and sympathy; adaptations for
reciprocity, including assessing the trustworthiness of potential
collaborators, and for detecting and punishing cheats; adaptations for
settling disputes and forming dominance hierarchies through costly (and
sometimes altruistic) signalling; and adaptations for recognising and
respecting prior ownership.
Extending the cooperative niche
Before moving on to compare adaptations for cooperation with Hume’s
moral passions, there is one more evolved faculty to consider. No survey
of human social psychology would be complete without discussing the
ability that humans have to invent novel means of achieving their goals,
and considering what effect this might have on human cooperation.
The evolutionary anthropologists Tooby and DeVore argue that whereas
most plants and animals compete and cooperate with one another
through naturally-selected genetic strategies, humans have evolved, in
                                                 
288 Brown, 1991, p140. We might expect the evolved psychology of property to generate different
concepts of property under different ecological, economic and technological conditions that
altered the mobility, defendability, divisibility, identifiability, and so on, of available goods.
289 Wilson, 1978, pp107-8.
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addition, a sophisticated ability to construct or imagine abstract cause-
and-effect models of the world – a “causal or instrumental intelligence” –
that enables them to model the effects of their own actions, and thereby
devise new ways to achieve their goals. (We might think of this ability as
an advanced version of the rudimentary folk physics and tool-using
abilities found in other species.)290 Instrumental intelligence has made it
possible for humans to vastly increase the number and type of natural
resources they can exploit, and increased their range of habitable
environments. And, once invented, these novel manipulations can be
pooled and passed onto others thanks to humans’ enhanced inferential
and communicative abilities (‘theory of mind’ and language).291
If humans can invent new ways of solving problems, then they can
presumably invent new ways of solving collective-action problems. This
is manifestly the case with a range of tools that can be seen as "extended
phenotypes",292 "outside-the-skin control mechanisms",293 "extrasomatic
scaffolding"294 that support vast increases in the scope of human
cooperation. For example, humans have extended their ability to
coordinate their behaviour by inventing: written language, semaphore,
morse code, telegraphs, telephones, radio, television, telecommunication
satellites, the internet, road signs, maps, compasses, GPS, sundials,
watches, clocks, diaries, and calendars. They have extended the scope of
exchange and reciprocity through such "technologies of trust"295 as: CVs,
letters of recommendation, money,296 written contracts, “mechanical
cheater-detectors” such as “[c]ash registers tapes, punch clocks, train
                                                 
290 Whiten, (forthcoming).
291 “Burrowing animals, underground storage organs, nuts, seeds, bone marrow, birds, fish,
molluscs, tool accessible nests, plant foods whose toxins or other inhibiting secondary
compounds can be neutralized through processing or cooking, quick animals that must be
ambushed, animals whose capture requires close cooperation, tools, or intelligent trickery – all
are made accessible by the ability to perform appropriate learned or invented manipulations.”
Tooby and DeVore, 1987, pp209-10.
292 Dawkins, 1982.
293 Clifford Geertz talks about symbols such as "words . . . gestures, drawings, musical sounds,
mechanical devices like clocks" as "extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms . . . for
ordering behaviour", for allowing humans to "find their bearings" Geertz, 1973, pp44-5. See also:
Berger and Luckmann, 1966.
294 Clark, 1997.
295 Wright, 2000, p205.
296 Money is a "formal token of delayed reciprocal altruism". Dawkins, 1976, p188.
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tickets, receipts, accounting ledgers”297, handcuffs, prisons, electric chairs,
CCTV, branding of criminals, and criminal records. And they have
extended the scope of conflict resolution through such technologies as
medals, games and sports, titles, land registries, and so on.
We might apply the same analysis to the use of “rules”. In theory, people
could invent and recommend an endless variety of social rules: people
must drive on the left; everyone must wear blue hats; murderers must be
beheaded; people should drink only boiled water; people must eat
bananas on Tuesdays… and so on. In practice, people will approve of and
adopt only those rules that further their ends (including the social,
cooperative and altruistic ends represented by their various adaptations
for cooperation). Let’s call solutions to coordination problems
‘conventions’, solutions to free-rider problems ‘laws’, and solutions to
conflict resolution problems ‘regulations’. Thus people approve of
conventions, laws and regulations to the extent that they efficiently
promote cooperation.298 And we might add that costly-signalling alpha
males shoulder a disproportionately large share of the burden of
enforcing these social rules, and receive the approval and support of
members of their societies to the extent that they do so efficiently and
effectively; and also that social and political reform can be seen as the
process whereby society is moved from one stable but sub-optimal set of
rules to another more optimal set.299
And so, in addition to evolved intuitions about what they ought to do in
order to bring about various cooperative outcomes, humans are equipped
with a wide array of tools and rules that further these ends. This ability to
generate and transmit novel techniques, including the ability to generate
and transmit novel solutions to problems of cooperation, provides
evolutionists with a rudimentary account and analysis of ‘culture’. To
                                                 
297 Pinker, 1997, p504.
298 This seems to be the case with conventions. Miller and Bresoff report that "rules are likely to
be regarded as legitimate social conventions [qua "solutions to social-coordination problems"] if
they are judged to be functional in meeting interests common to all members of a social body"
Miller and Bersoff, 1988, p367. Posner has applied this analysis to law in general: Posner, 1973;
Posner, 1981.
299 For this last point see: Binmore, 1994a; Binmore, 1994b.
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quote Steven Pinker: "Culture can be seen instead as a part of the human
phenotype . . . The phenomena we call 'culture' arise as people pool and
accumulate their discoveries, and as they institute conventions to
coordinate their labours and adjudicate their conflicts."300 Thus equipped,
humans have navigated their way through the stormy waters of the past
ten thousand years to generate what we know as human history.301
An aside on cultural transmission and cultural evolution
At this juncture it is worth mentioning that several theorists have argued
that cultural transmission makes cultural artefacts subject to a process of
evolution by natural selection;302 and that cultural evolution provides an
alternative explanation for the emergence of morality.
The basic idea of cultural evolution is that packets of cultural information
or ‘memes’ – such as songs, limericks, catchphrases, techniques, habits,
ideologies, institutions and so on – may vary slightly, and more
memorable or useful memes might get picked up and spread further and
faster than other less memorable or useful memes. In this way, the 'meme
pool' – the ideas of a particular culture – may come to be full of memes
that are good at getting themselves copied. And hence the design of
cultural artefacts is not merely the product of human ingenuity, but also
of a selective process equivalent to natural selection. As a result of this
process, different cultures may come to be dominated by different tools
and rules. Societies that come to adopt better memes may thrive at the
expense of other societies, which may die out.303 The differential success
rate of societies provides an additional selective pressure driving cultural
evolution.
                                                 
300 Pinker, 2002, p60. As this quote demonstrates, evolutionary and biological explanations of
human behaviour are not alternatives to ‘cultural explanations’; they constitute part of the
explanation of what culture is. Furthermore, this ‘instrumental’ view of culture stands in
contradistinction to accounts that would argue that ‘culture’ provides an autonomous source of
moral values or norms.
301 Diamond, 1999; Wright, 2000.
302 Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Dawkins, 1976; Dennett, 1995;
Lumsden and Wilson, 1981.
303 This is sometimes called ‘cultural trait group selection’ or ‘equilibrium selection’. See:
Binmore, 1994a; Binmore, 1994b; Dawkins, 1980; Sober and Wilson, 1998.
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Turning to the emergence of morality, some theorists begin with a
pessimistic, Hobbesian account of human nature, and argue that cultural
evolution has equipped humans with social, cooperative and moral ends.
According to Dennett, memes have ‘interests’ in the same way that genes
have interests; that is, they exhibit features designed to promote their
replication. In this way, memes constitute an autonomous source of
interests, goals and values and hence provide an alternative source of
motivation for, and hence explanation of, human behaviour. The interests
of memes can conflict with the interests of the genes of their hosts. In such
cases memes can "redirect or exploit or subvert . . . [the] genetically
endorsed designs" of their hosts in exactly the same way that a particular
parasite takes over the nervous system of certain ants.304 In other cases,
however, memes share common interests with the genes of their host, and
can therefore act as benign symbionts that provide benefits. For example,
certain memes might lead their hosts to be more cooperative or altruistic,
thereby solving various collective-action problems. Hence memes can
counter-act some of our selfish tendencies and promote more beneficial
cooperation; and individuals or societies ‘infected’ with such memes may
‘do better’ than uninfected rivals.305 Other researchers, adopting a milder
version of the thesis, have assumed that humans have a generalised
tendency to be social, and to conform to local conventions, but that their
biology leaves the means  by which they cooperate open; cultural
evolution is then invoked to explain the design of the means – the moral
rules – that they adopt.
Clearly, arguments to the effect that morality is a product of cultural
evolution must establish: that there is such a thing as cultural evolution;
and that cultural evolution provides a better explanation of morality than
does biological evolution. Below I argue that there is no such thing as
cultural evolution in any strict sense, and so cultural evolution is not
available as a candidate explanation of morality (or of anything else).
                                                 
304 Dennett, 1995, p472.
305 Dennett, 1995, p470.
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Does culture evolve by natural selection as opposed to merely changing
gradually? In order to be subject to evolution by natural selection, an
entity must undergo successive rounds of ‘random variation and non-
random replication’. Genes, for example, undergo random variation
(mutation). And gene replication – by means of an exact template – is
non-random by virtue of the fit between their phenotypic effects and the
world. However, it is far from clear that there are such things as ‘memes’
that meet these criteria.
First, new cultural artefacts – tools and rules – do not appear, nor are they
modified, at random. Cups, for example, did not start out as randomly-
varying amorphous blobs and only later, through selective retention of
some blobs, come to hold first a little bit of water, then a little bit more,
and finally an entire pint. On the contrary, people invent, create and
experiment with new designs; and once invented, artefacts tend to
improve gradually over time because successive designers make
improvements. Hence cultural artefacts exhibit ‘non-random’ or ‘directed’
variation. As a result, it is not clear what problem ‘culture evolution’ is
intended to solve. Recall that in biology, the problem that natural
selection solved was how to explain design in the absence of a designer.
When it comes to culture, we have an explanation of design: the human
designer. In order to create a problem in need of a solution, proponents of
cultural evolution would need to point to a feature of an artefact that goes
beyond what its creator intended, but might be explained as a product of
the independent design process of cultural evolution. But no such
examples are forthcoming. Instead, proponents of cultural evolution tend
to point to artefacts or habits that persist despite harming their users
(such as smoking); or they point to serendipitous features that had
unintended consequences (such as, boiling water also purifies it). But we
have plenty of explanations of why people are addicted to smoking –
explanations that have to do with human physiology, and the existence of
large cigarette corporations – that do not posit that smoking is a self-
replicating entity. And while it is undoubtedly the case that discoveries
and inventions have unanticipated consequences, and that societies that
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make better discoveries ‘do better’ than societies that do not, it is not clear
what cultural evolution adds to this observation.
Second, cultural transmission may well be non-random – in the sense that
useful artefacts spread further and faster than useless ones – but it does
not involve replication of the kind necessary to lead to the accumulation of
beneficial design features. Cultural artefacts are not copied ‘warts and all’
from person to person as would be the case if transmission was as precise
as the template-replication that genes undergo. Instead, social learning
and cultural transmission involve the sophisticated inferential
reconstruction of the goals of the actor, which includes the ability to
correct for the actor’s mistakes. Even infants correct for the errors that
their teacher is making, and copy what the actor is trying to do and not
what the actor actually does.306 Hence memes exhibit non-random
transmission but not non-random replication.
If cultural artefacts do not vary randomly, and are not replicated exactly,
then they are not subject to natural selection, and cultural transmission
provides no independent mechanism for explaining the design of tools
and rules. As such, ‘cultural evolution’ seems to be little more than a
convoluted redescription of the phenomena it seeks to explain. If Person
A sees Person B enjoying an exotic fruit, and elects to try it herself, is it
any more than a redescription of the phenomena to say that the ‘meme
for’ eating that fruit has spread from Person A to Person B? If a newcomer
adopts the local convention of driving on the left, what extra theoretical
leverage is gained by claiming that the ‘meme for’ driving on the left has
gained another host? If anything, the metaphor of cultural evolution
serves only to obscure and distract attention from the actual motors of
culture and cultural change: the many different psychological
mechanisms, abilities and preferences involved in the invention and
transmission of different types of cultural artefacts.307 After all, the
psychological mechanisms that enable a child to acquire local vocabulary
are quite distinct from the mechanisms that create aversions to particular
                                                 
306 Pinker, 2002, p62.
307 Daly, 1982; Miller, 2000b.
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types of food, or the combination of folk physics and folk psychology that
enable a person to inferentially reconstruct and recreate the purposes of a
tool.
Clearly, if there are no such things as memes or cultural evolution, then
this alternative account of morality does not even get off the starting
blocks. We can leave for another day such questions as: how and why
natural selection would have removed adaptations for cooperation from
the human line; how ‘cultural evolution’ is supposed to account for the
genetic, hormonal, anatomical, physiological and neurological evidence
for specific adaptations for cooperation; or, in Dennett’s case, how memes
are supposed to commandeer human nervous systems, fusing their
values with our own.308
Hume’s account of moral psychology
As we have seen, Hume provided the classic statement of belief-desire
psychology. He assumed that people would act in ways that they
believed would satisfy their desires. But Hume argued, contrary to
Hobbes, that human nature comprised some desires that promoted the
welfare of others and the common good.309 These attributes met with the
approval of our moral sense – our sympathy with the common interest –
and were thereby deemed ‘moral’.310 In this section I show that the human
adaptations for cooperation discussed above correspond almost exactly to
                                                 
308 Incidentally, much of the appeal of Dennett's account of cultural evolution comes from the
claim that our reliance on memes provides a way to break free from our biology: "This is our
transcendence, our capacity to 'rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators'." But even if the
account that Dennett gives of culture were true, it is not so obvious that he succeeds in liberating
us; Dennett has, after all, compared memes to infestation by parasites. Indeed, in making us
slaves to two masters, the triumph of memes seems something of a hollow victory. Dennett, 1995,
p471. Undaunted, Dennett develops the idea that ‘memes set us free’ in: Dennett, 2003.
309 As we have seen, Hume used a variety of synonyms for ‘the common good’: the "publick
interest"; the "public good"; a "common end"; "the general interests of society"; "the good of
mankind". Hume, 1739/1985, p532, p580, p590, p620, p628.
310 The philosopher John Mackie notes: "Protagoras, Hobbes, Hume and Warnock are all at least
broadly in agreement about the problem that morality is needed to solve: limited resources and
limited sympathies together generate both competition leading to conflict and an absence of what
would be mutually beneficial cooperation." And as Simon Blackburn notes: "the great naturalists,
theorists who have sought to understand ethical thought as part of the natural world – notably
Hobbes and Hume – are also inclined towards ethical rules whose authority eventually derives
from promoting the common good, or, perhaps, avoiding the common bad." Blackburn, 1998,
p46; Mackie, 1977, p111.
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the passions, the sentiments and the character traits that Hume identified
as promoting the common good. These include familial affection,
sympathy, reciprocity, pride, humility, and respect for property. As we
shall see, the specific social problems that these passions and traits are
described as solving, and the way that they solve them, correspond
almost exactly to the problems of cooperation and the adaptive solutions
discussed above.
The main difference between the Darwinian and Humean accounts of
moral psychology is that they draw the line between ‘natural’ and
‘artificial’ in different places. According to the Darwinian account, we
have a range of adaptations for cooperation, and each of them may be
‘artificially extended’ through the invention of new tools and rules.
According to the Humean account, human nature has a range of ‘natural’
virtues to which has been added a range of invented ‘artificial’ virtues.
For example, whereas the Darwinian sees reciprocity and property as
ancient and hard-wired aspects of human psychology, Hume regards
them as relatively novel artificial inventions. However, the decision as to
where to draw the line is an empirical one; Hume decided where to draw
the line after surveying the evidence available to him. As we have seen, in
pursuing his “anatomy of the mind”, Hume adopted a principle of
comparative parsimony, and considered evidence from nonhuman
species to be relevant to determining whether certain passions were
natural to humans: “where the structure of parts in brutes is the same as
in men, and the operation of those parts also the same, the causes of that
operation cannot be different, and that whatever we discover to be true of
the one species, may be concluded without hesitation to be certain of the
other”.311 But Hume mistakenly thought that animals “quickly lose sight
of the relations of blood; and are incapable of that of right and property”
and cannot take pride in “external objects”.312 (Hume had clearly never
met a bee, a butterfly or a bower bird.) He therefore assumed that these
traits must be artificially created by humans. I suggest that, with access to
modern evidence, Hume would be willing to revise his initial conclusion
                                                 
311 Hume, 1739/1985, p375.
312 Hume, 1739/1985, p377.
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and view more of the virtues as natural (not least because such evidence
would bolster his overall argument for the naturalness of morality).
In any case, let us see what Hume had to say about familial affection,
sympathy, reciprocity, pride, humility, and respect for property.
Kinship
On the subject of kinship, Hume notes that families provide for the
education of children, and contribute to the stability of society as a whole.
Hume observes that families are held together by ties of natural affection:
"the relation of blood produces the strongest tie the mind is capable of in
the love of parents to their children, and a lesser degree of the same
affection, as the relation lessens."313 This natural affection for one’s
children gives rise to a duty of care for one’s offspring: “We blame a
father for neglecting his child. Why? because it shews a want of natural
affection, which is the duty of every parent.”314
More specifically, Hume noted that uncertainty of paternity would lead
men and women to differ in their degree of commitment their children:
[I]n order to induce the men to ... undergo cheerfully all the
fatigues and expences [of child-rearing], they must believe,
that the children are their own... Now if we examine the
structure of the human body we shall find, that ... an error
may easily take place on the side of the [man], tho' it be
utterly impossible with regard to the [woman]. Men are
induc'd to labour for the maintenance and education of their
children, by the persuasion that they really are their own;
and therefore 'tis reasonable, and even necessary, to give
them some security in this particular.315
                                                 
313 Hume, 1739/1985, p401.
314 Hume, 1739/1985, p530.
315 Hume, 1739/1985, p621.
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As a result of this asymmetry, argued Hume, chastity and sexual fidelity
are valued more in women than in men: “In order, therefore, to impose a
due restraint on the female sex, we must attach a peculiar degree of
shame to their infidelity, above what arises merely from its injustice, and
must bestow proportionable praises on their chastity." 316 In other words,
feminine virtues such as fidelity and chastity are moral because they help
to keep families together, which in turn benefits society.
Coordination to mutual advantage
Hume had relatively little to say about ‘theory of mind’ (unless one
interprets the ability to take up the position of the “judicious spectator” in
this context). Hume did, however, discuss sympathy and conventions qua
solutions to coordination problems.
Hume regarded ‘sympathy’ as central to human moral psychology. For
Hume, the human mind was such that feelings and emotions are
inevitably transmitted from one to another: “The minds of all men are
similar in their feelings and operations; nor can any one be actuated by
any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible. As
in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the
rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and
beget correspondent movements in every human creature.”317 Sympathy
enables us to feel another’s pleasures and pains as our own. In the first
instance, sympathy disposes people to be generous to “friends and
family, or, at most, . . . [members of] their native country”. But sympathy
also establishes a general rule or habit by which we interact with others,
and thus extends, in a weaker form, to people in general. The result is that
“A propensity to the tender passions makes a man agreeable and useful
in all the parts of life.”318
                                                 
316 Hume, 1739/1985, p621.
317 Hume, 1739/1985, pp626-7.
318 Hume recognised that benevolence is dependent on there being some common interest. “[T]he
fortifications of a city belonging to an enemy are esteemed beautiful upon account of their
strength, tho’ we cou’d wish that they were entirely destroy’d.” Hume, 1739/1985, p637.
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Sympathy was also central to Hume’s account of ‘artificial virtue’. As
suggested above, in addition to the natural virtues, Hume argued that
there were also a range of ‘artificial virtues’ that did not spring directly
from human nature, but were the product of human artifice, invention
and contrivance. “Mankind,” noted Hume, “is an inventive species”.319
Foremost amongst these ‘artificial virtues’ were ‘conventions’. Hume’s
account of convention begins with “a general sense of common interest”
which “all the members of the society express to one another, and which
induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules”. “When this
common sense of interest is mutually expressed, and is known to both, it
produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly
enough be call’d a convention or agreement betwixt us . . . “.320 Hume
illustrates conventions with two examples of cooperative labour: two men
pulling on the oars of a boat, and two men working together to drain a
meadow.321 In the latter case: “Two neighbours may agree to drain a
meadow, which they possess in common; because it is easy for them to
know each others mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate
consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the whole
project.”322
Artificial virtues, such as conventions, meet with our approval to the
extent that they promote the common good, and thereby invoke our
sympathy:
Now as the means to an end can only be agreeable, where
the end is agreeable; and as the good of society, where our
own interest is not concerned, or that of our friends, pleases
only by sympathy: It follows, that sympathy is the source of
the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues. . . .
[S]ympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature, . .
                                                 
319 Hume, 1739/1985, p536.
320 Hume, 1739/1985, p541.
321 Hume, 1739/1985, p541, p542.
322 Hume, 1739/1985, p590. Skyrms uses this example to illustrate the problem of Rousseau’s
‘stag hunt’ Skyrms, 2004, p2.
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. it produces our sentiment of morals in all the artificial
virtues.323
As John Rawls notes, because the convention promotes the common
interest, Hume treats it “as normative in that violations of it are objected
to and criticized and the offending party is expected to accept these
reproofs and suitable penalties”.324
Reciprocity
Hume argues that the problems of ‘delayed mutualism’ are solved by
another artificial virtue: reciprocity. Hume argued that selfishness and
short-sightedness325 often prevented people from taking advantage of
certain forms of cooperation:
Men being naturally selfish, or endow'd only with a confin'd
generosity, they are not easily induc'd to perform any action
for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some
reciprocal advantage, which they had no hope of attaining
but by such a performance. Now as it frequently happens,
that these mutual performances cannot be finish'd at the
same instant, 'tis necessary, that one party contented to
remain in uncertainty, and depend upon the gratitude of the
other for a return of kindness. . . . [But] we cannot depend
upon their gratitude. Here then is the mutual commerce of
good offices in a manner lost among mankind . . . 326
                                                 
323 Hume, 1739/1985, p628. Hume continues: “had not men a natural sentiment of approbation
and blame, it could never be excited by politicians; nor would the words laudable and praise-
worthy, blameable and odious be any more intelligible, than if they were a language perfectly
known to us, as we have already observed.” (pp629-30). Or, as Hume puts it elsewhere, "a
sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation" of the convention. Hume,
1739/1985, p551.
324 Rawls, 2000, pp60-1.
325 “Men are always more concern’d about the present life than the future; and are apt to think the
smallest evil, which regards the former, more important than the greatest, which regards the
latter.” “There is no quality in human nature, which causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than
that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and remote….” Hume, 1739/1985,
p577, p590.
326 Hume, 1739/1985, pp571-2.
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As a result, "both of us lose our harvest for want of mutual confidence
and security."327 People overcome this problem, argues Hume, by means
of the institution of promising – a conventional sign of obligation – and
we keep our promises in order to maintain our reputations for honesty.
"Hence I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real
kindness; because I forsee, that he will return my service, in expectation
of another of the same kind, and in order to maintain the same
correspondence of good offices with me or with others."328 In this way,
Hume identifies both the problem and the solution of the prisoner’s
dilemma.
Conflict resolution: costly-signalling and hierarchy
In another remarkable passage, Hume introduces pride, humility and
admirable character traits (called ‘virtues’) with a discussion of the costly
signalling of fitness indicators in other species:
It is plain, that almost in every species of creatures, but
especially of the nobler kind, there are many evident marks
of pride and humility. The very port and gait of a swan, or
turkey, or peacock show the high idea he has entertained of
himself, and his contempt of all others. This is the more
remarkable, that in the two last species of animals, the pride
always attends the beauty, and is discovered in the male
only. The vanity and emulation of nightingales in singing
have been commonly remarked; as likewise that of horses in
swiftness, of hounds in sagacity and smell, of the bull and
cock in strength, and of every other animal in his particular
excellency.329
                                                 
327 Hume, 1739/1985, p573.
328 Hume, 1739/1985, p573.
329 However, argued that animals could take pride only in their physical characteristics, not in
their intelligence, or “external objects” Hume, 1739/1985, p376.
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“All these are evident proofs,” argues Hume, “that pride and humility are
not merely human passions, but extend themselves over the whole
animal creation.”330
Hume proceeds to argue that the causes of pride and humility are “much
the same in beasts as in us”: “the same qualities cause pride in the animal
as in the human kind; and it is on beauty, strength, swiftness or some
other useful or agreeable quality that this passion is always founded”.331
In humans, Hume argues that attributes such as "beauty, strength, agility,
good mien, address in dancing, riding, and . . . dexterity in any manual
business or manufacture" as well as mental qualities such as "imagination,
judgment, memory or disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage,
justice, integrity" are all causes of "a genuine and hearty pride, or self
esteem".332 Such 'well founded' pride is "essential to the character of a man
of honour" and is responsible for "heroic virtue" that benefits others. These
virtues include: "[c]ourage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory,
magnanimity, and all the other shining virtues".333
Hume also notes that differences in ability give rise to hierarchies in
which "certain deferences and mutual submissions” are required “of the
different ranks of men towards each other . . . “. “'Tis necessary, therefore,
to know our rank and station in the world, . . . to feel the sentiment and
passion of pride in conformity to it, and to regulate our actions
accordingly."334 Humility, the converse of pride, is also valuable to the
smooth running of society: "a just sense of our weakness, is esteem'd
virtuous, and procures the good-will of everyone"335
                                                 
330 Hume, 1739/1985, p376.
331 Hume, 1739/1985, pp376-7.
332 Hume, 1739/1985, pp330-1, p648-9. The absence of these qualities was occasion for humility.
333 Hume, 1739/1985, pp648-50. Adam Smith concurs: "We frequently, not only pardon, but
thoroughly enter into and sympathize with the excessive self-estimation of those splendid
characters in which we observe a great and distinguished superiority above the common level of
mankind. We call them spirited, magnanimous, and high-minded; words which all involve in their
meaning a considerable degree of praise and admiration." Smith, 1759/1976, p255.
334 Hume, 1739/1985, p650. "A sense of superiority in another breeds in all men an inclination to
keep themselves at a distance from him, and determines them to redouble the marks of respect
and reverence, when they are oblig'd to approach him" (p441).
335 Hume, 1739/1985, p642.
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Conflict resolution: property
Finally, Hume discusses at length the problem of defending private
property, and its solution.
There is, notes Hume, a scarcity of goods "in comparison of the wants and
desires of men".336 Hence, when men form society, "[t]he convention
concerning the stability of possession is enter'd into, in order to cut off all
occasions of discord and contention".337 It is "a convention for the stability
of possession, and for mutual restraint and forbearance".338 Hume
proceeds to discuss the means by which property is assigned, and argues
that foremost among these is "first possession" or "occupation".339 For
Hume, this right to property is central to the formation of society, and
accounts, in large part, for our ideas of justice and injustice. "After this
convention . . . there immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice;
as also those of property, right, and obligation. . . . [A]fter the agreement for
the fixing and observance of this rule, there remains little or nothing to be
done towards settling a perfect harmony and concord."340
What is more, Hume anticipates ‘prospect theory’ by two hundred years
when he observes that “Men generally fix their affections more on what
they are possessed of, than on what they never enjoyed”.341
In summary, it seems that evolutionists and Hume come to similar
conclusions about the problems facing social animals, and about the kinds
of solutions they tend to adopt. Adaptations for kin altruism,
coordination, reciprocity and conflict resolution clearly encompass what
Hume refers to as natural affection, feminine virtue, sympathy,
convention, reciprocity, pride, heroic virtue, first possession, and so on.
                                                 
336 Hume, 1739/1985, p546.
337 Hume, 1739/1985, p553.
338 Hume, 1739/1985, p554.
339 Hume, 1739/1985, p556. The other means of acquiring property are: prescription, which refers
to the a historical record of first possession; accession, which is the right to own the produce of
one's possessions, such as the apples from one's tree; and succession, which is the right to inherit
property from one's kin. Property can also be transferred by consent – which serves to allocate
property to those that desire it most. Hume, 1739/1985, pp556-8.
340 Hume, 1739/1985, p542, p543.
341 Hume, 1739/1985, p534.
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Conclusions
Two conclusions follow from this correspondence between evolutionary
psychology and Hume’s thinking.
The first is that – thanks to evolutionary theory, animal behaviour,
human evolutionary psychology, and the ethnographic record – Hume
wins his argument with Hobbes. Human nature is not entirely selfish, but
comprises desires aimed at the welfare of others and at the common
good. For this reason, as Simon Blackburn observes, Hume would “have
applauded contemporary alliances between philosophy and psychology,
neuroscience and evolutionary theory”.342
The second conclusion is that – thanks to Hume – the ethical import of the
discovery of adaptations for cooperation becomes clear. Remember that,
according to Hume, passions give rise to values; and passions aimed at
the common good give rise to moral values. If ‘moral passions’ are
revealed to be ‘adaptations for cooperation’, then it follows that ‘moral
values’ are revealed as ‘the proximate goals of these adaptations’. This
would suggest that, as Hume envisaged, moral philosophy – the study of
moral value – begins with the investigation of human nature and, as such,
should be seen as a branch of biology, psychology and anthropology.343
In the next chapter I review the moral philosophy that emerges from this
Humean-Darwinian account of morality by seeing how it tackles a range
of problems in moral philosophy.
                                                 
342 Blackburn, 2000.
343 As John Mackie puts it: “It is not for nothing that his work is entitled A Treatise of Human
Nature, and subtitled, An attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral
subjects; it is an attempt to study and explain moral phenomena (as well as human knowledge and
emotions) in the same sort of way in which Newton and his followers studied and explained the
physical world." Mackie, 1980, p6. Or, as Ernest C. Mossner’s introduction to the Treatise puts it,
Hume’s moral philosophy was “an attempt to establish a purely naturalistic ethics based on the
facts of human nature”. Hume, 1739/1985, p19.
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Chapter 5 – The problems of moral philosophy
[E]thical philosophers intuit the deontological canons of morality by
consulting the emotive centers of their own hypothalmic-limbic
systems.
– Edward O. Wilson344
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to show how the Humean-Darwinian
account of morality sketched in the previous chapters provides a rich
deductive framework in which to locate, make sense of, incorporate and
perhaps reconcile a wide variety of otherwise unruly, and apparently
contradictory, positions in traditional moral philosophy. I show that the
Humean-Darwinian account can incorporate meta-ethical theories about
the nature of moral values (such as monism and pluralism, subjectivism
and objectivism, universalism and particularism), as well as substantive
or normative theories about the content of moral values (such as the
feminist ‘ethic of care’, norm-following, social contracts, and virtue
ethics). I also show that the Humean-Darwinian account of human
morality provides a principled means of dividing up the problem space of
applied ethics. I conclude that because the Humean-Darwinian account is
consistent with what is known about human origins, human psychology
and human behaviour, and because it can incorporate a wide variety of
traditional ethical positions, it should be adopted as the default account
of morality.
Meta-ethics: What is the nature of moral value?
Meta-ethics can be divided into primary and secondary problems.
Primary problems include: What is the nature of moral value? What kinds
of things are they? Where do they come from? What are they made of?
How do they work? Where do they fit into our picture of the universe? In
the history of moral philosophy, there have been a variety of theological,
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cosmological, biological and sociological answers to these primary
questions (as well as nihilistic rejections of the premise that there are any
such things as moral values). Some have argued that moral values are
“divine commands” or "thoughts in the mind of God". Some have argued
that moral values are the dictates of reason or a ‘pure rational will’. Some
have argued that moral values are the product of natural human desires.
Some have argued that moral values are social conventions or cultural
inventions. And others have argued that so-called moral values are
merely the disguised 'interests of the stronger'.
David Hume treated the primary problem of 'the nature of morality' –
and specifically, the question of whether morality is a product of certain
desires – as an empirical problem to be solved by scientific method and
the best available evidence.345 The logic of Hume’s argument runs as
follows: Hume identifies acting morally with acting to promote the
common good. He presents a ‘subjective’ theory of value, according to
which values are the products of natural passions or desires. Hume then
argues that human nature comprises a variety of passions that naturally
dispose them to value and promote the common good. Thus Hume
concludes that moral values are the product of certain natural human
passions. (In addition, he argues that the moral passion of sympathy
enables humans to approve of novel and ‘artificial’ means of promoting
the common good.)
The Darwinian account of morality advanced in this thesis retains the
structure of Hume’s argument, but updates his ontology in two main
ways. First, it uses the (evolutionary) game theory of cooperation to
provide a rigorous account of ‘the common good’, and in doing so
distinguishes several different types of cooperation. Second, it views
‘passions’, ‘desires’, ‘sentiments’ and so on as examples of ‘adaptations’;
and it identifies ‘values’ with the proximate goals of adaptations. So, the
                                                 
345 This approach to the problems of meta-ethics differs from much of the rest of contemporary
meta-ethics, in which the problem is that we have conflicting intuitions about the operation of
moral psychology, and the methods used to solve these problems include further introspection
and intuition-mongering conducted within the framework provided by folk psychology. See:
Jackson, et al., 2004; Smith, 1994. Compare: Doris and Stich, (forthcoming); Stich, 1993.
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Humean-Darwinian account identifies morality with cooperation. It
presents a theory of value according to which values are the proximate
goals of adaptations. It shows that humans have adaptations for
cooperation that lead them to be social, cooperative and altruistic under
certain conditions. Thus it concludes that moral values are the products of
certain natural human adaptations. (In addition, these adaptations for
cooperation enable humans to approve of novel or ‘artificial’ means of
cooperating.)
In this way, Hume and Darwin offer an entirely naturalistic account of
the origins and ontological status of morality that is consistent with what
we know about human origins, psychology and behaviour. This account
of morality incorporates the ‘natural desire’ and ‘cultural invention’ meta-
ethical theories; it has no need for such question-begging entities as a god
or a ‘pure rational will’; and it rejects nihilistic skepticism about the
existence of moral value.
This Humean-Darwinian account also enables us to make sense of and
incorporate a variety of secondary meta-ethical theories. Secondary
problems include: Are moral values the subjective property of valuers, or
are they objective properties of the things valued? How many moral
values are there? Is there one ‘crowning virtue’ by which all the others
can be measured, or are there many potentially incompatible moral
values? Is there one moral system applicable to all humans, or do
different societies have different but equally valid moral systems? The
various possible answers are referred to as subjectivism and objectivism,
monism and pluralism, and universalism and particularism,
respectively.346
Subject and object
The Humean-Darwinian account of morality and moral value has
subjective and objective elements.
                                                 
346 I refer to these as secondary problems because their solutions depend in part on the position
one adopts on primary questions.
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On the one hand, values – qua the proximate goals of adaptations – are
clearly ‘subjective’ in the classical sense of being located in the minds of
human valuers, and not ‘out there’ in the objective world. On the other
hand, the adaptations that give rise to values are objective features of
human nature – they are as ‘objective’ as giraffes’ necks, peacocks’ tails,
or any other adaptation studied by evolutionary biology.347 Hence, human
values are not ‘subjective’ in the sense of being arbitrary, whimsical or
‘merely a matter of personal opinion’. On the contrary, the adaptations
involved are expected to be somewhat ‘hardwired’; people can no more
choose what moral values to have than they can choose which colours to
see. In addition, these adaptations have been selected to ‘latch on to’ and
to value certain reliably-occurring ‘objective’ features of the (social) world
– namely, configurations of interests that constitute opportunities for
cooperation, and traits and acts and inventions that realise such
opportunities. Hence, questions such as “What kind of game are we
playing (is this a coordination game or a prisoner’s dilemma)? What
would constitute a contribution to the common good in this context? Does
this particular act contribute more to the common good than some other
act?” and so on are objective questions that can be given objective
answers. They can be pursued separately from evaluative questions to do
with whether or not acting in a particular way (to promote the common
good) is (morally) desirable.
From the Humean-Darwinian perspective, it is not clear what there is to
gain by continuing to argue about whether adaptations are ‘subjective’ or
‘objective’; adaptations are subjective in some ways, and objective in
others. Now that we know what morality is, we can concentrate our
energies on investigating how it works, while providing historians of
moral philosophy with a theory of why it was that ethicists tended to
divide along subject-object lines.
                                                 
347 As Isaiah Berlin puts it: “values are objective – that is to say, their nature, the pursuit of them,
is part of what it is to be a human being, and this is an objective given. The fact that men are men
and women are women and not dogs or cats or tables or chairs is an objective fact; and part of this
objective fact is that there are certain values, and only those values, which men, while remaining
men, can pursue” Berlin, 1969; Berlin, 1998.
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A similar analysis can be applied to the tertiary question: What does a
person mean when they say ‘X is wrong’? Are they expressing something
like a desire or an attitude? Or is the statement an expression of a belief
about some matter of fact?348 Subjectivists (emotivists, expressivists,
internalists, non-cognitivists, and anti-realists) hold that moral statements
are expressions of desire; objectivists (externalists, cognitivists and
realists) hold that moral statements are expressions of belief. The
Humean-Darwinian answer is: ‘it depends’. Sometimes people say “X is
wrong” in order to express their feelings, to advertise their convictions, or
to reassure others of their humanity; sometimes, “X is wrong” expresses a
belief or an expectation about what other people think, or makes a factual
claim about the content of human moral sentiments;349 sometimes “X is
wrong” expresses a belief about the structure of the game, or the likely
consequences of an act; sometimes “X is wrong” expresses a belief that X
constitutes a relatively inefficient means to some more fundamental end;
sometimes “X is wrong” expresses the mistaken belief that moral values
are a property of external objects; and so on. The view that moral values
are proximate goals of adaptations for cooperation is consistent with all
these expressions. As always, in any given instance, the meaning of any
signal depends on what the audience is uncertain about, and which
aspect of that uncertainty the signaller is attempting to reduce.350
The one and the many
The Humean-Darwinian account of morality and moral value also has
monist and pluralist elements.
On the one hand, the Humean-Darwinian account suggests that there are
as many values as there are adaptations; and that there are as many moral
values as there are adaptations for cooperation. There are many adaptations
                                                 
348 I call these tertiary questions because one’s answers are largely the product of one’s position
on the secondary question of whether moral values are subjective or objective.
349 Smith, for example, argues that moral statements are ‘beliefs about desires’; that is, beliefs
about what desires we would in fact have under certain ideal conditions. Smith, 1991. See also:
Brink, et al., 1997.
350 Presumably, the intended meaning can be revealed by asking the speaker to give his reasons
for making the statement.
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for cooperation. Therefore, there are many moral values. In this sense, the
account is ‘value pluralist’ as defined by Isaiah Berlin: "there is a plurality
of values which men can and do seek, and . . . these values differ. There is
not an infinity of them: the number of human values, of values that I can
pursue while maintaining my human semblance, my human character, is
finite – let us say 74, or perhaps 122, or 26, but finite, whatever it may
be."351 It follows that, as value pluralists maintain, there are likely to be
situations in which two or more incompatible values come into conflict,
giving rise to apparently insoluble moral dilemmas.
On the other hand, what disparate moral values have in common is that
they all constitute means of achieving essentially the same end, namely
cooperation. In theory at least, the contribution that different values make
to the common good provides a common metric that can be used to trade
one value off against another. For example, if one is torn between keeping
a promise and being heroic, it is in theory possible to calculate what
contribution each value makes to the common good, and choose
accordingly. (Although they still might come out equal, in which case the
dilemma remains.) In this sense, the Humean-Darwinian account is
‘monist’ in Berlin’s terms, because it suggests that values are
commensurable.352
Again, on the Humean-Darwinian account, it is fruitless to argue about
whether morality is monist or pluralist; it is monist in some ways, but
pluralist in others. Instead, we can attempt to complete our catalogue of
the moral values, and investigate how they fit together and what
weightings they have been given by natural selection. Meanwhile, the
Humean-Darwinian account can bequeath to historians of moral
philosophy a theory of why it was that ethicists tended to divide
themselves up into monists and pluralists.
                                                 
351 Berlin, 1969; Berlin, 1998.
352 For further discussion of this issue, see Gray, 1995.
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Universal and particular
Finally, the Humean-Darwinian account of morality has universalist and
particularist elements.
Just as Hume thought that the moral passions were a universal part of
human nature, the Darwinian update of Hume expects the adaptations
for cooperation to be part of the ‘species-typical’ biology and psychology
of Homo sapiens. However, the theory expects this psychology to consist of
banks of sophisticated, condition-dependent, facultative adaptations that
lead moral sentiments to develop differently – and generate different
attitudes and behaviour – under different conditions. For example, the
psychological mechanisms governing paternal investment are sensitive to
cues of paternity; and cross-cultural differences in ‘certainty of paternity’
might be expected to lead to predictable cross-cultural differences in the
obligations of husbands to ‘their’ children. To take another example,
adaptations for reciprocity are expected to be sensitive to the degree of
luck versus effort that goes into the acquisition of a good, and to be
engaged only when the exchange of goods yields a net advantage to the
participants. Different ways of making a living – for example, hunting
versus gathering – might lead members of different societies to express
predictably different attitudes towards sharing and redistribution.353
For this reason, several theorists have suggested that the psychological
mechanisms underpinning morality can be compared to the
psychological mechanisms underpinning language – in other words,
there might be a universal ‘moral grammar’ that generates different
surface moralities in different environments.354
                                                 
353 Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Henrich, et al., (forthcoming). Compare Michael Walzer who, in
Spheres of Justice, observes that “the prescriptions . . . that attach children to their maternal
uncles” change over time, and that different societies assume that “different goods ought to be
distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures”. He attributes these
differences to differences in "cultural understandings" and "social meanings" that are "the
inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism”. Thus Walzer takes variation in moral
practice as evidence against universalist theories and in favour of relativist theories of the nature
of morality, and argues against the possibility of effective cross-cultural moral judgments Walzer,
1983, p228, p6.
354 See: Charvet, 1981, p190; Chomsky, 1988, pp153-4; Harman, 2000, Ch. 13; Rawls, 1971, p47.
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So, depending on one’s frame of reference, the Humean-Darwinian can
appear universalist and/or particularist.
On one hand, the Humean-Darwinian theory is universalist because it
posits that there are rules – embodied in species-typical adaptations for
cooperation – that underpin all possible human moral systems. And the
theory suggests that these rules could, in principle, be used to evaluate
the moral worth of an action under any given set of conditions, in any
given society, just as in linguistics, the rules of language embodied in
‘universal grammar’ can be used to determine the grammaticality of any
sentence in any linguistic community.
On the other hand, the theory is particularist because it expects different,
equally valid sets of moral values in different places. And the theory
suggests that it makes no sense to evaluate acts performed under one set
of conditions according to a set of values expressed under a different set
of conditions, just as it makes no sense to use the rules of English
grammar to determine whether a Chinese sentence is grammatical.
Once again, on the Humean-Darwinian account, it is redundant to argue
about whether morality is universalist or particularist; it is universalist in
some ways and particularist in others. Instead, we can continue to map
the countless ways in which adaptations for cooperation are context-
dependent, and begin to explain how moral systems develop differently
under different conditions. And we can furnish historians of moral
philosophy with a theory of why it was that ethicists tended to divide
themselves up along universalist-particularist lines.
Incidentally, the significance of the idea that there may be universal
human moral values that develop in different ways under different
conditions is not lost on moral relativists. David Wong, for example,
recognises that “some of the striking differences in moral belief across
societies may not be rooted in differences in fundamental values but in
the fact that these values may have to be implemented in different ways
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given the varying conditions that obtain across societies”.355 Nevertheless,
Wong stakes his moral relativism on the claim that there are “deep and
wide” value differences that go beyond what is accounted for by a
‘universal grammar’ approach. His candidate “deep and wide” difference
is the one that exists between the family-based ‘virtue-centered’
moralities of the East and the contract-based ‘rights-centred’ moralities of
the West.356 Of course, any such claim is vulnerable to advances in our
understanding of ‘moral grammar’. The question of whether any
particular value differences are really ‘deep and wide’, or whether they
are merely the product of yet-to-be-discovered variables in the
underlying moral grammar, is an empirical question that cannot be
settled until we have a more detailed explication of the underlying
content and structure of moral psychology.
Now that we have looked at how the Humean-Darwinian account of
morality tackles the problems of meta-ethics, we may proceed to look at
how it tackles the problems of substantive ethics.
Substantive ethics: What is the content of moral values?
Substantive ethics is the attempt to answer such questions as: What is the
content of our moral values? What does morality demand of us? Which
things are right and wrong?
According to Hume, acting morally consists of acting to promote the
common good. Humans promote the common good by: taking care of
their children, sympathising, adopting conventions, returning favours,
being heroic, respecting private property, and so on. Therefore, acting
morally requires that you: take care of your children, sympathise, adopt
conventions, return favours, be heroic, respect private property, and so
on. According to the Darwinian update of Hume, acting morally consists
of cooperating. Humans cooperate by: caring for family members,
adopting local norms, keeping promises, punishing cheats, resolving
                                                 
355 Wong, 1991, pp444-5.
356 Wong, 1984; Wong, 1991.
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disputes peacefully, respecting prior ownership, and so on. Therefore,
acting morally requires that you: care for family members, adopt local
norms, keep promises, punish cheats, resolve disputes peacefully, respect
prior ownership, and so on.
This Humean-Darwinian account of the content of morality provides a
rich deductive framework in which to locate, make sense of, incorporate
and perhaps reconcile a wide variety of disparate, and apparently
contradictory, positions in traditional normative ethics. Below I show,
first, that cooperation, in one form or another, has been identified as the
raison d’etre of morality by a wide variety of moral philosophers. Second, I
show that the various different ways that humans cooperate, as specified
by the Humean-Darwinian account, have been identified by various
different traditions in moral philosophy – such as the feminist ‘ethic of
care’, norm-following, social contract theory, and virtue ethics – as
constitutive elements of human morality.
Cooperation and the common good
The Humean-Darwinian assumption that morality can be identified with
cooperation is shared by a wide variety of moral philosophers. Plato saw
justice as an efficient division of labour, in which each individual, and each
part of the soul, stuck to the role that it was good at, to the mutual benefit
of all.357 Aristotle argued that justice is "what is for the benefit of the
whole community" or “to the common advantage."358 St Augustine argued
that the human law consists of “an ordered concord of civic obedience
and rule in order to secure a kind of co-operation of men's wills for the
sake of attaining the things which belong to this mortal life".359 Aquinas
observed: "If then a group of free men is directed by a rule to the common
good of the group, his government will be right and just . . . ".360 Bishop
Butler suggested that “there is a public end and interest of society which
                                                 
357 Plato, 1974.
358 Aristotle, 1992, p207, 1160a10-14.
359 Augustine, 1998, p945.
360 Aquinas, 1988, pp15-6.
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each particular is obliged to promote, is the sum of morals."361 Bertrand
Russell notes that "[M]en's desires conflict, and 'good' is, to my mind,
mainly a social concept, designed to find issue from this conflict."362 John
Rawls notes that: "The circumstances of justice may be described as the
normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and
necessary."363 David Wong comments: “Human beings have needs to
resolve internal conflicts between requirements and to resolve interpersonal
conflicts of interest. Morality is a social creation that evolved in response to
these needs".364 John Mackie observes that: "Protagoras, Hobbes, Hume
and Warnock are all at least broadly in agreement about the problem that
morality is needed to solve: limited resources and limited sympathies
together generate both competition leading to conflict and an absence of
what would be mutually beneficial cooperation."365 The economist and
social theorist Henry Hazlitt observes that: "Social cooperation is the
foremost means by which the majority of us attain most of our ends. It is
on the implicit if not the explicit recognition of this that our codes of
morals, our rules of conduct, are ultimately based. 'Justice' itself . . .
consists in observance of the rules or principles that do most, in the long
run, to preserve and promote social cooperation."366 And the philosophers
Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson are 'tempted' "to think of the
normative principles governing individual interactions as human
contrivances to adjudicate conflicts of interest and to secure the benefits
of cooperation".367
Some moral philosophers have been even more specific, and have
mentioned all four of the types of cooperation that evolutionary theory
leads us to expect. In his influential The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick
writes that 'common sense' suggests that there are four kinds of moral
duties: “(1) duties arising out of comparatively permanent relationships
not voluntarily chosen, such as Kindred . . . : (2) those of similar
                                                 
361 Butler, 1856, IX.
362 Russel, 1927, p230.
363 Rawls, 1971, p126.
364 Wong, 1984, p175.
365 Mackie, 1977, p111.
366 Hazlitt, 1964.
367 Hausman and McPherson, 1996, p151, p186.
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relationships voluntarily contracted, such as Friendship: (3) those that
spring from special services received, or Duties of Gratitude; and (4) those
that seem due to special need, or Duties of Pity."368 And it is to these four
types of cooperation that we now turn.
Kin altruism and family values
The obligations that one has to aid one’s children and one’s wider family
have been considered constituent elements of human morality the world
over. In his survey of the world’s moral systems, Edward Westermarck
observed that:
There is one duty so universal and obvious that it is seldom
mentioned: the mother's duty to rear her children, provided
they are suffered to live. Another duty – equally primitive, I
believe, in the human race – is incumbent on the married
man: the protection and support of his family. . . . The
parent's duty of taking care of their offspring is, in the first
place, based on the sentiment of parental affection. That the
maternal sentiment is universal in mankind is a fact too
generally admitted to need demonstration; not so the
father's love of his children. . . . [T]he paternal sentiment is
hardly less universal than the maternal, although it is
probably never so strong and in many cases distinctly
feeble.369
More recent anthropological surveys have tended to agree about the
ubiquity of the duties of the good mother. Edel and Edel observe that "the
moral obligation for a mother to take care of her children" is "a common
moral obligation which is deeply grounded in humans needs, biological,
physiological and social . . . . This is a universal imperative, and very
                                                 
368 Sidgwick, 1962, p248. Here I am interpreting ‘duties due to special need’ in terms of costly
signals of altruism.
369 Westermarck, 1906, quoted in Westermarck, 1994, pp61-3.
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pervasive in its moral implications, for it serves the groundwork not just
for restrictions, but for positive ideals and virtues."370
The Humean-Darwinian account of moral values can also explain why
women might feel that they have a different ‘ethic’ to men in some areas.
As we have seen, evolutionary theory expects the sexes to differ to the
extent that they have faced different adaptive problems during their
evolutionary history. For example, women's reproductive success has
depended more upon making discriminating decisions when it comes to
investing in offspring than has the reproductive success of men, and as a
result they have a more exacting psychology for solving such problems. If
moral reasoning involves the execution of evolved adaptive decision
rules, then evolutionary theory should lead us to expect sex differences in
moral reasoning to the extent that men and women have faced different
collective-action problems in their evolutionary histories. And if the
proximate goals of these adaptations constitute moral goals, then there
should be some disagreement between men and women about how one
ought to behave. Charles Darwin was the first person to draw out the
implications of his theory for sex differences in moral values. Darwin
expected that the adaptive problems facing women – primarily, childcare
– would select for sympathy and selflessness, whereas the adaptive
problems facing men – primarily, competition with other men – would
select for the virtues of patriotism and courage. Darwin saw moral
progress as the process whereby female sympathy came to predominate
over the male virtues, and began to extend from the family to the tribe to
the nation to all of humanity and then to all living things.371
In recent years, many feminist writers have (inadvertently) re-invented
this argument, although without the biological underpinnings. The basic
message of "feminist ethics" is that there is a female way of relating to
others that is distinct from the way that males relate to others.
Furthermore, it is argued, this mode of relating to others provides an
alternative set of values from which to critique the values of
                                                 
370 Edel and Edel, 1959/1968, p34.
371 Darwin, 1871, p326. For a discussion, see: Arnhart, 1998, pp143-149.
- 135 -
contemporary, ‘male-dominated’ society.372 For example, Carol Gilligan
and others have argued that women are more likely to adopt an 'ethic of
care' – that is, distributing goods according to the needs of the recipients,
and the relationships that one has with them – as opposed to an 'ethic of
justice' – that is, distributing goods according to abstract rules and
principles.373 This female mode of moral reasoning is suggestively similar
to the way in which a mammalian mother would relate to her offspring.
This theme is apparent in work with titles such as Maternal Thinking and
Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and education.374
Turning to “the duty of assisting brothers and sisters and more distant
relatives”, Westermarck observes that: “Among the Aleuts . . . a brother
'must always aid his brother in war as well as in the chase, and each
protect the other; but if anybody, disregarding this natural law, should go
to live apart . . . such dishonourable conduct would lead to general
contempt.' . . . I presume that these examples of fraternal relations may,
on the whole, be regarded as expressive of universal facts.”375
Westermarck goes on to comment that duties to kin reach their apotheosis
in the moral philosophy of Confucius, according to whom “the love
which brother should bear to brother is second only to that which is due
from children to parents."376 The moral relativist David Wong, and the
social theorist Francis Fukuyama concur that obligations to one’s kin
constitute moral duties according to Confucianism. Wong observes that
Confucianism makes “the family and kinship groups the models for the
common good", and that the Chinese “modelled ideal political relations
after the hierarchical structure of the family”.377 And Fukuyama observes
that: "The central core [of the 'Confucian personal ethic'] was the
apotheosis of the family – in Chinese, the jia – as the social relationship to
                                                 
372 Grimshaw, 1991.
373 Gilligan, 1982.
374 Noddings, 1978; Ruddick, 1980.
375 Westermarck, 1906, quoted in Westermarck, 1994, pp61-3. “Aleut” is the name given to
inhabitants of the islands off Alaska. Dumond, 1987.
376 Westermarck, 1906, quoted in Westermarck, 1994, pp61-3.
377 Wong, 1984, p163; Wong, 1991, p445.
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which all others were subordinate. Duty to the family trumped all other
duties…".378
Coordination to mutual advantage
Successful mutualism involves identifying others with whom you have
common interests, and coordinating your behaviour with theirs. Iterated
mutualisms can also lead to the formation of strong affiliations between
unrelated individuals: friendships. These ways of cooperating – the
identification with another’s goals, coordination by means of shared
expectations or ‘norms’, and the formation of friendships – have figured
prominently in a number of moral philosophies.
The tendency to identify with others’ goals and adopt them as one’s own
– to exhibit sympathy, compassion, empathy, fellow-feeling, pity – has
been central to a number of prominent moral philosophies.379 In the
previous chapter we saw that Hume regarded sympathy as the pre-
eminent moral passion, responsible for our general ‘agreeable’ attitude
towards others, and also for our approval of the artificial virtues. Darwin
argued that many animals felt sympathy with their fellow creatures, and
that such sympathy was the "foundation-stone" of a "moral sense or
conscience".380 Most famously, Adam Smith made sympathy central to his
Theory of Moral Sentiments.381 Smith argued that, contrary to Hobbes,
humans are not indifferent to the joys and sorrows of others, but are
disposed to “enter into the motives” of others and be affected
accordingly. Smith referred to this tendency as pity, compassion or
sympathy.382 According to Smith, sympathy works by imagining that we
are in the other’s place, and “conceiving what we ourselves should feel in
                                                 
378 Fukuyama, 1996, p85.
379 For reviews, see Goldman, 1993; Harman, 2000, Ch. 11. These reviews seem to suggest that
further investigation into the human capacity for ‘mindreading’ may reveal that theory of mind
makes possible other apparently unique features of human moral psychology, such as the ability
to see oneself as others see you – to conceive of an impartial spectator, or an impartial observer –
and hence to make impartial evaluations of one’s own conduct.
380 Darwin, 1871, pp70-2.
381 Smith, 1759/1976.
382 “Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of
others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however,
without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion
whatever.” Smith, 1759/1976.
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the like situation”.383 Sympathy, according to Smith, is more sophisticated
than merely copying the emotions present in another (‘emotional
contagion’). Sometimes an observer experiences emotions that the
observed does not (for example, when we feel sorry for a unwitting
cuckold, or embarrassed for another’s unacknowledged faux pas). And
sometimes the observer does not experience the emotions that the
observed does (for example, when we think the person is ‘over-reacting’,
or where his anger is not justified). Smith argues that the exercise of
sympathy gives rise to the virtues of humanity and benevolence: “And
hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to
restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes
the perfection of human nature; and can alone produce among
humankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists
their whole grace and propriety.”384
Turning to coordination through norms, the moral philosopher Allan
Gibbard has done most to place norm-following in an evolutionary
framework.385 Gibbard argues that people possess “biological adaptations
for coordination" – “psychic mechanisms that were shaped in the course
of human evolution" – that enable them to identify and adopt norms and
conventions.386 These norms consist of implicit or explicit expectations
about behaviour that serve to coordinate individuals to mutual
advantage.387 This tendency, argues Gibbard, is central to human
morality: “The key to human moral nature lies in coordination broadly
construed."388 Conversely, the failure to adopt such norms constitutes
deviance and invites sanction. As Lewis observes, a convention is "a
socially enforced norm: one is expected to conform, and failure to
                                                 
383 “By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the
same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person
with him. . .” Smith, 1759/1976.
384 Smith, 1759/1976.
385 "I want to understand acceptance of norms as a natural, biological phenomenon. . . . If there is
such a thing as governance by norms, there must be psychic mechanisms that accomplish it, and
we can ask about their biological function. That function, I want to suggest, is to coordinate. . . . "
Gibbard, 1997, p186.
386 Gibbard, 1990, p71, p79.
387 Gibbard, 1990, p65.
388 Gibbard, 1990, p26.
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conform tends to invoke unfavourable responses from others" in the form
of "poor opinions . . . reproaches, punishment, and distrust".389
Incidentally, the abundance of norms in human social life has led some to
conclude that morality consists of nothing but norms, social
constructions, or ‘cultural meanings’.390 This mistake has an ancient
pedigree. As Aristotle commented: "In what is just by convention . . . it
makes originally no difference whether it is fixed one way or another, but
it does make a difference once it is fixed, for example, . . . that a sacrifice
shall consist of a goat but not of two sheep . . . . Now, some people
[Sophists] think that everything [that is] just exists only by convention,
since whatever is by nature is unchangeable and has the same force
everywhere – as, for example, fire burns both here and in Persia –
whereas they see that notions of what is just change. But this is not the
correct view, although it has an element of truth."391 Not every problem of
social life is a coordination problem, hence not every solution to a social
problem is a coordination solution.392
Finally, friendship. A number of moral philosophers have seen friendship
as an important part of the moral life. For Aristotle, friendship revolves
around the mutually advantageous pursuit of some common interest:393
We count as a friend (1) a person who wishes for and does
what is good or what appears to him to be good for his
friend's sake; or (2) a person who wishes for the existence
and life of his friend for the friend's sake. . . . (3) a person
who spends his time in our company and (4) whose desires
                                                 
389 Lewis, 1969, p99. Traditional sociological accounts of deviance tend not to distinguish
between out of equilibrium play in coordination games, the choice of a frequency-dependent
equilibrium, and defection due to a dominant incentive; and their analyses suffer as a result.
Goode, 1978/97. For example, not all traditional deviance is pathological. I use the term deviance
to refer to out-of-equilibrium play in coordination games; under this definition frequency-
dependent play and defection are equilibrium choices, and therefore not deviations.
390 For example, see: Walzer, 1983.
391 Aristotle, 1962, V, vii, 19-28.
392 As Lewis observes, not all social regularities are conventions. There are also “rules, laws of
nature, generalisations, mathematical truths, strategic maxims, hypothetical imperatives, some
threats and warnings, social contracts, overwhelming sanction, or acts for which there are
independent instrumental reasons” and so on Lewis, 1969, p100.
393 Aristotle, 1962, VIII, 1155a 3-4.
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are the same as ours, or (5) a person who shares sorrow and
joy with his friend. This quality, too, is most frequently
found in mothers. By one or another of these sentiments
people also define friendship.394
The moral importance that Aristotle attaches to friendship is reflected in
the fact that he devotes two books of his Nichomachian Ethics to the subject
– more space than is given to any other topic. Cicero, meanwhile, devoted
an entire dialogue to the issue. In Laelius: On Friendship, Cicero defined
friendship as "a complete identity of feeling about all things in heaven
and earth: an identity which is strengthened by mutual goodwill and
affection" and argued that the origins of friendship were "primeval and
noble, something emanating directly from the actual processes of nature”.
Cicero urged his readers "to place friendship above every other human
concern that can be imagined! Nothing else in the whole world is so
completely in harmony with nature, and nothing is so utterly right, in
prosperity and adversity alike". Friendship was "the noblest and most
delightful of all the gifts the gods have given mankind"; it "ranks as the
finest and most glorious of all possible connexions, embodying the
highest good that nature has to offer."395 And, as a final example, in the
20th century, GE Moore ranked friendship as one of “the most valuable
things that we can know or imagine". Indeed, Moore went so far as to say
that "it is only for the sake of these things [friendship and beauty]. . . that
any one can be justified in performing any public or private duty. . . .
[They] form the rational ultimate end of human action".396
Reciprocity
In addition to overcoming coordination problems, potential cooperators
must also overcome free-rider problems. In the previous chapters we saw
a variety of ways of doing this, culminating in the ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy of
reciprocal altruism, and we reviewed the evidence for adaptations for
                                                 
394 Aristotle, 1962, IX, 1166a, 1-10.
395 Cicero, 1971, p187, p191, p191, p185, p201, p217.
396 Moore, 1903, pp188-9. Peter Singer and J B Schneewind interpret 'pleasurable human
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reciprocity in human psychology. The presence of these adaptations can
explain why reciprocity is everywhere considered a moral ideal, why
moral philosophers have seen trust, commitment, social contracts,
punishment, guilt and forgiveness as important aspects of human
morality.
Reciprocity involves exposing oneself to the risk of defection. The
tendency to take this risk, and open with a nice move, forms the basis of
ethical discussions of ‘trust’.397 To take just one example, Annette Baier
argues that "Trust is acceptance of vulnerability to harm that others could
inflict, but which we judge that they will not inflict", and that we have to
rely on trust if we are "to enter and sustain mutually beneficial
relationships of trust-involving cooperation".398 Game theorists employ a
similar analysis.399
It follows that attempts to reduce uncertainty and bolster trust should
have a moral feel to them. One of the ways of reassuring others about
one’s cooperative intentions is to possess and display signals of a low
discount rate (d); and indeed, many philosophers have seen a low
discount rate as an important component of moral character – in other
words, they have recognised that ‘patience is a virtue’. John Stuart Mill,
for example, in the context of higher and lower pleasures, attributes
"election for the nearer good" to "infirmity of character".400 Henry
Sidgwick considered the proposition "I ought not prefer a present lesser
good to a future greater good" to be a self-evident moral maxim.401 Allan
Gibbard argues that the capacity to forego short-term pleasures in favour
of long-term gains is the product of a "normative control system" that is
"peculiar to human beings" and which overrides the "animal control
system".402 And Robert Frank argues that such "self-control devices" make
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398 Baier, 1995, p152. For good measure, she adds: "Fidelity is certainly the virtue of those who
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cooperation and morality possible.403 Conversely, the tendency to heavily
discount the future is typically referred to pejoratively as “‘impulsivity’
and ‘short time horizons’ or . . . impatience, myopia, lack of self control,
and incapacity to delay gratification.”404
As noted in the previous chapter, the obligation to reciprocate – to keep
your promises, to repay your debts, to return favours, and so on – is a
feature of the ethical systems of all known societies.405 It also forms the
backbone of many moral philosophies. For example, when asked for a
single word that could sum up morality, Confucius answered:
"Reciprocity perhaps? Do not inflict on others what you yourself would
not wish done to you."406 More generally, the problem of delayed social
exchange and its reciprocal solution provide the logical framework for the
‘social contract’ tradition in ethics, according to which moral duties and
obligations arise as a result of mutually-advantageous agreements
entered into by agents acting in their own self-interest. Hobbes provides
the classic statement of this position; but one can find the same social-
contract view of justice being articulated (by the character ‘Glaucon’) as
early as Plato’s Republic.407
Deterring cheats, by punishment or exclusion, has also been a significant
component of substantive moral philosophies. Bishop Butler argues, in
the eighth of his Fifteen Sermons, that the desire to punish wrongdoers is a
moral sentiment.408 Our indignation and desire to punish, says Butler, is
                                                 
403 Frank, 1992; Frank, 1990; Frank, 1988.
404 Steep discounting is not necessarily “dysfunctional”. As Daly and Wilson observe: “Steep
discounting may be a 'rational' response to information that indicates an uncertain or low
probability of surviving to reap delayed benefits, for example, and 'reckless' risk taking can be
optimal when the expected profits from safer courses of action are negligible." Wilson and Daly,
1997.
405 Brown, 1991, p137.
406 Confucius, 1994.
407 Hobbes, 1651/1958; Plato, 1974. Indeed, one could argue that Plato anticipated the entire
game-theoretic analysis of cooperation and morality. ‘Socrates’ argues that life is a coordination
problem (a division of labour), and that justice ensues when everyone performs their allotted role.
‘Glaucon’ argues that life is a social contract, and that justice ensues when everyone abides by its
terms. ‘Thrasymachus’ argues that life is a hawk-dove game, and that justice ensues when the
weak defer to the strong. ‘Socrates’ also recognized that his plan for the perfect society could be
derailed by the allegiances that individuals have to their kin; hence he proposed to dissolve
traditional families among the Philosopher Kings.
408 Butler, 1856, VIII.
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raised by the contemplation of "injury and injustice"; and the purpose of
resentment, he says, is to "prevent and to remedy such injury, and the
miseries arising from it". "It is to be considered as a weapon put into our
hands by nature, against injury, injustice and cruelty." Butler adds: "The
good influence which this passion, has, in fact, upon the affairs of the
world, is obvious to every one's notice. Men are plainly restrained from
injuring their fellow-creatures by fear of their resentment". John Locke
notes that punishment is the only basis on which “one man may lawfully
do harm to another". "[E]ach transgression,” says Locke, “may be punished
to that degree, and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill
bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from
doing the like".409 John Stuart Mill observes, "to deter by suffering from
inflicting suffering is not only possible, but the very purpose of penal
justice".410 And the legal theorist Richard Posner observes: "Although
Aristotle and Kant obviously had no opportunity to read The Origin of
Species, their ideas about remedial justice – the justice of sanctions for
transgressions – are rooted in a view of human nature, as quintessentially
vengeful, that is highly compatible with a Darwinist view."411 And so on.
In the words of Daly and Wilson:
From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, this almost
mystical and seemingly irreducible sort of moral imperative
[retribution] is the output of a mental mechanism with a
straightforward adaptive function: to reckon justice and
administer punishment by a calculus which ensures that
violators reap no advantage from their misdeeds. The
enormous volume of mystico-religious bafflegab about
atonement and penance and divine justice and the like is the
attribution to a higher, detached authority of what is actually
a mundane, pragmatic matter: discouraging self-interested
competitive acts by reducing their profitability to nil.412
                                                 
409 Locke, 1992, p740-1.
410 Mill, 1868/1999, p182.
411 Posner, 1990, p331.
412 Daly and Wilson, 1988, p256.
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The motivation to make amends after a breach (guilt), and the motivation
to re-accept someone into a cooperative scheme after the appropriate
costs have been paid (forgiveness) have also figured prominently in
moral philosophies.
Allan Gibbard captures the essence of guilt by contrasting it with
shame.413 Both guilt and shame, he says, are emotional adaptations that
"respond preeminently to threats to one's place in cooperative schemes".
"Shame stems from things that indicate a lack of the abilities, powers, or
resources one needs if one is to be valued for one's cooperation and
reciprocity. Guilt stems from things that indicate insufficient motivation."
Shame – as indicative of failure – is met by others with disdain,
indifference, neglect and abandonment. And shame motivates one to
withdraw, develop one's powers, and then display them. Guilt – as
indicative of transgression, or cheating – is met by others with anger and
punishment in an attempt to alter motivation. And guilt motivates
attempts to placate others through apology and restitution. Shame, then,
would seem to stem from the inability to engage in mutually-beneficial
exchange, and perhaps from a lack of the traits needed to resolve conflicts
in one’s favour. Guilt, meanwhile, stems from a failure to reciprocate.
Forgiveness is a common theme of ethical codes. Hobbes’ sixth ‘law of
nature’ states that “a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that
repenting, desire it”.414 And as Bishop Butler notes, the purpose of
forgiveness is to prevent a "slight offence" becoming "the occasion of
entering into a long intercourse of ill offices".415 Recent philosophical
literature on forgiveness follows a similar, and predictable, line. For
Downie, a "logically necessary condition of forgiveness" is that the
forgiver has been injured by the forgivee.416 Kolnai defines forgiveness as
"re-acceptance" or "reestablishing a relationship" that involves "a venture
of trust".417 In this light, "to forgive is a virtue and inability to forgive, or at
                                                 
413 Gibbard, 1990, pp138-9.
414 Hobbes, 1651/1958, p633.
415 Butler, 1856, IX.
416 Downie, 1965, p128.
417 Quoted in Richards, 1988, p77, p92.
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least unwillingness to try, is a vice"; "the forgiving spirit is always in itself
to be morally approved of"; "an inability to forgive constitutes a moral
defect".418 And so on.
Conflict resolution: virtue
We saw how the display of costly signals of fitness could be used to settle
or forestall conflicts through face-to-face encounters and through the
establishment of stable social hierarchies. These costly signals can be
indicators of physical and mental prowess, and can confer benefits on
their audience; and in some species, the costly signals seem to include fair
and effective leadership. In the previous chapter we reviewed the
evidence for homologous adaptations in humans; and we saw that Hume
regarded such traits as ‘shining’ and ‘heroic’ virtues.419 Costly signals
have been celebrated as ‘virtues’ by other moral philosophers, including
Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Nietzsche.420
According to Aristotle, self-control, courage, generosity, honour,
truthfulness, wit, modesty, righteous indignation, and magnificence
(given to public works) were the principal examples of human
‘excellence’ or ‘virtue’. "Praise is proper to virtue or excellence, because it
is excellence that makes men capable of performing noble deeds."421
Aristotle regarded magnanimity – "greatness of soul” – as the highest of
                                                 
418 Downie, 1965, p128.
419 The word ‘virtue’ comes from the Latin for ‘proper to a man’, as in ‘virile’. "Appelata est enim
a viro virtus: viri autem propria maxime est fortitudo." ("The term virtue is from the word that
signifies man; a man's chief quality is fortitude.") Cicero, 1945, I, ix, 18.
420 Does the praise of ‘virtue’ suggest that might is right? No. First, competition for scarce
resources creates problems for which ‘excellences’ (and ‘first possession’) are among the
solutions. Perhaps the world would be a better place if resources were not scarce, there was no
competition, and hence no need for ritual contests and private property. But that is not the world
that we live in; and until it is, it hardly makes sense to criticize solutions on the grounds that the
problem is unpalatable. A better line of criticism would be to propose alternative, superior, means
of settling disputes. Second, excellences and private property solve problems only in the domain
of ‘chicken’. There is no suggestion that might is generally right, in other domains such as
reciprocity or coordination. Different games have different rules, and strategies from one game
are not expected to bring about cooperation in another. Third, the inequality manifest in, for
example, a dominance hierarchy, may be corrosive to other forms of cooperation that require
players to be on a more equal footing. In such circumstances, intervention to redress inequality –
and therefore reduce the reliance upon virtue and private property – would be justified.
421 Aristotle, 1962, p28.
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all virtues.422 The characteristics of the magnanimous man read like the
attributes of an idealised alpha male, who competes for status through
acts of altruism. The magnanimous man, says Aristotle, is characterised
by "a slow gait . . . , a deep voice, and a deliberate way of speaking."423
Moreover, the magnanimous man will do good turns, but: "is ashamed to
accept a good turn, because the former marks a man as superior, the latter
as inferior. . . . For the recipient is inferior to the benefactor, whereas a
high-minded man wants to be superior. . . . It is, further, typical of a high-
minded man not to ask for any favours, or only reluctantly, but to offer
aid readily."424 Aristotle’s view of virtue was common in the ancient
world. Alisdair MacIntyre reports that, in Homeric societies, virtue (aretê)
referred to "excellence of any kind"; examples include: physical strength,
courage, intelligence, cunning, sense of humour, fidelity, glory (kudos),
and prosperity.425
This classical view of virtue was resuscitated by Machiavelli. For
Machiavelli, a Prince’s virtú involved the display of 'manly qualities' and
accomplishments such as strength, skill, prowess, courage, fortitude,
audacity, wisdom, valour, virtuosity and civic spirit. These qualities
helped to convey a Prince into power; and if they are used not to further
the Prince's own interests, but to further the common good, then ‘power’
is transformed into 'glory'.426
And, in The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche celebrated a ‘master morality’
that involved the exhibition of such virtues as “bravery, skill, beauty,
fertility, strength, pride, leadership, stoicism, sacrifice, tolerance, mercy,
joy, humor, grace, good manners, and the creation of social norms”.427 As
Geoffrey Miller observes:
                                                 
422 Aristotle, 1962, IV, iii, 24a.
423 Aristotle, 1962, IV, iii, 25a.
424 Aristotle, 1962, IV, iii, 24b. As Aristotle says, "it is hard to be truly high-minded and, in fact,
impossible without goodness and nobility".
425 MacIntyre, 1981, p111, Ch. 10.
426 Machiavelli, 1988.
427 Miller, 2000a, pp337-8.
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What is striking here is that Nietzsche’s virtues sound
remarkably like sexually selected fitness indicators. . . . He
wrote of virtue as 'a luxury of the first order' which shows
'the charm of rareness, inimitableness, exceptionalness, and
unaverageness'. By their luxuriant excess, virtues reveal
'processes of physiological prosperity or failure.' For
Nietzsche, virtue was what the strong and healthy could
afford to display.428
Nietzsche famously contrasted his account of ‘master morality’ with
‘herd’ or ‘slave morality’ that celebrated turning the other cheek,
meekness, humility, quietism, stoicism, sacrifice, and patience (of which
Christianity was the predominant example). The Humean-Darwinian
account seems to have a place for these virtues too. As we have seen, the
attributes of the ‘superior’ cannot settle disputes peacefully without a
complementary set of attributes of the ‘inferior’. We should therefore
expect to find in the literature, not only celebrations of the hawkish
virtues of the 'strong', but also praise for the relevant dove-ish virtues of
the 'weak'. This might be one way to interpret the ‘Christian’ virtues, and
to explain the traditional antipathy between these and classical virtues.
Finally, costly signals of altruism also seem to encompass what John
Rawls refers to as ‘superogatory acts’, that is: “acts of benevolence and
mercy, of heroism and self-sacrifice . . . [that] are not required, though
normally they would be were it not for the loss or risk involved for the
agent himself". Accounting for these acts, says Rawls, is an issue "of first
importance for ethical theory".429
                                                 
428 Miller, 2000a, pp337-8. Conversely, according to Nietzsche, “‘Vice is a somewhat arbitrarily
limited concept designed to express in one word certain consequences of physiological
degeneration’.” If we replaced ‘physiological degeneration’ with ‘mutation’, this would be a
fairly good description of virtue acting as indicators of heritable fitness (Miller, personal
communication).
429 Rawls, 1971, p117.
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Conflict resolution: property
In addition to costly signalling, in previous chapters we saw how ‘prior
ownership’ could be used to settle disputes about resources. And, it is the
case that – from the commandment ‘Thou shalt not steal’ to maxims such
as ‘property is nine-tenths of the law’ – the right of private property has
been a perennial feature of moral and legal systems.
John Locke provides the classic account and defence of private property.
In his Second Treatise on Government, Locke argues that people have a
natural right to their bodies and to the means of sustaining their lives. For
this reason, they have a natural right of possession over the fruits of their
labour: “[E]very man has property in his own person. This nobody has
any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his
hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of
the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property”.430 Locke proceeds to argue that it is the principal job of
government to protect private property. The protection of property
ensures that people will be rewarded for their labour; hence the
institution of property provides an incentive to industry, and as a result
people produce a surplus that can be traded, thereby promoting the
common good.431
Incidentally, Locke’s defence of private property provides a good
example of how evolved intuitions can run into trouble in the modern
world. Locke assumed the resources available in the state of nature, such
as food, were perishable; and he restricted the right of private property to
only so much of a resource that could be consumed without waste. The
result was a natural limit on the degree of inequality. However, Locke
recognised that with the invention of gold and silver money that does not
perish, resources could be stockpiled indefinitely. Locke defended the
resulting inequalities by highlighting the economic benefits that a
                                                 
430 Locke, 1992, p746.
431 Locke was not the first, or the only, person to defend private property. Cicero, for example,
had made a similar argument 700 years earlier. Cicero, 1991, pp92-5.
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conventional means of exchange can provide. Others, notably Marx and
Marxists, have used Locke’s own ‘labour theory of value’ to argue that,
under conditions of gross economic inequality, labourers are no longer
rewarded in proportion to their efforts.432 In this way, intuitions about
property – that were designed to resolve conflicts under one set of
(ancestral) conditions – may no longer operate as intended under
modern, technologically-advanced conditions.
In summary, the Humean-Darwinian account of morality suggests that
moral values include promoting the common good by caring for family
members, adopting local norms, keeping promises, punishing cheats,
resolving disputes peacefully, and respecting prior ownership. This
whistle-stop tour of substantive moral philosophy suggests that,
irrespective of their various meta-ethical starting points, a diverse range
of moral philosophers and ethical traditions have come to similar
substantive conclusions about the content of morality. One way of
interpreting this convergence is that moral philosophers have, in the first
instance, been trying to articulate and make sense of the content of their
moral intuitions; and that different theorists have articulated different
aspects of their moral intuitions and the moral psychologies of those
around them, perhaps as a result of the different ways that their moral
psychologies have developed under different conditions in different
times and places. If this is the case, then the Humean-Darwinian account
has the potential to show why these different strands of traditional moral
philosophy are not alternatives; and it provides a principled framework
for weaving them into a comprehensive account of moral value. In
addition, the Humean-Darwinian account suggests that, in the future, we
can supplement these second-hand reports of moral values by going
directly to the source, investigating moral psychology as we would any
other aspect of psychology.
                                                 
432 For example, see: MacPherson, 1962.
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Applied ethics: How do people make moral decisions?
Finally, the Humean-Darwinian account of morality can provide an
account of what is involved in moral reasoning and moral argumentation,
and it can explain why there are such things as moral disagreements and
moral dilemmas, and what they are likely to be about. Hence it offers an
over-arching theoretical framework from which the problems of ‘applied
ethics’ can be derived.
Moral reasoning and decision-making
According to the Humean-Darwinian account, to a first approximation,
human moral psychology consists of a suite of evolved decision-rules
designed to solve the kinds of collective-action problems that were
recurrent in the lives of our ancestors. Hence moral reasoning is no
different in kind to reasoning in other domains; it is merely the
information-processing carried out by our adaptations for cooperation.
Decision rules render a person uncertain about what to do, how to act,
whether to approve, and so on; and this uncertainty is resolved with
reference to the conditions specified by the rule.433 In the simplest case,
moral reasoning can be represented as a syllogism in which one's moral
value constitutes the Major Premise. For example:
P1: If a person is your elder, then you ought to respect him.
P2:       Bill is your elder.
C: Therefore, you ought to respect Bill.
In this case, if the moral rule is "Respect your elders" then in order to
decide whether to respect any particular individual you will have to
answer the question "Are they my elder?" The answer to any particular
question depends on the facts of the matter specified as relevant by the
rule. Of course, "respect your elders" is a fairly simple moral rule to apply
– it requires only one ‘bit’ of information. Moral reasoning becomes more
                                                 
433 As in other domains of instrumental reasoning, what constitutes a ‘good reason’ for acting in a
particular way is a function of the prior rule. For example, that ‘there is milk in the fridge’ is a
good reason to go to the fridge only if you want to drink milk. The Humean-Darwinian
perspective suggests that there is no such thing as a free-standing reason.
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difficult as the moral rule that you wish to apply becomes more
complicated – but the principle is the same.434 Much of applied ethics can
be seen as the attempt to articulate our moral intuitions and decision-
rules, and make explicit the information processing that they perform.435
We should be able to derive from our account of the various adaptations
for cooperation predictions about what moral reasoners will be uncertain
about, and hence what the salient content of moral discussions will be.
For example, Cosmides and Tooby suggest that, in the context of social
exchange and redistribution, intuitions regarding luck and effort continue
to determine what counts as relevant:
Consider the political and moral debate concerning the
homeless in the United States. . . . One persistent theme
among those who wish to motivate more sharing is the idea
‘there but for fortune, go you or I.’ That is, they emphasize
the random, variance-driven dimensions of the situation.
The potential recipient of aid is viewed as worthy because
he or she is the unlucky victim of circumstances, such as
unemployment, discrimination, or mental illness. On the
other hand, those who oppose an increase in sharing with
the homeless emphasize the putatively chosen or self-
caused dimensions of the situation. Potential recipients are
viewed as unworthy of aid because they ‘brought it on
themselves’: They are portrayed as able-bodied but lazy, or
as having debilitated themselves through choosing to use
alcohol and other drugs. The counterresponse from those
                                                 
434 These kinds of rules could be extended indefinitely and hierarchically. "The principle involved
in an ‘ought’-statement may be a highly specific, complex and detailed one . . . [M]oral principles
do not need to be as general as ‘Never tell lies’: they can be more specific, like ‘Never tell lies
except when it is necessary in order to save an innocent life, except when . . . except when . . . and
except when . . . In a morally developed person the exceptions may get too complex to get
formulated in words." Hare, 1991, p457.
435 To put it mildly, this will be no easy task. As the editors of one volume put it: "To hope to
condense the subtle moral expertise encoded by a biologically realistic neural network into a
tractable set of summary principles or moral rules is in all probability a quite hopeless task. In this
respect, moral expertise looks set to follow the pattern of expertise in general. Long volumes fail
dismally to capture the knowledge of the expert chess player. The knowledge of the successful
moral agent is probably no less complex, and no more amenable to brief linguaform summation."
May, et al., 1996, p7.
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who want to motivate more sharing is to portray drug use
not as a choice but as a sickness, and so on.436
Furthermore, as in other domains, moral decision-making can take place
collaboratively, in a moral argument or discussion, where information
relevant to the decision is sought, elicited and offered by others.
Information about Bill’s age, for example, could come from a third-party.
Moral discussions create the opportunity for strategic manipulation
among actors with non-identical interests; for this reason, it may be useful
to model such interactions as signalling games. Theories of the content of
moral intuitions, combined with an appreciation of the structure of
signalling games, provides a rigorous framework in which to analyse the
form and content of rhetoric and oratory.437
Moral disagreements and dilemmas
The majority of the time, moral decision-making takes place without fuss
or incident; people have no trouble deciding that it is right to help old
ladies across the road, or that it is wrong to murder the innocent.
However, the Humean-Darwinian account leads us to expect (at least)
four instances in which people will experience difficulties in making
moral decisions.
First, indecision. In the simplest case, an individual could fail to acquire
the information necessary to make a decision, and hence remain in a state
of uncertainty. For example, one could fail to ascertain Bill’s age, and
therefore remain uncertain about whether to respect him or not.
Second, internal conflict. Because individuals pursue multiple goals or
values, there will inevitably be situations in which these values come into
conflict. At the point at which an individual is indifferent between values,
they will remain in a state of uncertainty and experience a ‘dilemma’.
When one or more of the values involved is a moral value, the person will
                                                 
436 Cosmides and Tooby, 1992.
437 Dawkins and Krebs, 1978; Sperber, 2001.
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experience a moral dilemma. For example, Bill might be an elder, and also
a cheat, requiring that he be punished and respected. Or, to take Sartre’s
famous example, one could feel a duty to attend to one’s ailing mother,
and also an incompatible duty to go off and fight the Nazis.
Third, conflict with others. Moral disagreements will arise among
individuals when they have different values, or when people have
different information, or both.438 Adaptations for cooperation, like other
adaptations, are expected to exhibit a normal distribution in the
population, and to exhibit systematic age and sex differences (see Chapter
7). We also expect moral psychology to develop and operate differently
under different conditions, thereby giving rise to cross-cultural
differences in the manifestation of moral values. As a result, we should
expect there to be individual differences in moral values; and individuals
with different values will not be able to agree on what they ought to do,
even when they have access to the same information. (They may also
disagree about what constitutes relevant information.) A similar analysis
pertains when individuals with the same values have access to different
information, although in these cases there is a more tractable means of
settling the dispute.
Fourth, evolutionarily-novel environments. Human moral intuitions were
designed to solve Stone-Age collective-action problems; there is no
guarantee that they will be able to properly frame, engage with, or
generate stable conclusions about all the apparent problems created by
modern technology and the modern world in general.439 It may be the
case, for example, that intuitions designed to distribute meat after a
successful hunt are not the best guides as to how to distribute healthcare
or unemployment benefit.440 More specifically, we might expect our
                                                 
438 Arnhart provides an extensive account of this kind of moral disagreement. Arnhart, 1998.
439 For further discussion, see: Pinker, 2002.
440 For example, the discussions of “brute and option luck” – sometimes referred to as “chance
and choice” – illustrate how intuitions regarding luck versus effort offer little guidance when
employed outside of their original domain. One stable conclusion of much recent literature is that,
to the extent to which the talents with which one is born are the product of a genetic lottery, a
certain amount of redistributive taxation is permitted. However, to the extent that one's income is
a product of one's effort, redistribution is not warranted. But these intuitions begin to break down
a) when one's genetic endowment is seen not as a product of luck, but of the effort one's parents
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ancient moral intuitions to generate false positives and false negatives. False
positives occur in situations in which we intuit that there is a collective-
action problem, and engage our moral psychologies, when in fact no such
problem exists. Perhaps the controversies surrounding recent
developments in biotechnology, such as cloning, or stem-cell research, are
examples of false positives. False negatives occur in situations in which
we fail to intuit that there is a collective-action problem, and hence do not
engage our moral psychologies, when in fact such a problem exists.
Perhaps the continuing degradation of the environment – a ‘tragedy of
the commons’ on a global scale – is an example of a false negative.
A correct account of moral psychology should be able to predict and
explain why and where certain moral dilemmas and disagreements arise.
Hence moral disagreements and dilemmas are a useful source of evidence
for moral psychology, in much the same way that optical illusions are a
useful source of evidence when studying the psychology of vision.
Conclusion
I have followed Hume and Darwin in assuming that morality is a natural
phenomenon that can be studied by the natural sciences. I have argued:
that human morality is an adaptation to social life; that it consists of a
range of social, cooperative and altruistic dispositions that promote
cooperation; and that moral reasoning can be treated in the same way as
reasoning in other domains. This parsimonious account of morality is
consistent with what we know about human origins, human psychology
and human behaviour; it re-structures the problems and solutions of
moral philosophy; and it incorporates – and provides a principled
structure for – a wide variety of theories in traditional meta-, substantive
and applied ethics. For these reasons, the Humean-Darwinian account
should be adopted as the default explanation of morality, and it should
constitute the theoretical framework within which future research in
moral psychology, moral philosophy and ethics takes place.
                                                                                                                                     
put into earning the money necessary to fund genetic engineering; and b) when we discover that
‘effort’ is heritable. Dworkin, 2000, grapples with these conflicting intuitions.
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In the final chapter I review some of the directions that this research
could take; they include broadening and deepening our understanding of
human adaptations for cooperation, filling the gaps in the existing
literature, and assessing the extent to which evolved moral sentiments
constitute optimal solutions to collective-action problems. But first, I shall
have to deal with the objection that such a project is ill-conceived from
the outset, on the grounds that any attempt to find a naturalistic base for
ethics commits a fallacy.
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Chapter 6 – Who’s afraid of ‘the naturalistic fallacy’?
[T]he 'is'/'ought' gap, and the naturalistic fallacy are perhaps
better seen as warnings than as outright barriers, reminding us of
ways in which the project can fail, and indeed often has failed. But
they should not warn us off the project altogether, since the need
to ask how morality fits with our best empirical understanding of
ourselves and our place in nature and history arises from within
normative moral thought itself.
– Peter Railton441
Introduction
This thesis has argued for a Humean-Darwinian meta-ethic that sees
moral values as the proximate goals of adaptations for cooperation. The
previous chapter outlined the moral philosophy that follows from this
starting point.
Few philosophers, however, have been willing to pursue the implications
of this Darwinian update of Hume’s meta-ethics for fear that the thesis
commits something called “the naturalistic fallacy”.442 As Michael Ruse
puts it: “Everybody knows (or ‘knows’) that it [evolutionary ethics] has
been the excuse for some of the worst kinds of fallacious arguments in the
philosophical workbook . . . It has been enough for the student to
murmur the magical phrase ‘naturalistic fallacy’, and then he or she can
move on to the next question, confident of having gained full marks on
the exam.”443 Although, as I will show, there are many versions of the
naturalistic fallacy, it has come to be synonymous with the widespread
belief that (someone, somewhere, has demonstrated conclusively that) the
natural and the normative inhabit two entirely separate realms, and never
the twain shall meet.444 One consequence of this view is that
contemporary moral philosophy has tended to neglect the empirical
                                                 
441 Railton, 2000, p126.
442 The work of Michael Ruse is the notable exception to this rule. See, for example: Ruse, 1995.
443 Ruse, 1995, p223.
444 Held, 2002.
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sciences.445 Another consequence is that contemporary moral
philosophers have tended to look somewhere other than ‘nature’ for their
account of moral value.
But what is “the naturalistic fallacy”? And does it really present a lethal
challenge to a Humean-Darwinian meta-ethic? The purpose of this
chapter is to show that such fears are misplaced. None of the arguments
that go by the name of “the naturalistic fallacy” constitute arguments
against the Humean-Darwinian meta-ethics presented above.
The naturalistic fallacies
The first thing that anyone wishing to investigate the naturalistic fallacy
discovers is that there is not one argument that goes by this name; there
are many. A survey of the literature reveals not one but (at least) eight
alleged mistakes that carry the label “the naturalistic fallacy”:
1. Moving from is to ought (Hume’s fallacy).
2. Moving from facts to values.
3. Identifying good with its object (Moore’s fallacy).
4. Claiming that good is a natural property.
5. Going ‘in the direction of evolution’.
6. Assuming that what is natural is good.
7. Assuming that what currently exists ought to exist.
8. Substituting explanation for justification.
For example: 1) Daniel Dennett says that the naturalistic fallacy involves
the derivation of "'ought' from 'is'".446 2) Peter Singer assumes that the
naturalistic fallacy involves "defining values in terms of facts".447 3)
Charles Pigden, meanwhile, argues that the naturalistic fallacy consists of
confusing "the property of goodness with the things that possess that
                                                 
445 Doris and Stich, (forthcoming).
446 Dennett, 1995, p467. And Frans de Waal claims that the naturalistic fallacy "has to do with the
impossibility of translating 'is' language (how things are) into 'ought' language (how things ought
to be)". de Waal, 1996, p38.
447 Singer, 1981, p74.
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property or with some other property that good things possess".448 4)
Simon Blackburn states that the naturalistic fallacy "consists of identifying
an ethical concept with a 'natural' concept".449 5) Robert Wright claims that
the naturalistic fallacy involves "drawing values from evolution or, for
that matter, from any aspect of observed nature".450 6) Dylan Evans claims
that "[a]rguing that something is good because it is natural is called the
'naturalistic fallacy'".451 7) David Buss states that "the naturalistic fallacy . .
. maintains that whatever exists should exist".452 8) William Rottschaefer
claims that one version of the naturalistic fallacy is committed when
“causal explanations are confused with or substituted for justifying
reasons”.453
My concern here is not with which is the ‘true’ fallacy. Rather, my aim is
to bring all the versions of the argument into the light, so that we may
examine them one by one, and thereby establish whether they constitute
serious obstacles to a Humean-Darwinian meta-ethic. Let’s begin with
Hume’s fallacy.
1. Moving from is to ought (Hume’s fallacy).
Although Hume’s theory is primarily a meta-ethical account of the nature
and ontological status of morality, it segues into normative or substantive
ethics in the following way. The ends supplied by the passions provide
the first premises of chains of means-end reasoning. For example, if you
                                                 
448 Pigden, 1991, p426.
449 Blackburn, 1994, p255. Larry Arnhart maintains that the naturalistic fallacy is the mistaken
attempt to "to define 'good' in natural terms" Arnhart, 1998, p82. Anthony O'Hear claims that to
deny that "goodness could consist in no natural property" is to commit the naturalistic fallacy.
O'Hear, 1985, p258.
450 Wright, 1994, p330.
451 Emphasis added. Evans and Zarate, 1999, p163. According to Anthony Flew, to commit the
naturalistic fallacy is to offer "some supposedly neutral descriptive statement about what is
allegedly natural as if it could by itself entail some conclusion about what is in some way
commendable". Flew, 1978, p148. Matt Ridley hedges his bets: "The naturalistic fallacy . . . is to
argue that what is natural is moral: deducing an 'ought' from and 'is'." Ridley, 1996, p257. As
does Joshua Greene: the naturalistic fallacy is "the mistake of identifying that which is natural
with that which is right or good (or more broadly, the mistake of identifying moral properties with
natural properties)." Greene, 2003, p847.
452 Buss, 1994, p16. John Beckstrom concurs: "The fact that something exists and has existed for
a very longtime does not call for society's endorsement. To say that it does is to commit the
'naturalistic fallacy'." Beckstrom, 1993, p2.
453 Rottschaefer, 1997, p8. This fallacy is sometimes rolled together with the ‘the genetic fallacy’.
Baggini and Fosl, 2003, pp89-92.
- 158 -
want to get to Grand Central Station, and if the Number 4 train takes you
there, then you ought to take the Number 4 train. It follows from this view
of human psychology – and in particular, from this instrumentalist
account of reason – that, in the absence of any passions, desires, or ends,
reason alone cannot tell you what you ought to do.454 Hume applied the
same argument to morality. Moral passions provide the first premise of
moral reasoning: if you want to punish cheats, and if Derek cheated, then
you ought to punish Derek. In the absence of moral passions, reason alone
cannot tell you what you morally ought to do.455 As Hume put it: "Morals
excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason itself is utterly
impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not
conclusions of our reason."456
At the beginning of his account of the moral passions – in a chapter
entitled Moral distinctions not deriv’d from reason – Hume pauses to
castigate rationalist moral philosophers who neglect to mention the
passions, and who proceed instead as if one could derive ought statements
using reason alone. Reading such philosophers, Hume is “surpriz'd to
find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I
meet with no proposition that is not connected with ought or ought not.”457
Hume points out that these rationalist philosophers have not explained
how reason is capable of such a feat. According to Hume, reason – or ‘the
understanding’ – works by ‘relating’ ‘simple’ ideas to one another in
order to form ‘complex’ ideas. There are seven ‘relations’: "resemblance,
identity, relations of time and place, proportion in quantity or number,
degrees in any quality, contrariety, and causation".458 Rationalist
philosophers, says Hume, have not “observ’d” or “explain’d” any
additional relation that would allow them to move directly from is to
ought, nor have they shown how such a move is possible by means of any
of the other relations: “[A]s this ought, or ought not, expresses some new
                                                 
454 "Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will". "[R]eason alone can never
produce any action, or give rise to volition". Hume, 1739/1985, p460, p462.
455 Or, as Alisdair MacIntyre puts it: "we can connect the facts of the situation with what we ought
to do only by means of one of those concepts which Hume treats under the heading of the
passions" MacIntyre, 1959, pp465-6.
456 Hume, 1739/1985, p509.
457 Hume, 1739/1985, p521.
458 Hume, 1739/1985, p117.
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relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that shou’d be observ’d and
explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given for what
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction
from others, which are entirely different from it."459
Of course, one can take issue with Hume’s account of psychology. But the
question under consideration here is whether this standard point about
the components of means-end reasoning constitutes an argument against
a Humean-Darwinian meta-ethic. And the answer is clearly: no. The
claim that “means-end reasoning must include a statement of ends” is not
an argument against the claim that “values (ends) are the product of
certain natural passions”. It is simply the case that Hume’s
straightforward point about the logic of moral arguments is neutral with
regard to meta-ethical arguments about the nature or ontological status of
moral values; and it is perfectly consistent with Hume’s own naturalistic
view of the nature of moral value.
2. Moving from facts to values
Despite Hume’s naturalistic approach to ethics, and despite it being the
case that Hume’s simple logical point about moving ‘from is to ought’ is
entirely neutral with regard to the ontological status of moral values,
Hume is widely regarded as having demonstrated a fundamental flaw in
naturalistic ethics. How did this happen? Part of the explanation is that
Hume’s dictum is often presented in terms of the impossibility of moving
from ‘facts to values’; and that this formulation tends to conflate ‘values’
and ‘oughts’. Let value refer to the first premise of a means-end syllogism,
let fact refer to the second premise, and let ought refer to the conclusion.
Hume argued, first, for a naturalistic account of value; and, second, that in
the absence of values, facts alone are insufficient to arrive at oughts.
However, if one presents this second argument – about moving ‘from
facts to oughts’ – in terms of the impossibility of moving ‘from facts to
values’ it can look as if Hume’s second argument contradicts his first.
                                                 
459 Hume, 1739/1985, p521.
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So, for example, Peter Singer takes E. O. Wilson to task for committing the
mistake of moving ‘from is to ought’ – specifically, for moving from the
premise “Our genes came from a common pool and will return to a
common pool” to the conclusion that “we ought not to do anything which
imperils the human gene pool”.460 Singer correctly points out that this
argument is invalid as it stands – Wilson has neither made explicit, nor
defended as a moral value, the premise: “We ought not to do anything
which imperils the long-term survival of our genes”. Then, invoking
nothing more than Hume’s "unbridgeable gulf between facts and values",
Singer asserts that “ethical premises are not the kind of thing discovered
by scientific investigation" and hence "[n]o science is ever going to
discover ethical premises inherent in our biological nature”.461 But clearly,
the demonstration that Wilson has neglected to provide or defend a
particular value-premise does not constitute an argument against the
more general Humean meta-ethical thesis that ‘values are the products of
passions that are inherent to human nature’. Singer’s assertion does not
follow from Hume’s dictum, and Singer provides no further arguments in
its support.
3. Good is identical with its object (Moore's fallacy)
As we have seen, Hume compared moral values to “sounds, colours, heat
and cold” which “are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the
mind."462 George Edward Moore’s moral philosophy is exactly the same
as Hume’s in this regard.
Moore argued that good is an “object of thought” that is evoked by certain
features of the world (such as "the pleasures of human intercourse and
the enjoyment of beautiful objects").463 Moore compared goodness to
yellowness, in that both are subjective psychological entities and not
objective features of the world. Moore sought to establish that good was
                                                 
460 Singer, 1981, p80.
461 Singer, 1981, p73, p77. More specifically, Singer argues that no “facts about our evolutionary
history, our biology or the origins of altruism”, “can compel me to accept any value, or any
conclusion about what I ought to do" (p75).
462 Hume, 1739/1985, pp520-1.
463 Moore, 1903, p188.
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an object of thought – and not an objective feature of the world – by
employing the famous “open question” argument. According to this
argument, whenever one claims that good is identical with external object
X, it is always possible to ask "Is X good?" Hence good and X are not the
same thing because we can conceive of them separately. We have,
according to Moore, "two different notions before our minds".464 Moore
also argued that good was a “simple” – as opposed to a “complex” – object
of thought, in the sense that it was not composed of any parts.465 Hence it
was not possible to “define” good – by which Moore meant render a
complex idea into the simple ideas of which it is composed.466 Good is a
"simple, indefinable, unanalysable object of thought".467
It follows from this account of good as an “object of thought” that it is a
mistake to identify the thought good with the states of the world that
evoke the thought, for the same reason that it is a mistake to identify the
thought yellow with the objects in the world (for example, light of a
certain wavelength) that evoke the thought. Moore called the mistake of
identifying an object of thought with its object a fallacy. And if the object –
with which one mistakenly identified the thought – happened to be a
natural object, as opposed to metaphysical entity, then the error became
the "naturalistic fallacy".468
The question here is not whether Moore made a good case for his moral
philosophy.469 Rather, the question is whether Moore’s naturalistic fallacy
constitutes an argument against Humean-Darwinian meta-ethics. Does
Moore’s contention that “good is a subjective psychological entity and not
an objective feature of the world” contradict the Humean-Darwinian
thesis that moral values “are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in
the mind”? No, it does not. Hume and Moore begin with exactly the same
premise: that “good is a subjective psychological entity and not an
                                                 
464 Moore, 1903, p16.
465 Baggini and Fosl, 2003, p204.
466 "[A] definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this
sense 'good' has no definition because it is simple and has no parts." Moore, 1903, p9.
467 Moore, 1903, p21.
468 Moore's fallacy is not peculiar to ethics: "The naturalistic fallacy has been quite as commonly
committed with regard to beauty as with regard to good." Moore, 1903, p201.
469 For a critical overview, see: Sturgeon, 2003.
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objective feature of the world”. And both argue that the opposite view is
mistaken. The main difference is that Hume calls the opposing view
“vulgar” whereas Moore calls it “fallacious”.
4. Good is a natural property
Thus far, Moore’s moral philosophy is entirely neutral with regard to the
ontological status of moral values. However, it is widely believed that
Moore went on to argue that good – qua object of thought – was non-
natural in the sense of being not part of the natural world. Hilary Putnam,
for example, assumes that Moore demonstrated that: “Good was a 'non-
natural' property, i.e. one totally outside the physicalist ontology of
natural science."470 This has led to a literature in which some assume that
it is a fallacy to claim that moral goodness is part of the natural world,
and in which others point out that to begin by supposing that good is a
non-natural property is merely to beg the question.471
If Moore had conclusively demonstrated that good was a non-natural
property in this sense, then Humean-Darwinian meta-ethics would
indeed be in trouble. However, Moore made no such argument. And
there is no such argument to be found in the pages of Principia Ethica. This
mistaken interpretation of Moore can be traced to his somewhat
idiosyncratic use of the term “natural”. For Moore, the opposite of
“natural” is “intuitive”, not “supernatural”.472 Moore used “natural” to
                                                 
470 Putnam, 1981, p206.
471 As Michael Ruse comments: "Why should one claim that goodness is a non-natural property?
Surely that is to presuppose the very point at issue?" Ruse, 1995, p230. And as WK Frankena
observes, "the charge of committing the naturalistic fallacy can be made, if at all, only as a
conclusion from the discussion and not as an instrument of deciding it." Frankena, 1939, p465.
472 "Naturalism has had two meanings in twentieth-century discussions relating to ethics. In a
wider sense 'naturalism' has stood for a general philosophical point of view the essence of which
is a denial of supernaturalism . . . . But since the publication of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica in
1903 . . . 'naturalism' has had also a more special meaning when used in ethics; it has meant any
ethical theory which holds that an ethical judgment is simply a true or false ascription of a
definable and natural (or empirical) property to an action, object, or person. Opposed to ethical
naturalism in this usage is not supernaturalism, but a pair of positions: (a) intuitionism, also called
'non-naturalism', which holds that an ethical judgment is a true or false ascription to something of
an indefinable and non-natural (or non-empirical) property, and (b) non-cognitivism, which in its
extreme form claims that an ethical judgment is not a true or false ascription of any property to
anything, but something very different, like an interjection, a command, a wish, a resolution, or a
prescription." Frankena, 1957, p457.
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refer to properties of the external world.473 He contrasted “natural” with
“intuitive”, which he used to refer to properties of the mind – including
“objects of thought” such as good. Hence when Moore claims that good is
not a natural property, he is simply restating the point that good is an
intuitive “object of thought” and not an objective feature of the outside
world. Moore made no further arguments to the effect that moral
goodness or intuitions were supernatural. On the contrary, Moore
maintained that good was an "object of thought", and that "in so far as . . .
thoughts did exist, they too are natural objects".474 Neither did Moore see
the "naturalistic" part of his fallacy as crucial: "Even if [good] were a
natural object, that would not alter the nature of the fallacy nor diminish
its importance one whit. All that I have said about it would remain quite
equally true: only the name which I have called it ["the naturalistic
fallacy"] would not be so appropriate as I think it is. And I do not care
about the name: what I do care about is the fallacy."475
Much of the confusion surrounding “the naturalistic fallacy” stems from
the fact that Moore made several further distinct arguments against
Herbert Spencer’s version of evolutionary ethics.476 If Moore’s classic
naturalistic fallacy presents no obstacles to a Humean-Darwin meta-ethic,
then perhaps one of his other arguments against evolutionary ethics does.
Fallacies 5, 6, & 7
In his critique of Spencer, Moore argued that: the direction of evolution is
not necessarily good (5); and that the moral worth of something is not
decided by its being natural (6). Perhaps as a spin-off of fallacy number
five, some people have also claimed that it is a fallacy to argue that what
currently exists (perhaps because it is ‘natural’) ought to exist (7). Under
this view, statements such as “evolution is a progressive force, and we
                                                 
473 As Sturgeon puts it, for Moore: "Natural objects and qualities . . . are objects of experience
(sec. 25, pp. 38-39), of perception; they are what we can 'touch and see and feel' (sec. 66, pp. 110-
11).” "[N]atural qualities are ones that we can know about by 'empirical observation and
induction' (sec. 25, p. 39)." Sturgeon, 2003, p541.
474 Moore, 1903, p41.
475 Moore, 1903, p14.
476 In this paper I will not be concerned with the question of whether Moore accurately
represented Spencer’s moral philosophy. See MacIntyre, 1966, p251.
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ought to help it on its way – and prevent humankind from becoming ‘less
evolved’ – by practicing various forms of eugenics”; “males are naturally
more promiscuous than females, and therefore it is morally acceptable for
them to be more promiscuous”; or “males have always been more
promiscuous than females, therefore one ought not to change the natural
order of things”, are taken to be examples of fallacious or invalid
arguments.
Let us accept, without further argument, that ‘fallacies’ 5, 6 & 7 are valid
objections to spurious uses of evolutionary theory. The question here is
whether any of these objections constitute arguments against the
Humean-Darwinian meta-ethical thesis that “moral values are the
products of certain natural human passions”. And again, the answer is:
no. First, according to the orthodox evolutionary theory on which the
Humean-Darwinian thesis is based, evolution has no direction. And so
the notions of ‘moving in the direction of evolution’ or of being 'more or
less evolved' have no content, and play no role in the thesis. Second, the
Humean-Darwinian thesis argues that ‘all moral values are natural
phenomena’, but it does not argue, and nor does it follow, that ‘all natural
phenomena are moral’ or even ‘all natural values are moral’. As we have
seen, according to the Humean-Darwinian thesis the test of whether a
passion is moral is whether it promotes ‘the common good’, not whether
it is natural.477 And besides, to a naturalist, all possible states of the
universe are equally natural, and therefore ‘naturalness’ cannot act as a
criterion of anything.478 Third, according to the Humean-Darwinian
thesis, the ‘moral goodness’ of an institution has to do with whether or
not it promotes the common good, not whether it exists or not. A
biological explanation of a given state of affairs does not justify it any
more than a sociological explanation does.
                                                 
477 As Hume puts it: "[N]othing can be more unphilosophical than those systems, which assert,
that virtue is the same with what is natural, and vice with what is unnatural. For in the sense of
the word, Nature, as opposed to miracles, both vice and virtue are equally natural . . .". Hume,
1739/1985, p526.
478 Radcliffe Richards, 2001, p246.
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This brings us on to the final version of the naturalistic fallacy: the
objection that Humean-Darwinian ethics can explain, but not justify
moral values.
8. Explanation and justification
Let us, for the sake of argument, suppose that the Humean-Darwinian
thesis is correct, and that moral values are the projections of certain
human passions. Some critics of this thesis have argued that even if the
naturalistic or evolutionary theories may be able to explain and describe
the nature and content of moral value, they cannot justify those moral
values. Since the true business of ethics involves the justification of moral
values, so the argument goes, there are certain aspects of ethics that will
forever remain beyond the reach of naturalistic approaches. In short,
there is more to ethics than evolution.
For example, Christine Korskgaard writes: "When we seek a
philosophical foundation for morality we are not looking merely for an
explanation of moral practices. We are asking what justifies the claims that
morality makes on us." She continues: "People who take up the study of
moral philosophy do not merely want to know why those peculiar
animals, human beings, think that they ought to do certain things. We
want to know what, if anything, we really ought to do."479 Korskgaard
calls this “the normative question”. And, as Paul Farber notes, "to go
beyond description, to enter the arena of the normative, that is, to say
what ought to be, involves an important shift that requires justification.
Here, sociobiology provides no new basis, no new foundation, no new
hope."480
However, objections of this kind rest on two faulty assumptions.
First, the normative objection misconstrues the Humean-Darwinian
argument. It supposes that the Humean-Darwinian thesis is merely an
                                                 
479 Korsgaard, 1996, pp9-10, p13. Emphasis added.
480 Farber, 1994, p156
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explanation or description of what people happen to do or think. If this
were the case, then the call for justification would be in order: one could
attempt to justify particular opinions and practices with reference to some
higher-order moral value. However, like all meta-ethical theories, the
explicandum of the Humean-Darwinian thesis is not ‘what people
happen to think or do’. Rather, the explicandum is the nature and
ontological status of moral values.481
Second, the normative objection assumes that the question “Are moral
values morally justified?” is capable of a coherent answer (and that it is
the job of meta-ethics to provide such an answer). However, this
assumption would seem to be unwarranted. To recall an earlier
distinction, you can justify ought statements with reference to certain
values, but what are you supposed to justify values by? What you need is
some super-ordinate criterion of justification. And yet it is exactly the
existence of such super-ordinate criteria that any meta-ethical theory
denies. If there were super-ordinate criteria, then one would have a
different meta-ethical theory (and you would be back to square one).
Clearly, one cannot go on justifying statements forever, one must come to
a stop somewhere. And where one comes to a stop constitutes one’s meta-
ethical theory. Theologians stop at divine commands, relativists stop at
social conventions, Humeans stop at certain passions. In the words of
Hume:
Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will answer, because he
desires to keep his health. If you then enquire, why he desires
health, he will readily reply, because sickness is painful. If you
push your enquiries farther, and desire reason why he hates
pain , it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an
ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object. . . .
And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason. It is
impossible there can be a progress in infinitum; and that one
thing can always be a reason why another is desired.
                                                 
481 If moral values were the products of human passions, then the Humean-Darwinian thesis
would, in addition, partly explain why people thought they ought to do certain things.
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Something must be desirable on its own account, and
because of its immediate accord or agreement with human
sentiment and affection.482
Hume, and numerous other philosophers, have concluded that when you
get to this point, the call for justification is “senseless”, “unanswerable” or
“mistaken”, and all that remains to be done is explain the origins and
ontological status of moral values.483 Korsgaard provides no reason for
overturning this conclusion. She begins by clearly stating the difficulties
that one encounters when attempting to answer the normative question:
So we are faced with a dilemma. . . . If we try to derive [the
authority of morality] from some supposedly normative
consideration, such as gratitude or contract, we must in turn
explain why that consideration is normative, or where its
authority comes from. Either its authority comes from
morality, in which case we have argued in a circle, or it
comes from something else, in which case the question
arises again, and we are faced with an infinite regress.484
And, faced with the option of either circularity or infinite regression, she
opts for circularity. Korsgaard’s answer to the normative question is
“reflective endorsement”. Reflective endorsement is the view that values
are justified if, having reflected upon them, we approve or endorse them.
Because Korsgaard is a Humean to the extent that she takes moral values
                                                 
482 Hume, 1777, pp244-5.
483 Thomas Nagel has written: "Denial that justification is the appropriate final defence of ethics
suggests the familiar view that the question 'Why should I be moral?' is senseless or in principle
unanswerable. Strictly the suggestion is correct . . . I believe that an explanation can be
discovered for the basic principles of ethics, even though it is not a justification. . . . Psychology .
. . may therefore be the appropriate field in which to make progress in ethical theory." Nagel,
1970, p5. Michael Ruse writes: "evolution explains (not justifies) morality in the sense of
showing where it came from. Furthermore, once such an explanation is given, one sees that the
traditional call for justification is mistaken. There can be no ultimate support for morality in the
sense of reasoned absolute foundations." Ruse, 1987, p427. "The view of reason adopted by
sociobiology is Humean . . . an instrument that allows us to calculate the best means to the
attainment of our ends. . . . What it cannot do, however, is evaluate the ends finally accepted as
ultimate, for these are given by the passions and, at this level, reason is a slave of the passions.
And where do these basic passions come from? Evolutionary biology surely has, at least, part of
the answer to this question." Murphy, 1982, p100.
484 Korsgaard, 1996, p30.
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to be the expression of a moral sense, reflective endorsement involves the
moral sense approving of itself. In other words, the criterion that
Korsgaard proposes as a measure of whether moral values are justified is
those same moral values. So, morality is moral if: "The moral sense
approves of its own origins and workings and so approves of itself."485
Unfortunately, Korsgaard does not explain how the values embodied in
the moral sense can be used as a standard of justification when it is
exactly the justifiability of these values that is at issue.
In case this is all rather abstract, let me re-state the point by way of an
analogy. Suppose that instead of being about morality and why people
find certain things morally good and bad, this dissertation had been
about sweetness, and why people find certain things sweet and certain
things sour. The Humean-Darwinian would have argued that humans
have an evolved digestive system that distinguishes between good and
bad sources of nutrition and energy; and that the human ‘sweet tooth’ is
an evolved preference for foods with high sugar-content over foods with
low sugar-content. If one accepted this premise, it would make no sense
to complain that evolution may have explained why humans find certain
things sweet, but it cannot tell us whether these things are really sweet or
not. It follows from the premises of the argument that there is no criterion
of sweetness independent of human psychology, and hence this question
cannot arise. Of course, one may object to the premise, and claim that
there really is such a thing as sweetness that human psychology is
latching on to. But then this would be a different argument. One would
have to make the case for an independent criterion of sweetness, and not
merely assume it. Applying this to morality: The Humean-Darwinian
argues that humans are equipped with a suite of adaptations for
cooperation, that these adaptations constitute what have been called the
moral passions or moral sentiments, and that these adaptations determine
what people deem morally good and bad. If one accepts this argument, it
makes no sense to complain that evolution may have explained why
humans find certain things morally good, but it cannot tell us whether
these things are really morally good or not. It follows from the premises of
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the argument that there is no criterion of ‘moral goodness’ independent
of human psychology, and hence this question cannot arise. Of course,
one may object to the premise, and claim that there really is such a thing
as ‘goodness’ that human psychology is latching on to. But then this
would be a different argument. One would have to make the case for an
independent criterion, and not merely assume it.486
In summary, the normative question mistakes the Humean-Darwinian
thesis for an argument about what people believe, when it is in fact an
argument about the ontological status of moral values; and the normative
question presupposes, incorrectly, that it makes sense to morally evaluate
moral values. Given that it is not possible to answer a senseless question,
the failure of Humean-Darwinian meta-ethics to answer the normative
question does not count against the thesis. In time, the ‘failure’ of
Humean-Darwinian ethics to provide a justification of moral values may
come to be seen as a strength rather than a weakness.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed eight different versions of the "naturalistic
fallacy”, and shown that none of them constitute obstacles to Humean-
Darwinian meta-ethics. Of course, there may be other versions of the
naturalistic fallacy, or other arguments altogether, that succeed in
establishing that moral values inhabit a realm distinct from the natural,
rendering Humean-Darwinian and other naturalistic meta-ethics
untenable. What would such an argument look like? Presumably, such an
argument must establish that there is something other than the natural
world, that moral values reside there, and that such entities can somehow
exert an influence this world. Any such arguments would seem to be
mystical, dualist, transcendental, supernatural or theological in flavour.
                                                 
486 One of the things that seems to unite the various naturalistic fallacies is that they are motivated
by a disagreement with the basic premise of ethical naturalism; they dispute the claim that values
are merely the product of natural human passions. ‘The naturalistic fallacy’ is often invoked in an
attempt to soften up evolutionary ethical naturalism before a replacement meta-ethic is proposed.
However, one needs to make an argument in favour of these alternative sources of value, and not
merely smuggle it in under the guise of a logical fallacy.
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In the absence of any such arguments, we can conclude that the Humean-
Darwinian version of ethical naturalism remains a "live option".487
The naturalistic fallacy, by contrast, seems to have become something of a
superstition. It is dimly understood and widely feared, and its ritual
incantation is an obligatory part of the apprenticeship of moral
philosophers and biologists alike. But if the arguments presented above
are correct, then it is surely time to dispense with this superstition. To
that end I make the following recommendation: Whenever someone uses
the term "naturalistic fallacy", ask them "Which one?", and insist that they
explain the arguments behind their accusation. It is only by bringing the
'fallacy' out into the open that we can break the mysterious spell that it
continues to cast over ethics.
                                                 
487 As Charles Pigden comments: "[T]here is no need for naturalists to evade the arguments of
Moore and Hume . . . Insofar as they are valid, Hume's arguments, and Moore's too, are
compatible with naturalism. Formal attempts to refute naturalism having failed, it remains a live
option." Pigden, 1991, pp427-8.
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Chapter 7 – The future of ethics
Someone may ask, 'What is the difference, then, between moral
philosophy and moral psychology?' Well, who says there is an
interesting difference? Surely, the issue is of interest only to
university administrators.
– Gilbert Harman488
Introduction
David Hume argued that human nature is equipped with a range of
moral passions that give rise to human moral values; and he suggested
that morality could be studied like any other part of the natural world.
This thesis has argued that, with a little help from Darwin, Hume was
basically right. Human nature comprises a suite of adaptations for
cooperation; these adaptations constitute human moral sentiments, and
their proximate goals constitute human moral values; hence human
morality can be studied like any other branch of natural history.
The purpose of this chapter is to preview some of the directions that
moral philosophy, pursued in a Humean-Darwinian spirit, might take in
the future. I suggest that, first, we should aim to increase our knowledge
of human adaptations for cooperation. And second, we should evaluate
the design of these adaptations to see whether they provide efficient
solutions to collective-action problems.
More problems
The goal of “evolutionary moral psychology” is to arrive at a full circuit-
diagram of human adaptations for cooperation. Chapter 4 reviewed the
progress that has been made so far towards this goal (see also Appendix
3). We saw how evolutionary theorists use game theory to identify
distinct problems of cooperation, use these problems to derive predictions
about the design of possible adaptive solutions, and then go into the field
                                                 
488 Harman, 2003, p15.
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to look for the predicted design features in humans and other organisms.
And we reviewed the evidence that showed that, like many other species,
humans seem to have adaptations for kin altruism, coordination to
mutual advantage, reciprocity and conflict resolution.
Future research in this area will attempt to be more specific about the
particular adaptive problems that fall within each of these broad
categories, and thereby attempt to arrive at a complete list of human
moral sentiments. Again, this process begins by generating hypotheses
about additional collective-action problems that were recurrent in the
lives of human ancestors. Examples of problem areas that have yet to be
investigated from this perspective include: the problem of partner choice
in cooperative ‘markets’ and the evolution of confidence and cues of
competence; bargaining problems and the evolution of a sense of fairness;
the problems of cooperation between the sexes and the evolution of
sexual morality; the problem of alpha males and the evolution of political
psychology; and the problems of intergroup relations and the evolution
of an in-group/out-group psychology.
Markets and partner choice
In most extant models of the evolution of cooperation players are paired
at random. Models in which individuals can choose with whom to
cooperate are at an early stage.489 Given that many animals can exercise
choice over cooperative partners, we might ask: What criteria do
individuals use when selecting cooperative partners? How do individuals
cultivate and advertise attributes that meet these criteria? How do
individuals ensure that they get ‘picked for the team’, and are not simply
redundant? What is the role of reputation in partner choice? And so on.
Most discussions of partner choice have focused on uncertainty about
incentives, and hence trustworthiness; but we should also expect
individuals to be uncertain about the ‘competence’ of other partners
(especially in cases of mutualism where incentive is not at issue) and
hence to the degree of ‘confidence’ one player should have in another.
                                                 
489 Noë, et al., 2001.
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Bargaining problems
Bargaining problems arise in the context of deciding how to divide up the
spoils of a cooperative venture among participants. What constitutes a
stable solution depends on such factors as: what contribution different
players make to the venture (what they ‘bring to the table’ in terms of
skill or effort), how indispensable are those contributions, what
alternative opportunities players have, and the costs of bargaining, in
terms of the ‘decay’ rate of the good and the ‘impatience’ or discount rate
of the players.490 Bargaining problems are more difficult to solve when
players are asymmetric, and vary along one or more of these dimensions.
(So, the default solution might be ‘equal shares’, unless one of these other
conditions could be established.) Existing theoretical work on bargaining,
including the evolution of a ‘sense of fairness’, has tended to be
conducted under the heading of reciprocity.491 But evolutionary theory
suggests that bargaining problems may arise in other contexts, such as
mutualism (‘fair shares’), the allocation of resources to kin (especially
from parents to offspring – ‘that’s not fair!’),492 and in the context of
conflict resolution (‘fair play’). To the extent that different games have
different rules, we might expect distinct ‘senses of fairness’ for each one.
An evolutionarily-informed experimental economics that, instead of
relying on a tried-and-tested instrument (the ‘ultimatum game’), made
explicit the adaptive problem and solution it is looking for, might help to
tease such adaptations apart.
Sexual morality
Numerous games of conflict and cooperation are played out in between
males and females in the context of sexual reproduction.493 Given that
                                                 
490 For a limpid introduction to bargaining problems, see: Dixit and Skeath, 1999, Ch. 16.
491 Trivers, 1983. See also Rawls: "The main idea [of fairness] is that when a number of persons
engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict their
liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those that have submitted to these
restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from
their submission. We are not to gain from the cooperative labors of others without doing our fair
share. . . . Each person receives a fair share when all (himself included) do their part." Rawls,
1971, p112.
492 Trivers, 1974.
493 Dawkins, 1976, Ch. 9.
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sexual reproduction is an evolutionarily ancient problem with significant
evolutionary consequences, we might expect human males and females to
have specific intuitions regarding relations between the sexes. Humans
may have a distinct set of intuitions governing their attitudes to: length of
courtship, promiscuity, commitment, parental investment, infidelity,
sexual jealousy, mate desertion, polygamy, infanticide, abortion, incest,494
domestic violence, sexual harassment, and rape. To the extent that these
intuitions are designed to solve recurrent problems of cooperation, we
might say that they form the basis of human ‘sexual morality’.
Political psychology
As we have seen, in several primate species, individuals – usually males –
compete for status not only through brute force, but also by cultivating
allies, and by acting in ways that benefit other members of the group. In
chimpanzees, dominant males lead collective hunts and raids into
neighbouring territories, distribute some of the spoils of collective hunts,
and intervene impartially to settle disputes. It seems as if individuals gain
and maintain support (especially from the constituency of females) by
being willing and able to shoulder some of the costs of maintaining
collective-action schemes. Previous accounts of ‘chimpanzee politics’
have been content to document these phenomena, and to provide blow-
by-blow accounts of the ‘court intrigue’ that ensues as one coalition
displaces another at the top of the dominance hierarchy.495 It would be
interesting to go further and investigate whether this account of ‘primate
politics’ can shed any light on the intuitions (and perhaps philosophical
concepts) that humans have about politics and political leadership –
concepts such as authority, political obligation, sovereignty, charismatic
leadership, impartiality, tyranny, justice, the ‘monopoly of the legitimate
use of force’ and so on. A ‘primate political theory’ might be illuminating
both in providing a causal explanation of the origin of such intuitions
(homology), and/or in providing a relatively simple model in which to
examine basic political processes (analogy).496
                                                 
494 For recent work on the evolution of incest avoidance, see: Lieberman, et al., 2003.
495 de Waal, 1982.
496 Curry, 2003.
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International relations
As we have seen, whereas Hobbes argued that individuals are inherently
selfish, and that cooperation is an artificial invention, Hume argued that
humans are inherently social, and that cooperation is a result of various
natural social and moral dispositions. I have argued that Hume was
correct when it comes to modelling relations between individuals.
However, it remains an open question as to how best to model relations
between groups. One view, standard in the field of international relations,
is that human societies inhabit a Hobbesian state of nature, and that
cooperation between groups is an artificial invention.497 An alternative,
‘Humean’, view of international relations would make the following
argument. First, human groups lived in close proximity to one another for
a sufficient period of time to lead to the evolution of a specific set of
intuitions governing relations between groups (or between members of
those groups). Second, the opportunities for competition with other groups
may have led to the familiar psychology of in-group/out-group
distinctions, xenophobia, and warlike aggression.498 But, third,
opportunities for cooperation with other groups may have led, in addition,
to a more benign psychology of tolerance, live-and-let-live,
‘internationalism’, mutual aid, coalition-formation, conflict resolution,
and so on, that are not merely instances of adaptations for inter-
individual cooperation operating on a larger scale.499
These and other problems can be used to develop a more detailed and
comprehensive account of human social and moral psychology.
A new framework
In addition to providing a more fine-grained analysis of the problems of
cooperation, the evolutionary approach makes a number of broader
predictions about moral psychology, which provide the framework in
                                                 
497 Bull, 1977/1995.
498 Tooby and Cosmides, 1988; Wrangham and Peterson, 1996.
499 See Kurzban, et al., 2001 for one example of research into ‘coalitional’, ‘inter-group’ or
‘corporate’ psychology.
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which future empirical research in moral psychology will take place. For
example, the evolutionary approach suggests that: morality is moderately
heritable; morality is the product of a number of distinct neuroanatomical
structures that humans share with closely-related species; and morality
exhibits systematic sex and age differences. The evolutionary approach
also promises to explain: how moral psychology develops differently
under different environmental conditions; how moral values vary cross-
culturally in predictable ways; and how moral psychology goes wrong.
Below I preview what form these research programs will take; and I
contrast them with existing approaches to moral psychology, which
operate with different, incompatible, pre-Darwinian theories of
psychology.
Morality is moderately heritable
The proportion of variance in a trait in a given population that is due to
differences in genes is referred to as the ‘heritability’ of that trait. The
heritability of height, for example, is around 70%. This means that 70% of
the differences in height between people in a given population is due to
differences in genes. The heritability of most behavioural and personality
traits appears to be around 50%.500 We should expect adaptations for
cooperation, and hence moral values, to exhibit a similar heritability. And
this appears to be the case. In a review of the literature, Steven Pinker
comments: "Study after study has shown that a willingness to commit
antisocial acts, including lying, stealing, starting fights, and destroying
property, is partly heritable . . . ".501
However, existing heritability studies have tended to look for variance
not in the specific adaptations that evolutionary theory suggests are
components of moral psychology, but in the larger more loosely-defined,
a-biological, social psychology categories such as ‘pro-‘ and ‘anti-
                                                 
500 Harris, 1998; Plomin, 1990.
501 Pinker, 2002, p50. Studies of ‘lying and stealing’ are, at the same time, studies of ‘telling the
truth and respecting others’ property’. It would be interesting to know to what extent behavioural
genetics explains the other end of the curve; that is, why some people become priests, traffic
wardens, police officers, magistrates, judges, triage nurses, sports referees, and so on. In what
ways do their moral psychologies differ from the average?
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sociality’ or ‘individual- versus community-orientation’. The alternative,
Darwinian approach to moral psychology would investigate the
heritability of the performance of actual adaptive mechanisms, such as:
maternal and paternal sentiment; offers made in ultimatum games; skill
at solving coordination problems using various orders of ‘theory of mind’
(that is, problems requiring first-, second-, third-, nth-order ‘theory of
mind’); discount rate and tendency to cooperate in prisoner’s dilemmas;
accuracy and speed of detecting cheats in a Wason Selection Task;
‘punitivity’; willingness to forgive; display of costly-signals of fitness;
tendency to detect and respond to facial cues of distress or submission;
and so on.
In addition to testing the performance on these ‘benchmarks’ tasks, we
could look for individual differences in the relative strength or weighting
of one moral sentiment as compared to another, or of a moral sentiment
compared to a nonmoral sentiment through the construction of suitably
excruciating moral dilemmas. (It should be possible, by altering the
variables of particular scenarios, to find the point at which individuals
were indifferent between conflicting moral intuitions, and between moral
and nonmoral intuitions, and thereby assess their relative strength. Such
dilemmas would play on conflicting loyalties to family, friends, teams,
associates and strangers.)502 Such tests would tap into the various
adaptations that comprise human moral psychology and thereby reveal
the heritability of these underlying adaptations. We might find that some
areas of moral value – such as the display of virtue – exhibit greater
heritable variation than others.503
Assuming that there are differences in the ‘genes for’ morality, we might
proceed to ask “Where are these genes?” and “Why do they differ?”. We
are a long way off from being able to match genotype with phenotype,
especially for traits as complicated as morality, but in theory it should be
possible to identify the genes involved. If we were able to do this, we
                                                 
502 The boardgame Scruples provides one example: You are making the school run with your own
child and your best friend's child, but your new car has only one seatbelt. Which child do you put
in the seat with the belt?
503 Miller, 2004.
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could then look for homologous genes in other species, and thereby build
up a family tree of morality – a true genealogy of morals. We might, for
example, be able to tell when and in which species different aspects of
moral psychology first evolved, what they evolved from, and with which
extant species humans share them. (In turn, evidence from genetic studies
might converge with evidence from comparative neuroanatomy to give
us a complete picture of the evolution of moral sentiments. See below.)
Turning to the question of why genes differ, such differences could merely
reflect a normal distribution, produced by mutation and noise.
Alternatively, differences in genes could reflect the selection of distinct
adaptive ‘morphs’ in the population. For example, Linda Mealey has
argued that some instances of sociopathy are the product of a genetic
polymorphism – “frequency-dependent, genetically-based individual
differences in employment of life strategies”. Mealey argues that the
game-theoretic prediction that a small proportion of ‘natural born hawks’
can survive by preying on the majority ‘doves’, explains the high-
risk/high-reward, anti-social behaviour that is characteristic of “a small,
cross-culturally similar, and unchanging baseline frequency of
sociopaths”.504
The neuroanatomical location of moral sentiments
If morality is the product of a number of distinct adaptations, then we
might expect different parts of the brain to ‘light up’ when attempting to
solve different collective-action problems.505 Evolutionary theory itself
makes no predictions about the specific neuroanatomical location of
particular adaptations. But, as Hume noted, comparative and
phylogenetic evidence can.506 Studying the brains of closely-related
species might generate predictions about where to find homologous
adaptations in human brains. For example, we could place other primates
in typical social and cooperative situations – we could play distress calls
                                                 
504 Mealey, 1997, p163.
505 In general, see: Blakemore, et al., 2004; Duchaine, et al., 2001. More specifically, see: Rilling,
et al., 2002; Sanfey, et al., 2003; Stone, et al., 2002.
506 Clutton-Brock and Harvey, 1984; Hume, 1739/1985, pp375-6.
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of an infant to a rhesus mother, get orangutans to play coordination
games, steal a chimp’s banana, or disrespect an alpha-male gorilla – and
see which parts of their brain are activated. We could then place humans
in equivalent situations, and look to see whether the same areas light
up.507 The discovery of functional homologies between nonhuman
adaptations for cooperation and human moral sentiments would
obviously provide a very firm evidentiary foundation for the Humean-
Darwinian account of morality.
James Rilling has recently begun to use this comparative method to
establish the neuroanatomical location of mechanisms governing mate
guarding, or “jealousy”.508 Rilling allowed a dominant male rhesus to
mate with a female. Rilling then put the dominant male behind a one-way
mirror, from which the male could watch as a subordinate male mated
with the same female. Not surprisingly, the dominant male became very
agitated. Rilling was then able to conduct a PET-scan on the dominant
male to discover the location of his putative 'mate guarding system'.
Rilling now knows where to look for a homologous system in humans.
The prediction would be that if you subjected a human male to the same
situation – albeit by means of an imaginary scenario – then the same parts
of his brain would become activated. If they did, then this would
constitute prima facie evidence that sexual jealousy was an ancient instinct,
and not merely an artificial social construction.509
This comparative approach differs from most extant attempts to
investigate moral psychology using brain-scanning technology. Instead of
using predictions derived from evolutionary or phylogenetic
considerations, most current brain-scan research tends to test whether
moral decision-making is a product of ‘emotion’ or ‘reason’.510 As such,
                                                 
507 We might, at a later date, attempt to establish homologous neuroanatomical structures across
wider groups than primates – perhaps including other social mammals (dolphins, wolves), or
social vertebrates in general (ravens, cleaner fish).
508 Rilling and Kilts, 2003.
509 See also: Buss, 2000a.
510 Greene and Haidt, 2002.
- 180 -
modern technology is being used to test the ancient, mediaeval, and folk
theories of psychology that are au courant in moral philosophy.511
Moreover, researchers attempt to test the theory not by giving individuals
distinct ‘ecologically valid’ problems and scenarios, but by giving moral
dilemmas that arise in evolutionarily-novel environments.512 As discussed
in the previous chapter, a moral dilemma may not be the best way to
tease out the components of a moral psychology, because such dilemmas
are likely to arise at exactly the point at which individuals are indifferent
between outcomes, and where their intuitions are most unstable,
conflicted and/or weak. This is not to say that moral dilemmas are of no
use in the investigation of moral psychology. Like optical illusions, moral
dilemmas can be used to reveal the gaps between the adaptations. It’s just
that in order to make sense of moral dilemmas – or optical illusions – we
must locate them in a broader theory of the underlying mechanisms that
give rise to them. This alternative approach to moral dilemmas would
begin by establishing distinct adaptive systems, and would then construct
scenarios in which these systems come into conflict or interfere with one
another.
Sex differences in morality
Generally speaking, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that
organisms that have faced different adaptive problems will exhibit
different adaptive solutions. This applies to individuals within a
particular species as much as to members of different species. So, for
example, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that, to the extent that
men and women have faced different adaptive problems, they will
                                                 
511 The problem of sticking with theories that are long past their ‘sell by date’ was elegantly
diagnosed by one of the early pioneers of cybernetics: "Some of today's outstanding problems
about the brain and behaviour come to us from mediaeval and earlier times, when the basic
assumptions were very different and often, by today's standards, ludicrously false. Some of these
problems are probably wrongly put, and are on a par with the problem, classic in mediaeval
medicine: what are the relations between the four elements and the four humours? This problem,
be it noticed, was never solved – what happened was that when chemists and pathologists got to
know more about the body they realised that they must ignore it." What is required instead is "a
clear demonstration that they should not be asked". Ashby, 1956, p191.
512 The results of these studies may also be confounded by invoking intuitions about tool-use, as
in ‘the trolley problem’.
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exhibit different adaptations. And, to the extent that men and women
have faced different problems of cooperation over evolutionary time, they
will exhibit different adaptations for cooperation, and hence different
moral values.
For example, we might expect the expression of kin altruism to loom
larger in the psychologies of women, for whom social relations have
involved a greater degree of interaction with close kin (and others with
whom their interests are closely tied). We might also expect the
expression of reciprocal altruism and conflict resolution to loom larger in
the psychologies of men, for whom social relations have involved a
greater degree of interaction with non-kin and those with whom their
interests are in conflict. We might also expect the display and selection of
particular ‘virtues’ to reflect the cross-cultural sex differences in
behaviour and mate-choice criteria.513 We have already seen that men
seem more willing to perform risky heroic acts to save the lives of
strangers; and that in women, chastity and fidelity are more highly
valued.514
This approach to sex differences differs from existing approaches, which
tend to assume that boys and girls start with identical minds, and that
any resulting differences between them are the arbitrary products of
differential socialisation, or of some kind of Freudian psychodrama.515
Age differences in morality
Evolutionary theory also leads us to expect that individuals will exhibit
systematic age differences in moral values. Different stages of an
individual’s life – infancy, childhood, adolescence, sexual maturity,
parenting, grandparenting – present different adaptive challenges, and
we might expect different psychological mechanisms to come on- and off-
                                                 
513 Cross-cultural sex differences in mate-choice criteria: Buss, 1994. See also: Low, 1989.
514 One prediction might be that men and women hold men more accountable than women for
failing to perform heroic acts. That is, attitudes to the moral status of the omission versus the
commission of particular moral acts may vary according to the sex of the actor.
515 Chodorow, 1978.
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line at different times to deal with them. And this includes adaptations
for various kinds of cooperation.
For example, we might expect individuals to have different adaptations:
for signalling viability and need to mothers when infants; for competing
with siblings for parental investment; for fine-tuning moral competences
through play during childhood; for identifying with a peer group; for
negotiating relations with the opposite sex following sexual maturity; for
climbing status hierarchies through the display of sexually-selected
fitness indicators; for adopting local conventions; and so on.516 These
adaptations might come on-line (and go off-line) according to a pre-
specified developmental sequence – similar to the emergence of
secondary sexual characteristics. To quote Tooby and Cosmides: “just as
teeth and breasts are absent at birth and develop later in an individual’s
life history, perceptual organization, domain-specific reasoning
mechanisms, the language acquisition device, motivational organization
and many other intricate psychological adaptations mature and are
elaborated in age-specific fashions that are not simply the product of
‘experience’.”517 Alternatively, the development of certain adaptations
might be triggered if individuals enter into long-term sexual
relationships, if they have status and property to defend, if they have
children, or grandchildren of their own, or if they ascend to the rank of
alpha status and are called upon to resolve disputes.
This evolutionary approach to developmental moral psychology differs
from the dominant approach, which tends to assume that moral
development in children is largely a function of general growth in the
capacity for sympathy, coupled with a general increase in intelligence
that enables the child to learn, comprehend, and eventually criticise,
increasingly-sophisticated moral rules.518
                                                 
516 “To understand why the form of moral judgement undergoes systematic changes with
development, evolutionary theory directs us to attend to its functions; this more than anything, is
missing in cognitive-developmental models”. Krebs, 1998, p364.
517 Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, p81.
518 Kohlberg, 1981; Piaget, 1997; Rawls, 1971, Ch. 13.
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One prediction that combines sex and age differences relates to life-
history strategy and attitudes to abortion. Life-history strategy predicts
that females value offspring as a function of the females' age. That is,
younger females, who have the opportunity to reproduce again in the
future, discount offspring at a higher rate than do older females, for
whom each offspring may be their last. Could these attitudes towards the
value of the lives of infants be reflected in, and largely constitute,
attitudes towards abortion? One evolutionary prediction is that women's
approval of abortion will decline as a function of age; whereas men's
approval will not (or not by as much).
Morality develops differently under different environmental conditions
If about half the variance in moral personality traits can be traced to
difference in genes, then this leaves about half to be explained by non-
genetic factors. A Darwinian account of psychology can help here by
generating hypotheses about which aspects of the environment particular
adaptations for cooperation are likely to be sensitive to (and how they are
likely to respond).
As we have seen, adaptations for cooperation tend to be ‘conditional’;
hence specifying the design of such an adaptation necessarily involves
specifying what states the adaptation will adopt under different
environmental conditions. As discussed above, this conditionality might
be manifest as ‘triggering’. In addition, there may be many ‘critical
periods’ during (childhood) development in which distinct moral
competences are fine-tuned, similar to the critical periods in the
development of language.
For example, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that adaptations for
kin altruism might be calibrated by the viability of one’s offspring, or to
the size and distribution of one’s family group.519 Adaptations for
mutualism may be calibrated by one’s skills and abilities – what one has
                                                 
519 Lieberman, et al., 2003.
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to offer.520 Adaptations for reciprocity may be sensitive to average
mobility and discount rates, or life-expectancy.521 Adaptations for conflict
resolution may be calibrated by feedback on entering contests during
adolescence, by the gradient of local status hierarchies, or by the
availability of certain types of resources.522 And so on.
In this way, the Darwinian account of moral sentiments suggests the
development of moral psychology is influenced by ‘the environment’ in
many more ways that are currently envisaged by standard social
psychological theories that restrict their focus to rote-learning from
parents or imitation of role models.523
Incidentally, it would be strange, from an evolutionary perspective, if
natural selection had designed children to fine-tune their cooperative
strategies entirely, or largely, in response to the behaviour of their
parents. How one is treated by one’s parents as a child – let alone as an
infant – seems to hold relatively little predictive information about how
one will be treated by other people, several decades later, in one’s adult
social environment. More reliable information about one’s future social
environment may come from assessments of one's own abilities, strengths
and weaknesses, and how these abilities compare to those with whom
one will be competing, cooperating, meeting and mating for the rest of
one’s life – one's peer group – as well as background assessments of local
ecological or economic conditions. Recent research in behavioural
genetics has indeed undermined the standard ‘nurture assumption’ that
one’s parents and one’s home are the most important environmental
influences on a child’s developing personality, including their developing
moral character. Parents influence their children primarily through the
genes that they give them. Parenting style and home environment seem
                                                 
520 Tooby and Cosmides, 1996.
521 Wilson and Daly, 1997.
522 Economists and social psychologists have found that, for men, adolescence height is a better
predictor than adult height of adult self-confidence, dominance, ‘social poise’, and income: Jones,
1957; Persico, et al., 2001. This suggests that there is a ‘critical period’ during adolescence in
which males calibrate their ‘conflict resolution’ strategies.
523 Pinker, 2002.
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to have negligible effects on adult personality.524 But which other factors
may be important has yet to be fully investigated.
Abnormal psychology and pathology
The emerging picture of moral psychology is one of a vast and intricate
decision-tree, with hundreds and thousands of branches, decision nodes,
variables, switches, sensitivities, subroutines, feedback loops and so on. A
full account of this vast circuitry is a necessary pre-requisite for
understanding the countless ways in which it can go wrong. There will be
as many different types of moral psychopathy as there are mechanisms
that can go wrong multiplied by the number of different ways that they
can go wrong. (Genetic mutation, developmental extremes, poisoning,
hormonal imbalances, a bump on the head or countless other
interventions could all be responsible for knocking out or getting wires
crossed in various parts of this intricate structure, which in turn, go
wrong in countless ways.) In this way, the evolutionary account of moral
psychology creates the possibility of a vast list of distinct pathological
conditions, for which current terms such as ‘sociopath’ or ‘psychopath’
may merely be imprecise catch-all labels.
Research in the area of evolutionary moral psychopathology has only just
begun.525 But already, work by James Blair seems to have identified one of
the mechanisms that can fail. We saw earlier that many animals forestall
or settle conflicts by attending to costly signals of fitness and submission
cues. James Blair has argued that problems with this ‘violence inhibition
mechanism’ lead to one of the typical patterns of psychopathy.526
Again, it is an open question as to whether some or all of these abnormal
psychologies are the product of pathology, or whether they represent
polymorphisms.
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525 See, for example: Murphy and Stich, 2000; Nesse, 2001b.
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Moral values exhibit predictable cross-cultural variation
So far I have been discussing the Darwinian approach to individual
differences in moral value. Aggregating these theories of individual
difference constitutes the first step in explaining cross-cultural differences
in moral value.
For example, if individuals of different ages and sexes have different
adaptations for cooperation, and hence different moral values, then
societies composed of different proportions of such individuals can be
expected to exhibit different moral systems. Consider, for example,
demographic factors such as changes in the age-structure and operational
sex ratio of a population. What would happen if a society experienced a
war that decimates males, had a baby boom, or had a disproportionately-
old population. Perhaps a baby boom produces an outbreak of maternal
sentiment, followed twenty years later by intense costly-signalling as a
swollen age-cohort enters a fiercely competitive mating market, followed
ten years later by a suffocating preponderance of risk-averse
conservatism… and so on.527
In addition, given that individuals rely on several kinds of adaptations for
cooperation – for kin altruism, mutualism, reciprocity, and conflict
resolution – we might be able to identify, first in theory, and then
empirically, conditions under which different modes of social interaction
become predominant, and categorise societies accordingly. Factors that
might alter the balance between different modes of social interaction
might include: dispersal of families, mobility of the population, type of
economy, efficiency of trade, and degree of inequality. For example, we
might predict that social order in a society in which family relations were
disrupted – by migration, urbanisation, or industrialisation for example –
would come to be characterised more by reciprocal ties than by kin, and
vice versa.528 As a society becomes more unequal, we might expect its
                                                 
527 See Buss, for a discussion of the effects of a baby boom on the mating market Buss, 1994,
p202.
528 In the West, was the shift from 'status to contract' in the modern era the point at which the
rewards to reciprocal relations outweighed the rewards to kin relations? Was this shift an effect of
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social institutions to become increasingly those designed to manage
conflicts and competition; we might expect the display of sexually-
selected virtues to increase when male-male competition is particularly
intense, or, for women, when hypergamy pays particularly well.
We should also expect ‘conditional’ adaptations operating under different
conditions to produce cross-cultural differences in attitudes and
behaviour. We have seen, for example, how psychological mechanisms
governing paternal investment are sensitive to certainty of paternity,
which in turn can lead to society-wide differences in family structure. In
turn, certainty of paternity depends on such factors as time spent away
from the home base, sex ratios, degree of male-male inequality, ecological
distribution of resources. We have also seen how cognitive adaptations
for social exchange are likely to trade luck-based goods but not effort-
based goods.529 Mechanisms governing incest aversion are triggered by
the presence of siblings in the household; this predicts that China’s one-
child policy will have produced a nation for whom the thought of sibling
incest is not repugnant… And so on.
What moral philosophy needs is a cross-cultural survey of moral
psychology of the kind conducted by David Buss into sexual psychology.
Buss took evolutionary predictions about sexual psychology and mate
preferences and tested them on 10,000 individuals in 37 cultures.530 A
survey of moral attitudes could provide a provisional account of
‘universal moral grammar’; that is, it would help in discovering cross-
cultural universals, as well as testing theories of how moral systems vary
from place to place.
                                                                                                                                     
technology making it possible for an individuals to acquire more resources in their lifetimes than
they could inherit from their families?
529 Other factors influencing the preponderance of social exchange may include: “degree of
kinship; status or rank; whether a relationship is long-term or short-term; whether one is in daily
contact . . . or only rare contact; whether storage [of the goods] is possible; whether the group is
sedentary enough for inequalities in wealth to accumulate; whether gaining a resource requires
close, interdependent cooperation; whether people are trading different resources or dividing the
same resource; whether an external, consensual definition of ‘equal portion’ is feasible; whether
an individual can control access to a resource, and thereby ‘own’ it; and so on.” Cosmides and
Tooby, 1992, p285.
530 Buss, 1989.
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As yet, evolutionarily-informed tests of moral reasoning have not
progressed further than testing whether or not people are kin altruists, as
opposed to what extent they are kin altruists as compared to reciprocators.
O’Neill and Petronovich, for example, tested American and Taiwanese
children on a version of the trolley problem that required them to choose
between saving family and friends, saving a stranger, or saving a
nonhuman animal. Not surprisingly, for all groups, “it was preferable to
save the humans at the expense of the nonhumans, and kin and friends at
the expense of strangers”.531
The evolutionary approach to cross-cultural diversity in moral values
provides a broader framework for – and potentially incorporates –
existing accounts, which tend to focus exclusively on historical
descriptions of local conventional solutions to coordination problems (or
assume that all differences or changes are the product thereof).
In summary, by providing more specific predictions about the contents of
moral psychology, and by providing a broader integrated framework in
which research can take place, the evolutionary approach promises to
bring moral psychology into the 21st century, and vastly increase our
understanding of how human moral sentiments work.
Re-evaluating morality
Once we have the full circuit diagram of moral sentiments, we will be in a
position to: a) examine the extent to which human moral sentiments
(continue to) constitute optimal solutions to collective actions problems;
and, to the extent that they fall short, b) to design interventions –
education, incentives, institutions, policies – to make up the difference.
Adaptationist theorising has a role to play here also. Remember that
adaptationists begin by deriving optimal or evolutionary stable solutions
to adaptive problems, and then proceed to use these ‘ideal solutions’ to
                                                 
531 O'Neill and Petrinovich, 1998, p363. The article goes on to review a number of similar
findings by other researchers.
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guide the search for actual adaptations. But as well as being of heuristic
value, these ‘ideal solutions’ can provide a benchmark against which to
evaluate the performance of particular adaptations.
Evolutionists expect adaptations to fall short of any theoretical optimal
solution for a variety of reasons. Natural selection cannot wipe the slate
clean and redesign adaptations from scratch; it can work only with the
available genetic variation; there are always trade-offs to be made
between the demands of different adaptations; and so on.532 But perhaps
most relevant to assessing human moral sentiments is the problem of
‘time lag’: some adaptations designed to solve collective-action problems
in the Pleistocene may not provide the best guides for solving collective-
action problems in the modern world. As the moral philosopher Henry
Sidgwick observed: “however completely adapted the moral instincts of
community may be at some particular time to its conditions of existence,
any rapid change of circumstances would tend to derange the adaptation,
from survival of instincts formerly useful, which through this change
become useless or pernicious.”533
Biotechnology provides one possible example of the way in which ancient
moral psychology fails to cope with the modern world. Steven Pinker has
argued that our attributions of agency – sometimes articulated as a ghost
in the machine – may work well for negotiating social relationships most
of the time. But this intuition seems incapable of resolving the problems
generated by modern medicine and reproductive biotechnologies, such as
abortion, euthanasia, cloning, animal rights, environmental degradation
and so on – or rather, it makes decisions about whether to permit certain
activities turn on such arcane issues as “At what point does the soul enter
the body?” A proper understanding of the nature of moral intuitions may
lead us to reframe the problem, or more radically, question whether the
issue really is a moral one and not merely an example of a ‘false positive’.
                                                 
532 Dawkins, 1982, Ch. 3.
533 Sidgwick, 1962, p465.
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We might conclude that ‘bioethics’ consists of the range of problems that
our moral intuitions are incapable of solving.534
International relations may provide another example. Revenge and
honour may have been necessary to secure order in small bands of
hunter-gatherers armed only with sticks and stones; but is it still a good
rule to use in populations of billions armed with ICBMs, anthrax and
dirty bombs? The point is not to prejudge the issue. Natural selection has
had several million years ‘research and design’ experience of building
systems of ethical rules, and moral philosophers have a lot to learn from
it. Perhaps the problem of international order in the modern world is
sufficiently similar to the problem of order in prehistory for revenge to
continue to be a good strategy, at least as good as the proposed
alternatives. The point is that we cannot simply assume that this is the
case because it feels right.
Once we have identified the ways in which our moral sentiments let us
down, and assuming that we nevertheless want to promote cooperation,
we can proceed with proposals for novel interventions to make up the
difference. Peter Singer has suggested that, in the distant future, it may be
possible to genetically modify morality, “so that instead of living in
societies constrained by our evolutionary origins, we can build the kind
of society we judge best”.535 Less drastically, we might engage in the more
familiar practice of attempting to design incentives and institutions that
artificially extend and sustain evolutionarily-novel levels of human
cooperation.536
A curious but inevitable result of this re-examination of our moral
sentiments is that, as Michael Ruse notes, once we recognise that ancient
moral rules may not be “the ideal strategy for long-term survival and
reproduction in an era of high technology” it could become the case that
                                                 
534 Pinker, 2002, pp223-9.
535 Singer, 1999.
536 I hesitate to give ‘a’ footnote to the concept of policy-making. But the following represent the
best recent general accounts of using game theory to design policy in the light of evolutionarily-
informed accounts of human nature: Binmore, 1994a; Binmore, 1994b; Popper, 1945; Posner,
1981; Rawls, 1971. More specifically, see: Crawford and Salmon, 2004.
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we “owe it to our children to be immoral". Or, in other words, "a better
understanding of biology might incline us to go against morality".537
What’s more, if policy-makers suggest novel ways of tackling social
problems that depart from our evolved intuitions, the proposed solutions
might strike us, intuitively, as non-moral or, in some cases, immoral.538
That, after all, is exactly what we should expect. There is an analogy here
with human dietary preferences. Our evolved tastes for sugars, salts and
fats were good guides in ancestral conditions; but they no longer work as
intended in a world where these foods are abundant. Given our desire to
be attractive, and to live long healthy lives, we try to overcome these
preferences. Nutritionists can prescribe a healthier diet than can our
beleaguered taste buds, but we shouldn’t expect the new diet to taste as
good. It is a moot point whether you would want to call this new set of
rules ‘moral’, any more than the new diet is ‘tasty’.
Incidentally, the project outlined in this chapter – of first arriving at an
accurate description of our evolved moral sentiments, and then assessing
them according to ‘optimal’ cooperative strategies – is in many ways
similar to John Rawls’ view of moral philosophy. First, Rawls accepts the
view that human moral sentiments are the product of evolution by
natural selection. Rawls writes: “The theory of evolution would suggest
that [human moral psychology] is the outcome of natural selection; the
capacity for a sense of justice and the moral feelings is an adaptation of
mankind to its place in nature".539 Referring to Triver’s paper on
reciprocal altruism, Rawls adds: "We can also see how the system of
moral feelings might evolve as inclinations supporting the natural duties
and as stabilizing mechanisms for just schemes."540 Second, Rawls argues
that the first job of the moral philosopher is to accurately describe human
moral faculties. Rawls writes: "[O]ne may think of moral philosophy at
first . . . as the attempt to describe our moral capacity; or, in the present
case, one may regard a theory of justice as describing our sense of
                                                 
537 Ruse, 1995, p256, p283.
538 “[A] scientific ethics might be equally counter-intuitive.” Collier and Stingl, 1993, p59,
539 Rawls, 1971, p503.
540 Rawls, 1971, p504.
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justice."541 Rawls regards the problem of describing our sense of justice as
equivalent to the problem, in linguistics, of describing “the sense of
grammaticalness that we have for the sentences of our native
language”.542 Third, Rawls sets up a model of ideal cooperation – through
the apparatus of ‘the original position’ – that can be used to evaluate our
moral intuitions and political institutions. Rawls suggests that we should
be willing to revise our intuitions and institutions in order to bring them
into line with the rules generated by the model (a process he called
‘reflective equilibrium’).543
Conclusion: pastures new
David Hume’s contribution to moral philosophy consists not of a
particular psychological theory, but in his ‘bold conjecture’ that morality
is a part of the natural world, and can be studied using the tools of
natural science. With this move, moral philosophy ceased to consist of a
profusion of mysteries, and became instead a series of problems.
This thesis has presented some of the progress that has been made on
these problems since Hume’s day. We have seen how recent advances in
evolutionary biology, game theory, animal behaviour, decision-making,
and neuro-imaging have shed new light on the mechanisms underlying
human moral reasoning and moral behaviour. Evidence from all these
sources suggests that human psychology is in part composed of a suite of
"adaptations for cooperation" – including adaptations for caring for kin,
for coordinating behaviour with others, for making and enforcing
                                                 
541 Rawls, 1971, p46.
542 Rawls, 1971, p47.
543 If morality consists of a suite of decision rules, then it should be possible to program them into
a computer or to include them among the control-systems of robots. This has already happened in
a relatively simple way in the context of artificial-life and evolutionary game theory, where
different strategies for playing nonzero-sum games are let loose to compete and cooperate with
one another. But in time we should be able to program a computer with a more comprehensive
repertoire of human moral sentiments. Danielson, 1992; May, et al., 1996. Such a computer
would provide a novel way for us to test our theories of the content and organisation of moral
psychology, in much the same way that artificial intelligence in general has been a proving
ground for philosophy of mind: Harvey, 2000. Such a computer program could form the basis of
a ‘Moral Turing Test’, or a cybernetic version of Rawl’s reflective equilibrium. We would know
that we had the theories correct if we couldn’t distinguish the computer’s answers to our moral
questions from the answers given by a human, or if the output of the program meshed with our
moral intuitions.
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agreements, for detecting and punishing cheats, and for settling disputes
peacefully. This thesis has argued that these adaptations for cooperation
constitute what have been referred to as "human moral sentiments" –
sentiments such as maternal love, sympathy, shame, trust, revenge, guilt,
and magnanimity – and showed that this evolutionary approach to
human morality makes sense of, and has the potential to incorporate, a
wide variety of traditional positions in moral philosophy. In this chapter,
I have looked at some of the problems that remain, at some of the novel
problems that this approach to morality generates, and considered how
scientists and philosophers might go about solving them.
This exciting approach to morality promises to be a rewarding non-zero
sum game for all those willing and able to participate.
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Appendix 1: How to build an animal
Figure 1: A simple animal
The ‘cups’ at the top of the diagram are photo-detectors. They are linked
to the square ‘motors’ at the bottom. Assume that blue light falling on the
detectors activates the motor(s) indicated by the crossed lines; and that
red light activates the motor(s) indicated by the straight lines. Assume
also that if both circuits are activated, the red circuit takes priority over
the blue. You now have a mobile system that will turn and move towards
blue objects, and that will turn away from red objects. For example, a blue
light source in the top left hand corner of the page will activate the right-
hand motor, causing the system to turn towards the blue light. At the
point at which both detectors are activated equally the system moves
directly towards the source of the blue light. (Adapted from Brooks,
1999.)
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Figure 2: A control model for the courtship of the smooth newt
(Holland, O. and D. McFarland (2001). Artificial Ethology. Oxford, OUP,
p10.)
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Appendix 2: Nonzero-sum games
Table 1: The principal categories of nonzero-sum games
Coordination Prisoner's dilemma
A B A B
A 1, 1 0, 0 A 2, 2 0, 3
B 0, 0 1, 1 B 3, 0 1, 1
Chicken
A B
A 2, 2 1, 3
B 3, 1 0, 0
Table 2: Coordination games
Simple coordination Division of labour
A B A B
A 1, 1 0, 0 A 0, 0 1, 1
B 0, 0 1, 1 B 1, 1 0, 0
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Table 3: Prisoner's dilemmas544
Prisoner's dilemma Prisoner's dilemma 
C D C D
C R, R S, T C 1, 1 -1, 2
D T, S P, P D 2, -1 0, 0
Repeated Assurance
C D C D
C R+wdR, R+wdR S+wdP, T+wdP C 2, 2 -1, 1
D T+wdP, S+wdP P+wdP, P+wdP D 1, -1 0, 0
Table 4: Hawk-Dove/Chicken
Hawk-Dove Hawk-Dove (V<c)
D H D H
D V/2, V/2 0, V D 2, 2 0, 4
H V, 0 (V-c)/2, (V-c)/2 H 4, 0 -1, -1
                                                 
544 A game is a prisoner's dilemma if T>R>P>S, and R>(S+T)/2. A hawk-dove game in which
V>c is also a prisoner's dilemma Dixit and Skeath, 1999, p341.
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Appendix 3: An overview of research on human adaptations
for cooperation
Genetic Hormonal Develop-
mental
Neuro-
logical
Behavioural Anthropo-
logical
Kinship Hrdy,
1999;
Panksepp,
2000
Platek,
2003
Platek, et al.,
2002
Brown,
1991; Daly
and
Wilson,
1988
Coordination
to mutual
advantage
Grimes,
2003
Baron-
Cohen,
1995;
Hoffman,
2001;
Pinker,
1994
Baron-
Cohen,
1995;
Decety
and
Chaminad
e, 2002;
Pinker,
1994
Baron-Cohen,
1995
Brown,
1991
Reciprocity Rilling, et
al., 2002;
Stone, et
al., 1997;
Stone, et
al., 2002
Cosmides
and Tooby,
1981; Frank,
1988; Price, et
al., 2002
Brown,
1991
Conflict
resolution
(CA)
Mazur and
Booth,
1998;
Miller,
2000a
Blair, 1997 Miller, 2000a Brown,
1991;
Miller,
2000a
Conflict
resolution
(UA)
Kahneman,
et al., 1982
Brown,
1991;
Wilson
and Daly,
1992
Other (Sex,
disgust)
Lieberman
, et al.,
2003
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